“Well at least explain why you want the ice cream,” an increasingly frustrated Bryce may say. “You have to have a reason for it, right?”
“You just want me to give a reason?”
“Yeah, it doesn’t make sense to me.”
“The reason is it tastes good and will make me happy.”
“Those don’t seem like actual reasons to have ice cream specifically. If I find you something tasty but healthier, you’d have that instead, right?”
“Maybe? But I actually just want the ice cream right now.”
“Okay, but let’s look at this logically...”
This example seems like it’s not proving the point set out; Bryce doesn’t seem to be critiquing his partner’s desires for something that tastes good and makes her happy(her wants), but rather the action of buying ice cream that fulfills those goals. He’s assuming that she also shares a value/desire for good health(which I would say is a reasonable assumption for most people) and Bryce tries to lay out an alternate course of action that would fulfill all those values.
This seems like a specific instance of a broader issue throughout the post, which is that want is sometimes used to mean an intrinsic value and sometimes used to mean an instrumental value, making the treatment of both confused. Intrinsic/terminal values can’t be irrational, like you’ve said, but instrumental values certainly can be. If you have a terminal value of being happy and content in life, I would say that wanting money would be instrumentally irrational value/desire.
In the ice cream narrative above, Bryce is critiquing her instrumental values rather than her terminal values, and in theory I don’t see much wrong with that. If she explains her reasoning behind choosing ice cream as a terminal value and Bryce still rejects it, or if it turns out she just intrinsically values eating ice cream, then that is a problem for their relationship.
In fact, I think it’s the last two sentences that make the exchange problematic. It seems like she is expressing an illegible preference for ice cream that Bryce is just dismissing.
It is the case that Bryce is, ostensibly, just trying to help Ash fulfill their terminal goals while being healthier. The problem is that Bryce presumes that of the available action space, ice cream is fungible for something else that is healthier, and does not listen when Ash reasserts that ice cream itself is the thing they want.
Just because it is a safe bet that Ash will share the value/desire for good health does not mean Ash must prioritize good health in every action they take.
I also find the ice-cream example confusing because it’s your main example but it doesn’t seem like it supports your main points. For example replace Ash with a drug addict and ice cream with meth and Bryce suddenly looks like a hero trying to help his friend from making a big mistake.
I think the below example still makes Bryce look like how it seems you intended him to look even if it was talking about meth.
Ash: “Ooh, I want ice cream.” Bryce: “Seriously?” Ash: “Well, I’m not actually going to buy some, I just want some” Bryce: “That’s the problem. You know it’s not good for you. You should want to be eating healthy food” Ash: “I mean, yeah, but right now I just really feel like ice cream.” Bryce: “That’s stupid”
This is a good point, but the actual difference in the scenario is that ice cream is not meth ;P I think it is actually meaningful to notice that, while there may in fact be good reasons not to have ice cream, there are many, much stronger reasons not to do meth, and Bryce bringing those up are much more likely to dissuade Ash, and if they don’t, Ash is much more irrational if Ash chooses to do it anyway… but that choice is still independent from wanting meth.
Your version of Bryce is doing a less defensible thing, while mine is being more reasonable, while still being wrong, and I think that’s the important point I’m making.
So, I have to admit I’m still confused. Is the icecream example fairly unrelated to the introduction and first chapter? They seem to be talking mostly about pure qualia, while the ice-cream example is talking about actions.
I agree qualia is entirely disconnected from rationality, but I think anything beyond qualia such as actions or intending to take actions is rationality fair game so to speak. I don’t see an issue in Bryce assessing the rationality of Ash stopping for ice-cream, it was his communication/social skills that were lacking.
After reading your post very carefully, I think you are agreeing with the above, I just had the opposite impression upon my first and second reading. Apologies if i’m still misunderstandin, either way I find this topic very interesting so thanks for writing this post.
No apologies necessary, it’s possible I wasn’t clear enough!
My main point is that the orthogonality thesis applies to humans too: intelligence and values are distinct things. To judge someone’s actions as irrational, you need to actually understand their values and preferences. If you think they shouldn’t do something because the tradeoff is too high, and they acknowledge the tradeoff but want to do it anyway, that may just reveal preferences different from yours, not necessaril irrationality.
This example seems like it’s not proving the point set out; Bryce doesn’t seem to be critiquing his partner’s desires for something that tastes good and makes her happy(her wants), but rather the action of buying ice cream that fulfills those goals. He’s assuming that she also shares a value/desire for good health(which I would say is a reasonable assumption for most people) and Bryce tries to lay out an alternate course of action that would fulfill all those values.
This seems like a specific instance of a broader issue throughout the post, which is that want is sometimes used to mean an intrinsic value and sometimes used to mean an instrumental value, making the treatment of both confused. Intrinsic/terminal values can’t be irrational, like you’ve said, but instrumental values certainly can be. If you have a terminal value of being happy and content in life, I would say that wanting money would be instrumentally irrational value/desire.
In the ice cream narrative above, Bryce is critiquing her instrumental values rather than her terminal values, and in theory I don’t see much wrong with that. If she explains her reasoning behind choosing ice cream as a terminal value and Bryce still rejects it, or if it turns out she just intrinsically values eating ice cream, then that is a problem for their relationship.
In fact, I think it’s the last two sentences that make the exchange problematic. It seems like she is expressing an illegible preference for ice cream that Bryce is just dismissing.
It is the case that Bryce is, ostensibly, just trying to help Ash fulfill their terminal goals while being healthier. The problem is that Bryce presumes that of the available action space, ice cream is fungible for something else that is healthier, and does not listen when Ash reasserts that ice cream itself is the thing they want.
Just because it is a safe bet that Ash will share the value/desire for good health does not mean Ash must prioritize good health in every action they take.
I agree with that. I think that the general ick that I get from the dialogue is the presumption and general tone of Bryce. Thanks for clarifying!
I also find the ice-cream example confusing because it’s your main example but it doesn’t seem like it supports your main points. For example replace Ash with a drug addict and ice cream with meth and Bryce suddenly looks like a hero trying to help his friend from making a big mistake.
I think the below example still makes Bryce look like how it seems you intended him to look even if it was talking about meth.
Ash: “Ooh, I want ice cream.”
Bryce: “Seriously?”
Ash: “Well, I’m not actually going to buy some, I just want some”
Bryce: “That’s the problem. You know it’s not good for you. You should want to be eating healthy food”
Ash: “I mean, yeah, but right now I just really feel like ice cream.”
Bryce: “That’s stupid”
This is a good point, but the actual difference in the scenario is that ice cream is not meth ;P I think it is actually meaningful to notice that, while there may in fact be good reasons not to have ice cream, there are many, much stronger reasons not to do meth, and Bryce bringing those up are much more likely to dissuade Ash, and if they don’t, Ash is much more irrational if Ash chooses to do it anyway… but that choice is still independent from wanting meth.
Your version of Bryce is doing a less defensible thing, while mine is being more reasonable, while still being wrong, and I think that’s the important point I’m making.
So, I have to admit I’m still confused. Is the icecream example fairly unrelated to the introduction and first chapter? They seem to be talking mostly about pure qualia, while the ice-cream example is talking about actions.
I agree qualia is entirely disconnected from rationality, but I think anything beyond qualia such as actions or intending to take actions is rationality fair game so to speak. I don’t see an issue in Bryce assessing the rationality of Ash stopping for ice-cream, it was his communication/social skills that were lacking.
After reading your post very carefully, I think you are agreeing with the above, I just had the opposite impression upon my first and second reading. Apologies if i’m still misunderstandin, either way I find this topic very interesting so thanks for writing this post.
No apologies necessary, it’s possible I wasn’t clear enough!
My main point is that the orthogonality thesis applies to humans too: intelligence and values are distinct things. To judge someone’s actions as irrational, you need to actually understand their values and preferences. If you think they shouldn’t do something because the tradeoff is too high, and they acknowledge the tradeoff but want to do it anyway, that may just reveal preferences different from yours, not necessaril irrationality.