I bite this bullet: personal identity is a lie—I am a collective of many distinct algorithms
Whilst this is true, it is in the interest of each of those algorithms to reciprocally unify with others, as opposed to continually struggling for control of the person in question.
It’s not clear to me that my subpersonal algorithms have the ability to enforce reciprocity well enough, or to reflectively alter themselves with enough control to even make an attempt at unification. Certainly parts of me attempt to modify other parts in an attempt to do so, but that’s really more conquest than reciprocity (a conquest “I” pursue, but still clearly conquest).
Unification is a nice theory, but is there any reason to think it’s possible for subpersonal evaluation mechanisms any more than it is for interpersonal resource sharing?
I don’t understand the point you;re making here. Can you spell it out for me in more detail? Thanks.
My point is simply that it is better for each facet of a person if all the facets agree to unify with each other more, to the point where the person is fully unified and never in conflict with itself.
...this glosses over the concept of the individual.
This misses the mark, I think. Here’s a mutation:
“It is in interest of each and every cell to unify (coordinate) more with other cells, so this glosses over the concept of the organism.”
The coordination of cells is what allows us to speak of an organism as a whole. I won’t go so far as to declare that co-ordination of agents justifies the concept of the individual, but I do think the idea expressed in the parent is more wrong than right.
Whilst this is true, it is in the interest of each of those algorithms to reciprocally unify with others, as opposed to continually struggling for control of the person in question.
Very good point, though.
It’s not clear to me that my subpersonal algorithms have the ability to enforce reciprocity well enough, or to reflectively alter themselves with enough control to even make an attempt at unification. Certainly parts of me attempt to modify other parts in an attempt to do so, but that’s really more conquest than reciprocity (a conquest “I” pursue, but still clearly conquest).
Unification is a nice theory, but is there any reason to think it’s possible for subpersonal evaluation mechanisms any more than it is for interpersonal resource sharing?
It is in interest of each and every agent to unify (coordinate) more with other agents, so this glosses over the concept of the individual.
I don’t understand the point you;re making here. Can you spell it out for me in more detail? Thanks.
My point is simply that it is better for each facet of a person if all the facets agree to unify with each other more, to the point where the person is fully unified and never in conflict with itself.
This misses the mark, I think. Here’s a mutation:
“It is in interest of each and every cell to unify (coordinate) more with other cells, so this glosses over the concept of the organism.”
The coordination of cells is what allows us to speak of an organism as a whole. I won’t go so far as to declare that co-ordination of agents justifies the concept of the individual, but I do think the idea expressed in the parent is more wrong than right.