It’s a hard estimation problem, but as a rough estimate, I’m comfortable with it being at least an order of magnitude lower than the Lipsitch and Inglesby paper, per lab worker—and that estimate is only relevant for those people working on enhancing these specific high risk pathogens, which is very few of the total number in these labs. Because even in BSL-4 labs, most people are doing things that can’t create enhanced diseases. And of those doing enhancement, many are working with Anthrax, which isn’t transmissible, or with one of the various hemorrhagic fevers that can’t spread undetected, which could cause a breakout but almost certainly not a pandemic.
Do you have an idea of what numbers you would consider more reasonable?
It’s a hard estimation problem, but as a rough estimate, I’m comfortable with it being at least an order of magnitude lower than the Lipsitch and Inglesby paper, per lab worker—and that estimate is only relevant for those people working on enhancing these specific high risk pathogens, which is very few of the total number in these labs. Because even in BSL-4 labs, most people are doing things that can’t create enhanced diseases. And of those doing enhancement, many are working with Anthrax, which isn’t transmissible, or with one of the various hemorrhagic fevers that can’t spread undetected, which could cause a breakout but almost certainly not a pandemic.