Very few people are doing the specific class of work being discussed, i.e. transmissibility enhancement of worrying influenza viruses. And work with these most worrying influenzas needs to be in a BSL-4 lab, and the US only has room for a couple hundred workers total across all of those labs—and most are doing other things.
Cool, in that case the lower ends of the interval seem plausible, though 0.6% is pushing it (you’d expect ~1 US-originating pandemic per year, which seems pretty inconsistent with observations).
Yes, I think the rates he quoted are obviously high—mostly because it ignores that most lab accidents don’t cause infections, and most infections don’t lead to spread. As we documented.
It’s a hard estimation problem, but as a rough estimate, I’m comfortable with it being at least an order of magnitude lower than the Lipsitch and Inglesby paper, per lab worker—and that estimate is only relevant for those people working on enhancing these specific high risk pathogens, which is very few of the total number in these labs. Because even in BSL-4 labs, most people are doing things that can’t create enhanced diseases. And of those doing enhancement, many are working with Anthrax, which isn’t transmissible, or with one of the various hemorrhagic fevers that can’t spread undetected, which could cause a breakout but almost certainly not a pandemic.
Very few people are doing the specific class of work being discussed, i.e. transmissibility enhancement of worrying influenza viruses. And work with these most worrying influenzas needs to be in a BSL-4 lab, and the US only has room for a couple hundred workers total across all of those labs—and most are doing other things.
Cool, in that case the lower ends of the interval seem plausible, though 0.6% is pushing it (you’d expect ~1 US-originating pandemic per year, which seems pretty inconsistent with observations).
Yes, I think the rates he quoted are obviously high—mostly because it ignores that most lab accidents don’t cause infections, and most infections don’t lead to spread. As we documented.
Do you have an idea of what numbers you would consider more reasonable?
It’s a hard estimation problem, but as a rough estimate, I’m comfortable with it being at least an order of magnitude lower than the Lipsitch and Inglesby paper, per lab worker—and that estimate is only relevant for those people working on enhancing these specific high risk pathogens, which is very few of the total number in these labs. Because even in BSL-4 labs, most people are doing things that can’t create enhanced diseases. And of those doing enhancement, many are working with Anthrax, which isn’t transmissible, or with one of the various hemorrhagic fevers that can’t spread undetected, which could cause a breakout but almost certainly not a pandemic.