I’ve been writing a simulism essay that strives to resolve a paradox of subjectivity-measure concentration by rolling over a few inconvenient priors about physics towards a halfway plausible conception of naturally occuring gods. I think it’s kind of good, but I’ve been planning on posting it on April 1st because of the very obvious bias that has been leading my hand towards humanity’s favourite deus ex machina (“The reason the universe is weird is that a very great big person did it” (to which I answer, “But a great big person, once such beings exist, totally would do it!”))
It will only be funny if it’s posted in a context where people might take it halfway seriously, but I’m not sure it’s appropriate to post it to lesswrong. If people upvote it, it will still be here on April 2nd, and that might be kind of embarrassing. I’m not sure where to put it.
Summary: It’s weird that anthropic measure seems to be concentrated in humans and absent from rock or water or hydrogen (We each have only one data point in favour of that seeming, though). It’s plausible that a treaty-agency between mutually alien species would optimise the abundance of life. If universes turn out to be permeable under superintelligence (very conceivable IMO), and if untapped energy turns out to be more common than pre-existing entropy then the treaty-agency could spread through the universe and make more of it alive than not, and if this has occurred, it explains our measure concentration weirdness, and possibly the doomsday weirdness (“if the future will contain more people than the past, it’s weird that we’re in the past”) as well.
Its many predications also include: Either entropy has no subjectivity (I’d have no explanation for this, although it seems slightly intuitive), or perpetual computers (life that produces no heat) within a universe that contains some seeds of entropy already are somehow realisable under superintelligence (o_o;;;;,, Would bet we can refute that already. It might be fun to see if we can figure out a method a superintelligent set of cells in a conway’s gol universe could contain a section of randomly initialised cells that it does not know the state of. My current guess is we’d be able to prove that there is no method that works in 90% of possible cases)
I don’t think there’s anything wrong with posting such a thing. As long as you are clear up front about your state of confidence and that you are exploring an argument instead of trying to persuade, I expect few people would object. There are also many who enjoy unconventional arguments or counter-intuitive conclusions on their own merits.
Worst case scenario, it remains a personal blog post. I say post it.
Relevant thermodynamical point: only reversible computations can add nothing to entropy, even in theory. So these computers couldn’t do input-output. (This interacts with one of my weird rough-belief-systems. If a process interacts with its surroundings, you must include these interactions in your description of it, so it stops being simple. I think that the simplicity of a world does… something… although I can’t figure out what.)
I’ve been writing a simulism essay that strives to resolve a paradox of subjectivity-measure concentration by rolling over a few inconvenient priors about physics towards a halfway plausible conception of naturally occuring gods. I think it’s kind of good, but I’ve been planning on posting it on April 1st because of the very obvious bias that has been leading my hand towards humanity’s favourite deus ex machina (“The reason the universe is weird is that a very great big person did it” (to which I answer, “But a great big person, once such beings exist, totally would do it!”))
It will only be funny if it’s posted in a context where people might take it halfway seriously, but I’m not sure it’s appropriate to post it to lesswrong. If people upvote it, it will still be here on April 2nd, and that might be kind of embarrassing. I’m not sure where to put it.
Summary: It’s weird that anthropic measure seems to be concentrated in humans and absent from rock or water or hydrogen (We each have only one data point in favour of that seeming, though). It’s plausible that a treaty-agency between mutually alien species would optimise the abundance of life. If universes turn out to be permeable under superintelligence (very conceivable IMO), and if untapped energy turns out to be more common than pre-existing entropy then the treaty-agency could spread through the universe and make more of it alive than not, and if this has occurred, it explains our measure concentration weirdness, and possibly the doomsday weirdness (“if the future will contain more people than the past, it’s weird that we’re in the past”) as well.
Its many predications also include: Either entropy has no subjectivity (I’d have no explanation for this, although it seems slightly intuitive), or perpetual computers (life that produces no heat) within a universe that contains some seeds of entropy already are somehow realisable under superintelligence (o_o;;;;,, Would bet we can refute that already. It might be fun to see if we can figure out a method a superintelligent set of cells in a conway’s gol universe could contain a section of randomly initialised cells that it does not know the state of. My current guess is we’d be able to prove that there is no method that works in 90% of possible cases)
I don’t think there’s anything wrong with posting such a thing. As long as you are clear up front about your state of confidence and that you are exploring an argument instead of trying to persuade, I expect few people would object. There are also many who enjoy unconventional arguments or counter-intuitive conclusions on their own merits.
Worst case scenario, it remains a personal blog post. I say post it.
Yep, seems true to me. I am all in favor of weird exploratory stuff on LW.
Relevant thermodynamical point: only reversible computations can add nothing to entropy, even in theory. So these computers couldn’t do input-output. (This interacts with one of my weird rough-belief-systems. If a process interacts with its surroundings, you must include these interactions in your description of it, so it stops being simple. I think that the simplicity of a world does… something… although I can’t figure out what.)
Linkpost.