Most plausible explanations for a future great filter are logical facts, not empirical ones. The difficulty of surviving a transition through technological singularities, if it convergently causes non-colonization, is some logical fact, derivable by a sufficiently powerful mind. A tendency for advanced civilizations to “realize” that expansionism is pointless is a logical fact. I would argue that anthropic considerations should not move us on such logical facts.
These may be logical facts for a “sufficiently powerful mind”, but they are empirical facts to us. For that mind, there is no such thing as an empirical fact about our universe (except for recursive statements about itself), so any distrinction between empirical and logical facts is moot via this kind of argument.
These may be logical facts for a “sufficiently powerful mind”, but they are empirical facts to us. For that mind, there is no such thing as an empirical fact about our universe (except for recursive statements about itself), so any distinction between empirical and logical facts is moot via this kind of argument.
If the mind is initially implemented as a program in a computer, it will have to predict what it’ll observe at each subsequent moment, including when it leaves the initial implementation, only given its mathematical construction and not taking into account the previous observations. By creating two copies of such mind, I can introduce different observations to the copies, so that any constant expected observation won’t be correct.
Yes, I skated over that point (since it reinforces my argument against logical facts but wasn’t that relevant, I omitted it).
This corresponds to my current intuition about deterministic empirical facts—that a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actualy logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actually logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
Where the mind is in the world is a very important factor. Control scheme is given by a mapping from the controlling domain (the agent’s influence) to the controlled outcomes (where preference is defined, inducing preference on the controlling decisions). Taking the controlling domain out of the system makes control and preference meaningless.
For that mind, there is no such thing as an empirical fact about our universe
What about the initial quantum fluctuations that caused asymmetries that allowed matter to clump in the first place? What about the physical constants?
Would you mind if I elided that question by taking a step back, and questionning all definitions? Not for the fun of it, but just because I think we are arriving at a crucial point:
What, for us, is the distinction between a logical and an empirical fact?
Take, for instance, your sufficiently powerful mind (located in some sense outside the universe, or at least outside the causal flow of the question it is considering). You said that this mind can deduce, from first principles, that there is a great filter.
Is that claim empirical, or logical? In cannot be purely logical, for it will not be true in certain universes (such as those whose next instant is derived by hyper-computational means, for examples); so it has to have an empirical component (we see it to be true in our universe, somehow).
Hence we know, empirically, that a hypothetical mind will deduce, logically, the great filter. So, from our perpective, is the great filter logical or empirical?
It gets worse; the hypothetical mind has to know empirically, that it can deduce these facts logically, so even the second step is not purely logical. Then we can add that empirical deduction depends on certain logical facts about how deduction works, etc...
Even to return to the original question:
What about the initial quantum fluctuations that caused asymmetries that allowed matter to clump in the first place? What about the physical constants?
What if many-worlds is true? What if we live in a level X multiverse? You could say your location is an empirical fact, even in these worlds; but your location—and the fact you think about your location—is also a logical fact of the many-worlds/level X multiverse.
So a solid distinction between empirical and logical seems nebulous to me; I think we should at least start clearly defining these terms, before saying that certain facts lie in one category or the other.
And I haven’t even brought up the whole issue of our minds being (empirically known to be) imperfect and possibly mistaken about whether particular logical facts are true...
These may be logical facts for a “sufficiently powerful mind”, but they are empirical facts to us. For that mind, there is no such thing as an empirical fact about our universe (except for recursive statements about itself), so any distrinction between empirical and logical facts is moot via this kind of argument.
If the mind is initially implemented as a program in a computer, it will have to predict what it’ll observe at each subsequent moment, including when it leaves the initial implementation, only given its mathematical construction and not taking into account the previous observations. By creating two copies of such mind, I can introduce different observations to the copies, so that any constant expected observation won’t be correct.
Yes, I skated over that point (since it reinforces my argument against logical facts but wasn’t that relevant, I omitted it).
This corresponds to my current intuition about deterministic empirical facts—that a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actualy logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
Where the mind is in the world is a very important factor. Control scheme is given by a mapping from the controlling domain (the agent’s influence) to the controlled outcomes (where preference is defined, inducing preference on the controlling decisions). Taking the controlling domain out of the system makes control and preference meaningless.
What about the initial quantum fluctuations that caused asymmetries that allowed matter to clump in the first place? What about the physical constants?
Would you mind if I elided that question by taking a step back, and questionning all definitions? Not for the fun of it, but just because I think we are arriving at a crucial point:
What, for us, is the distinction between a logical and an empirical fact?
Take, for instance, your sufficiently powerful mind (located in some sense outside the universe, or at least outside the causal flow of the question it is considering). You said that this mind can deduce, from first principles, that there is a great filter.
Is that claim empirical, or logical? In cannot be purely logical, for it will not be true in certain universes (such as those whose next instant is derived by hyper-computational means, for examples); so it has to have an empirical component (we see it to be true in our universe, somehow).
Hence we know, empirically, that a hypothetical mind will deduce, logically, the great filter. So, from our perpective, is the great filter logical or empirical?
It gets worse; the hypothetical mind has to know empirically, that it can deduce these facts logically, so even the second step is not purely logical. Then we can add that empirical deduction depends on certain logical facts about how deduction works, etc...
Even to return to the original question:
What if many-worlds is true? What if we live in a level X multiverse? You could say your location is an empirical fact, even in these worlds; but your location—and the fact you think about your location—is also a logical fact of the many-worlds/level X multiverse.
So a solid distinction between empirical and logical seems nebulous to me; I think we should at least start clearly defining these terms, before saying that certain facts lie in one category or the other.
And I haven’t even brought up the whole issue of our minds being (empirically known to be) imperfect and possibly mistaken about whether particular logical facts are true...