These may be logical facts for a “sufficiently powerful mind”, but they are empirical facts to us. For that mind, there is no such thing as an empirical fact about our universe (except for recursive statements about itself), so any distinction between empirical and logical facts is moot via this kind of argument.
If the mind is initially implemented as a program in a computer, it will have to predict what it’ll observe at each subsequent moment, including when it leaves the initial implementation, only given its mathematical construction and not taking into account the previous observations. By creating two copies of such mind, I can introduce different observations to the copies, so that any constant expected observation won’t be correct.
Yes, I skated over that point (since it reinforces my argument against logical facts but wasn’t that relevant, I omitted it).
This corresponds to my current intuition about deterministic empirical facts—that a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actualy logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actually logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
Where the mind is in the world is a very important factor. Control scheme is given by a mapping from the controlling domain (the agent’s influence) to the controlled outcomes (where preference is defined, inducing preference on the controlling decisions). Taking the controlling domain out of the system makes control and preference meaningless.
If the mind is initially implemented as a program in a computer, it will have to predict what it’ll observe at each subsequent moment, including when it leaves the initial implementation, only given its mathematical construction and not taking into account the previous observations. By creating two copies of such mind, I can introduce different observations to the copies, so that any constant expected observation won’t be correct.
Yes, I skated over that point (since it reinforces my argument against logical facts but wasn’t that relevant, I omitted it).
This corresponds to my current intuition about deterministic empirical facts—that a mind running inside a program must treat as empirical certain facts, when they are actualy logical for a mind “outside the universe”.
Where the mind is in the world is a very important factor. Control scheme is given by a mapping from the controlling domain (the agent’s influence) to the controlled outcomes (where preference is defined, inducing preference on the controlling decisions). Taking the controlling domain out of the system makes control and preference meaningless.