I’m merely against the idea that anyone has a “right” over the thoughts of others, or a right to not have their feelings hurt
I agree with the first part—that’s pretty obvious from any common conception of rights—it’s very hard to support rights about thoughts simultaneously with any right to liberty.
Of course, it wasn’t central to the complaint. The main issue is that we might be driving people away, and there are at least a few people for whom it is true.
Here, we should be talking about how to disconnect our buttons, rather than how to insist that other people stop pushing them.
I disagree. If you take away the ‘buttons’, there isn’t much left. While of course rationality for AIs is relevant here, most of the discussion should be about rationality implemented in humans. And while there are some who think rationality requires denying what it is to be human, I would not be among them.
It’s very hard to support rights about thoughts simultaneously with any right to liberty.
In the thread which Alicorn objects to, she makes precisely this argument. Her entire premise is based on a notion of such rights, although she conveniently doesn’t mention it in this post.
And while there are some who think rationality requires denying what it is to be human, I would not be among them.
Arguing that bad feelings give meaning to life or contrast to the good feelings is precisely the same as arguing for death giving meaning to life or contrast to living.
Research has already established that positive and negative feelings are not inherently-linked opposites; in fact, they’re largely independent of each other. (It should also be trivially obvious in practice that we can enjoy something without feeling deprived by its absence or reverse. I can enjoy sunny weather without being hurt by it raining, for example.)
Her entire premise is based on a notion of such rights
No. While a notion of such rights is certainly something she’s mentioned believing in, that’s not central to the question of whether it’s warranted to object to such language. I, for instance, do not hold any such notion of rights, and yet raise the same objection.
Arguing that bad feelings give meaning to life or contrast to the good feelings is precisely the same as arguing for death giving meaning to life or contrast to living.
My first reaction is “no, it’s not”, which suggests to me that I’m misreading you.
I’m not sure I’d argue that “bad” feelings give “meaning” to life (I’d generally consider that a category mistake, as life isn’t the sort of thing with a meaning). However, “bad” feelings are a part of what it is to be human. I’m not particularly interested in specifically accumulating “positive” feelings, so I don’t think the rest of your comment applies.
That death is a part of being human is certainly not something to be discarded out of hand. There is indeed a tension in our nature between the need to preserve ourselves and the facticity of our deaths. Acknowledging this does not entail insisting on people dying, though.
My first reaction is “no, it’s not”, which suggests to me that I’m misreading you.
I would be most illuminated if you would share a justification in favor of having ongoing bad feelings (as opposed to a momentary notification of a possible problem), that does not also work as a justification in favor of death.
If one is in a continuing bad situation, a persistent bad feeling encourages one to search for the persistent factor.
Really? Has it been your experience that persistent bad feelings actually motivate you to change something? In my experience, and in the experience of my clients, a persistent bad feeling is usually an alternative to actually doing something about a problem. You want to talk about anosognosiac self-deception? Try bad feelings. It’s very easy to deceive yourself into thinking that, say, worrying about work somehow counts the same as working.
People who feel bad don’t want to do anything except stop the bad feeling (or in some cases, wallow in it), and the most expedient ways to stop most bad feelings usually do nothing to resolve the problem that created the bad feeling in the first place.
In short, bad feelings do not prime constructive behaviors. Good feelings do.
It’s very suspect on the surface that you say people “don’t want to do anything except stop the bad feeling” followed by (paraphrasing) “except when it’s the exact opposite.”
While it seems that people in persistent bad situations often get nothing out of their stress and suffering but additional health problems, I think we’d have even worse failure modes if we really only reacted emotionally to changes in circumstance, and were unable to sustain persistent (dis)satisfaction with our present state. I mean this as a statement about our possible evolutionary “design”, not about what’s theoretically possible.
I feel oddly like you didn’t read the rest of my comment. Are we talking past each other again?
The simplest justification is that they are ‘uniquely human’, a part of our nature and the human experience. All justifications must follow from what we are, or else what are they to rest on?
On the face of it, this serves as a justification for death. However, death is a one-off problem whose removal would hardly impact the nature and character of one’s life. Removing ‘bad’ feelings would entail scraping out a decent-sized chunk of what it is to be a human.
And don’t think the problem of death is so easily solved.
Removing ‘bad’ feelings would entail scraping out a decent-sized chunk of what it is to be a human.
So, if I were to never become depressed again, I’m no longer a human? That doesn’t make any sense to me.
Bear in mind, I’m not proposing Superhappy-ness. I’m simply saying that after the initial moment of pain or sorrow or frustration or grief or embarrassment or whatever, the utility of that feeling being continued drops off dramatically. And if something bothers you emotionally for, say, an hour (let alone frequently) the odds are good that you are wasting your time. (And yes, that does mean I’ve been doing a bit of time-wasting here recently.)
Unless I’m misunderstanding ‘utility’ as you’re using it here, it seems like you’re begging the question. To say that “bad feelings don’t serve utility” doesn’t really seem to be saying much at all; this is part of why I felt the need to put scare quotes around ‘bad’ above—bad feelings are by definition bad.
The simplest justification is that they are ‘uniquely human’, a part of our nature and the human experience. All justifications must follow from what we are, or else what are they to rest on?
That isn’t even remotely a justification for actually having bad feelings.
You didn’t show where I was begging the question, or was that not what you meant to imply above?
While I’m not sure formalism is the right way to go, let’s try it:
.1. ‘Bad’ feelings are part of what it is to be uniquely human.
.2. Our standards for what is good/acceptable flow from our nature.
.3. By 2, any standard of the good that runs counter to our nature is not a good standard. .4. By 3 and 1, a standard of the good that considers ‘bad’ feelings to be bad is not a good standard.
Perhaps not the most helpful way of putting it, but hopefully that works. Any sign of a fallacy there? (note: ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ is not an acceptable answer)
Bad feelings are not unique to humans, so how are they “uniquely” human? And even if they were, why is being “uniquely human” all that’s required for something to be good?
Why does that mean our standards are actually good?
Our nature includes violence, so by this argument, violence is a good standard.
I didn’t say being “uniquely human” is all that’s required for something to be good—rather, that discarding such things entirely is certainly bad. “Uniquely human” was supposed to be evocative—if it doesn’t work for you, use “part of our nature” instead; it is probably more precise. ETA: though ‘nature’ is its own can of worms
To be clearer, what is actually good flows from our nature, so a correct standard for determining what is good will bear that in mind.
No, by this argument, a standard of the good that excludes violence is a bad standard. I agree that violence is a valued part of the human condition.
I didn’t say being “uniquely human” is all that’s required for something to be good—rather, that discarding such things entirely is certainly bad.
Having a bad back is uniquely human, too, as are male pattern baldness and HIV. Is discarding these things “certainly bad”?
I also notice you haven’t actually corrected the begging-the-question problem: you still haven’t established that bad feelings belong to the class of “uniquely human”, and you certainly haven’t established that being uniquely human is good.
If you go with “part of our nature” instead, then it’s also part of our nature to be stupid and irrational, biased and fallacious. Shall we not discard those either?
And of course, you’re still begging the question of why “part of our nature” equals “certainly bad” to “discard”. Sickness is part of our nature; shall we not cure it? Must we linger in ill health for as long as our ancestors, instead of getting well more quickly?
If not, how is it different from getting over a bad emotion more quickly?
Your #2 is even more disappointing—“what is actually good flows from our nature”—WTF? That’s as much begging the question as saying there must be a God because he’s good, and all the good we have in the world must therefore flow from His love. You’re just babbling here, not making a case for anything. It’s good because good flows from our nature, and our nature is good because discarding it is bad? Perhaps it contains a dormative principle, too?
“what is actually good flows from our nature”… [is] begging the question
I wasn’t aware we were arguing metaethics at that level here, so a charge of begging the question seems entirely out of line.
That what is good comes from the sort of thing that one is, is not all that controversial. It’s actually one thing I didn’t have to explain or defend at all in my thesis on ethics, but as always your panel may vary. Let’s go through a few candidate explanations of the good:
The good is objective, and based on universal principles; it’s pure chance that we care about what’s good
The good is objective, and based on universal principles; we care about what’s good because our observations about the good track reality
The good is objective and relative; what is good for a human is based on what it is to be human
The good is subjective; what is good as far as I’m concerned is not based on any facts about the universe other than some human’s say-so
I’m leaving out explanations of the good such as Divine Command Theory and Ethical Nihilism since I assume you wouldn’t buy into them anyway.
In each of these cases, what is good comes from what it is to be human. Our nature is the grounding of value, and to ignore a major part of our nature is sure to lead one astray when seeking out the good.
Did you have another idea in mind for what constitutes goodness?
That’s as much begging the question as saying there must be a God because he’s good, and all the good we have in the world must therefore flow from His love.
That’s not begging the question either, though I suppose it might be if it was stated more clearly. Does anyone actually argue that, anyway?
It’s good because good flows from our nature, and our nature is good because discarding it is bad?
No. I did not argue that our nature is good. That would indeed seem circular.
And of course, you’re still begging the question of why “part of our nature” equals “certainly bad” to “discard”.
Sorry, were you using ‘begging the question’ in the colloquial sense this whole time? I’d assumed not, since you referred to Aristotle. If not, please point out where I’d initially set out to prove that “part of our nature” equals “certainly bad” to “discard”. I’d initially used (something like) that as a premise and not my conclusion!
If you see what I’m doing as “just babbling” then I don’t see how you even have anything to argue against. You’re being disingenuous, at best. That I’m taking fairly standard philosophical views and arguing using logic should not equate to “just babbling”.
That what is good comes from the sort of thing that one is, is not all that controversial.
But since that’s precisely the thing we’re arguing about, to present it as your premise is begging the question, per the definition I quoted.
In addition to that, it’s not even relevant. I could equally say, “what is bad comes from the sort of thing that one is”, and use this to prove that we should discard bad feelings. So stating it isn’t actually reducing the original problem in any way.
That I’m taking fairly standard philosophical views and arguing using logic should not equate to “just babbling”.
Actually, given most philosophy I’ve seen, I’d say that’d be a pretty fair assessment. ;-)
You most certainly were begging the question. From Wikipedia (quoting Aristotle):
“Begging the question” can also refer to making an argument in which the premise “is different from the conclusion … but is controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion.
You asserted that one class of thing was good because another class of thing was good, while failing to either establish that the class was good, or even that the thing in question was a member of that class.
I agree with the first part—that’s pretty obvious from any common conception of rights—it’s very hard to support rights about thoughts simultaneously with any right to liberty.
Of course, it wasn’t central to the complaint. The main issue is that we might be driving people away, and there are at least a few people for whom it is true.
I disagree. If you take away the ‘buttons’, there isn’t much left. While of course rationality for AIs is relevant here, most of the discussion should be about rationality implemented in humans. And while there are some who think rationality requires denying what it is to be human, I would not be among them.
Whether this is a problem depends on the people being driven away, and why.
In the thread which Alicorn objects to, she makes precisely this argument. Her entire premise is based on a notion of such rights, although she conveniently doesn’t mention it in this post.
Arguing that bad feelings give meaning to life or contrast to the good feelings is precisely the same as arguing for death giving meaning to life or contrast to living.
Research has already established that positive and negative feelings are not inherently-linked opposites; in fact, they’re largely independent of each other. (It should also be trivially obvious in practice that we can enjoy something without feeling deprived by its absence or reverse. I can enjoy sunny weather without being hurt by it raining, for example.)
No. While a notion of such rights is certainly something she’s mentioned believing in, that’s not central to the question of whether it’s warranted to object to such language. I, for instance, do not hold any such notion of rights, and yet raise the same objection.
My first reaction is “no, it’s not”, which suggests to me that I’m misreading you.
I’m not sure I’d argue that “bad” feelings give “meaning” to life (I’d generally consider that a category mistake, as life isn’t the sort of thing with a meaning). However, “bad” feelings are a part of what it is to be human. I’m not particularly interested in specifically accumulating “positive” feelings, so I don’t think the rest of your comment applies.
That death is a part of being human is certainly not something to be discarded out of hand. There is indeed a tension in our nature between the need to preserve ourselves and the facticity of our deaths. Acknowledging this does not entail insisting on people dying, though.
I would be most illuminated if you would share a justification in favor of having ongoing bad feelings (as opposed to a momentary notification of a possible problem), that does not also work as a justification in favor of death.
If one is in a continuing bad situation, a persistent bad feeling encourages one to search for the persistent factor.
Really? Has it been your experience that persistent bad feelings actually motivate you to change something? In my experience, and in the experience of my clients, a persistent bad feeling is usually an alternative to actually doing something about a problem. You want to talk about anosognosiac self-deception? Try bad feelings. It’s very easy to deceive yourself into thinking that, say, worrying about work somehow counts the same as working.
People who feel bad don’t want to do anything except stop the bad feeling (or in some cases, wallow in it), and the most expedient ways to stop most bad feelings usually do nothing to resolve the problem that created the bad feeling in the first place.
In short, bad feelings do not prime constructive behaviors. Good feelings do.
It’s very suspect on the surface that you say people “don’t want to do anything except stop the bad feeling” followed by (paraphrasing) “except when it’s the exact opposite.”
While it seems that people in persistent bad situations often get nothing out of their stress and suffering but additional health problems, I think we’d have even worse failure modes if we really only reacted emotionally to changes in circumstance, and were unable to sustain persistent (dis)satisfaction with our present state. I mean this as a statement about our possible evolutionary “design”, not about what’s theoretically possible.
I feel oddly like you didn’t read the rest of my comment. Are we talking past each other again?
The simplest justification is that they are ‘uniquely human’, a part of our nature and the human experience. All justifications must follow from what we are, or else what are they to rest on?
On the face of it, this serves as a justification for death. However, death is a one-off problem whose removal would hardly impact the nature and character of one’s life. Removing ‘bad’ feelings would entail scraping out a decent-sized chunk of what it is to be a human.
And don’t think the problem of death is so easily solved.
So, if I were to never become depressed again, I’m no longer a human? That doesn’t make any sense to me.
Bear in mind, I’m not proposing Superhappy-ness. I’m simply saying that after the initial moment of pain or sorrow or frustration or grief or embarrassment or whatever, the utility of that feeling being continued drops off dramatically. And if something bothers you emotionally for, say, an hour (let alone frequently) the odds are good that you are wasting your time. (And yes, that does mean I’ve been doing a bit of time-wasting here recently.)
Unless I’m misunderstanding ‘utility’ as you’re using it here, it seems like you’re begging the question. To say that “bad feelings don’t serve utility” doesn’t really seem to be saying much at all; this is part of why I felt the need to put scare quotes around ‘bad’ above—bad feelings are by definition bad.
Pot, meet kettle. ;-)
If you’re going to accuse me of committing a logical fallacy, please do me the service of doing so explicitly, and pointing out where it happened.
Here:
That isn’t even remotely a justification for actually having bad feelings.
You didn’t show where I was begging the question, or was that not what you meant to imply above?
While I’m not sure formalism is the right way to go, let’s try it:
.1. ‘Bad’ feelings are part of what it is to be uniquely human.
.2. Our standards for what is good/acceptable flow from our nature.
.3. By 2, any standard of the good that runs counter to our nature is not a good standard.
.4. By 3 and 1, a standard of the good that considers ‘bad’ feelings to be bad is not a good standard.
Perhaps not the most helpful way of putting it, but hopefully that works. Any sign of a fallacy there? (note: ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ is not an acceptable answer)
Bad feelings are not unique to humans, so how are they “uniquely” human? And even if they were, why is being “uniquely human” all that’s required for something to be good?
Why does that mean our standards are actually good?
Our nature includes violence, so by this argument, violence is a good standard.
I didn’t say being “uniquely human” is all that’s required for something to be good—rather, that discarding such things entirely is certainly bad. “Uniquely human” was supposed to be evocative—if it doesn’t work for you, use “part of our nature” instead; it is probably more precise. ETA: though ‘nature’ is its own can of worms
To be clearer, what is actually good flows from our nature, so a correct standard for determining what is good will bear that in mind.
No, by this argument, a standard of the good that excludes violence is a bad standard. I agree that violence is a valued part of the human condition.
Having a bad back is uniquely human, too, as are male pattern baldness and HIV. Is discarding these things “certainly bad”?
I also notice you haven’t actually corrected the begging-the-question problem: you still haven’t established that bad feelings belong to the class of “uniquely human”, and you certainly haven’t established that being uniquely human is good.
If you go with “part of our nature” instead, then it’s also part of our nature to be stupid and irrational, biased and fallacious. Shall we not discard those either?
And of course, you’re still begging the question of why “part of our nature” equals “certainly bad” to “discard”. Sickness is part of our nature; shall we not cure it? Must we linger in ill health for as long as our ancestors, instead of getting well more quickly?
If not, how is it different from getting over a bad emotion more quickly?
Your #2 is even more disappointing—“what is actually good flows from our nature”—WTF? That’s as much begging the question as saying there must be a God because he’s good, and all the good we have in the world must therefore flow from His love. You’re just babbling here, not making a case for anything. It’s good because good flows from our nature, and our nature is good because discarding it is bad? Perhaps it contains a dormative principle, too?
I wasn’t aware we were arguing metaethics at that level here, so a charge of begging the question seems entirely out of line.
That what is good comes from the sort of thing that one is, is not all that controversial. It’s actually one thing I didn’t have to explain or defend at all in my thesis on ethics, but as always your panel may vary. Let’s go through a few candidate explanations of the good:
The good is objective, and based on universal principles; it’s pure chance that we care about what’s good
The good is objective, and based on universal principles; we care about what’s good because our observations about the good track reality
The good is objective and relative; what is good for a human is based on what it is to be human
The good is subjective; what is good as far as I’m concerned is not based on any facts about the universe other than some human’s say-so
I’m leaving out explanations of the good such as Divine Command Theory and Ethical Nihilism since I assume you wouldn’t buy into them anyway.
In each of these cases, what is good comes from what it is to be human. Our nature is the grounding of value, and to ignore a major part of our nature is sure to lead one astray when seeking out the good.
Did you have another idea in mind for what constitutes goodness?
That’s not begging the question either, though I suppose it might be if it was stated more clearly. Does anyone actually argue that, anyway?
No. I did not argue that our nature is good. That would indeed seem circular.
Sorry, were you using ‘begging the question’ in the colloquial sense this whole time? I’d assumed not, since you referred to Aristotle. If not, please point out where I’d initially set out to prove that “part of our nature” equals “certainly bad” to “discard”. I’d initially used (something like) that as a premise and not my conclusion!
If you see what I’m doing as “just babbling” then I don’t see how you even have anything to argue against. You’re being disingenuous, at best. That I’m taking fairly standard philosophical views and arguing using logic should not equate to “just babbling”.
But since that’s precisely the thing we’re arguing about, to present it as your premise is begging the question, per the definition I quoted.
In addition to that, it’s not even relevant. I could equally say, “what is bad comes from the sort of thing that one is”, and use this to prove that we should discard bad feelings. So stating it isn’t actually reducing the original problem in any way.
Actually, given most philosophy I’ve seen, I’d say that’d be a pretty fair assessment. ;-)
So then in your opinion, I didn’t commit a logical fallacy after all?
ETA: Or were you just changing the subject?
You most certainly were begging the question. From Wikipedia (quoting Aristotle):
You asserted that one class of thing was good because another class of thing was good, while failing to either establish that the class was good, or even that the thing in question was a member of that class.
While I disagree with your assessment, it’s clear at least that I did not make the argument clear to you, so more elaboration is above.