I agree that any correct theory of personal identity must take into account the fact that one individual is only ever consciously aware of one particular individual’s point of view.
This observation “I exist” is in fact the starting point of the Brief Proof. Note that the Brief Proof would not work from the perspective of someone who did not exist, just as the evidence for the Easy Game does not exist for those who are never awakened.
The fact that a single individual is only ever aware of a single perspective can be explained without appeals to theories of personal identity, but rather, a much simpler answer from neurology. Any conscious brain state only has the reach of one particular organism’s nervous system, senses, and memories. This fact applies equally well to both the usual view, and universalism.
The non-integration of nervous systems alone, is enough to explain the limited scope of any particular being’s conscious perspective. As evidence, consider that patients who undergoe the Wada Test (akin to a temporary hemispherectomy) reintegrate the consciousness of both hemispheres when the anesthetic wears off, regaining conscious functions, etc. We do not have to hypothesize a separate left-hemisphere-soul, and right-hemisphere-soul to track their separate identities. The split between hemispheres can be accounted for simply by non-integration.
So the postulate, that some additional factor (beyond neural non-integration) has to be added to explain our experience becomes unnecessary and redundant, and should be dropped according to Ockham.
Finally, you may object that one’s existence, or one’s having been born, is something that has already happened, and therefore cannot be improbable. Sometimes people say that it is P(1). But consider: if I spill a box of 1,000 fair coins (an event which has already happened) and then look and find every one of those 1,000 fair coins has landed heads, is it not still stupendously improbable an occurrence? Consider too, if I check them one at a time, and find each one I check is heads. The fact that this is the result of a past event is no cause to dismiss the improbability of such an occurrence. And for the same reason, we cannot dismiss the improbability of having been born on account of it having already happened.
Now consider if there were two possibilities for what we just observed:
1. The box contained 1,000 fair coins, or
2. The box did not contain fair coins, but 1,000 double-headed coins
Would you agree it would be valid to reason that it is overwhelming more likely that the box contained double-headed coins, rather than fair coins? In other words, we can infer hypothesis #2. If so, can you explain why we cannot use a similar reasoning, to justify Universalism—which just as with the case of double-headed coins, obviates the improbability.
There is no outside view for my experience of myself. I am a singleton in the multiverse—literally there is exactly one set of experiences that I have access to. One cannot apply probabilities to a singleton. One cannot generalize from a single datum.
if I spill a box of 1,000 fair coins (an event which has already happened) and then look and find every one of those 1,000 fair coins has landed heads, is it not still stupendously improbable an occurrence?
Well, no. it was stupendously improbable before I saw it, but once observed, I assign it p(1). Reminder: probability is subjective—it’s my estimate of what I might experience in the future. I would need further observations to determine whether the box had fair-seeming coins or double-headed coins, but I’d assign much higher probability before that observation to the double-headed expectation. Probability of that is also just uncertainty in my mind, which may or may not be reduced by future observations.
There is no outside view for my experience of myself. I am a singleton in the multiverse—literally there is exactly one set of experiences that I have access to.
Acknowledged, and I agree. But that has no bearing on the argument as far as I can see.
One cannot apply probabilities to a singleton. One cannot generalize from a single datum.
If I am to understand you correctly, you are saying that if you see a box of 1,000 spilled coins, all of which landed “heads” you could not reason (from this singleton event) that it is more probable the box of coins contained double-headed, rather than fair coins? This seems obviously false to me, but I am open to hearing your arguments for why we could not draw this conclusion.
Well, no. it was stupendously improbable before I saw it, but once observed, I assign it p(1).
Consider if you won the national lottery 5 times in a row. While everyone else is increasingly shocked at your luck, you dismiss your win each time saying “don’t worry, it was P(1), nothing strange is going on.”
Should the lottery commission take your claim that it was P(1) at face value and not investigate to see if something fishy is going on? If they are justified in an investigation, what do you see that justification being?
Reminder: probability is subjective—it’s my estimate of what I might experience in the future.
I think this is a needless limitation of probability. When we observe something we didn’t expect, that can serve as a basis to revise one’s original assumptions. If you see a box of coins spill and all land heads up, you can revise your original assumption that all the coins were fair, as it would be stupendously improbable to observe what you just observed had they been fair coins. If the lottery commission observes you win 5 times in a row, they too are justified in revising their opinion that the game is fair, and are thereby justified to investigate further and question the legitimacy of your winning streak. And finally, the observation that you have been born (despite it being much less likely than winning the lottery 5 times in a row) can serve as a justification to question the legitimacy of the “Usual View.”
I would need further observations to determine whether the box had fair-seeming coins or double-headed coins, but I’d assign much higher probability before that observation to the double-headed expectation.
I agree you would need to check the coins to be 100% sure, but would you agree that you would not need to make any further observations to be >99.99999999% sure the coins are not fair (for reference the odds of seeing this happen when the coins are fair are ~1 in 10^301).
I know, and it may be the ONLY thing I know, that I experience myself, and that I do not experience anyone else, except by their effects on me.
Any sophistry that does not acknowledge this is fully disqualified as a search for truth.
Hi Dagon,
I agree that any correct theory of personal identity must take into account the fact that one individual is only ever consciously aware of one particular individual’s point of view.
This observation “I exist” is in fact the starting point of the Brief Proof. Note that the Brief Proof would not work from the perspective of someone who did not exist, just as the evidence for the Easy Game does not exist for those who are never awakened.
The fact that a single individual is only ever aware of a single perspective can be explained without appeals to theories of personal identity, but rather, a much simpler answer from neurology. Any conscious brain state only has the reach of one particular organism’s nervous system, senses, and memories. This fact applies equally well to both the usual view, and universalism.
The non-integration of nervous systems alone, is enough to explain the limited scope of any particular being’s conscious perspective. As evidence, consider that patients who undergoe the Wada Test (akin to a temporary hemispherectomy) reintegrate the consciousness of both hemispheres when the anesthetic wears off, regaining conscious functions, etc. We do not have to hypothesize a separate left-hemisphere-soul, and right-hemisphere-soul to track their separate identities. The split between hemispheres can be accounted for simply by non-integration.
So the postulate, that some additional factor (beyond neural non-integration) has to be added to explain our experience becomes unnecessary and redundant, and should be dropped according to Ockham.
Finally, you may object that one’s existence, or one’s having been born, is something that has already happened, and therefore cannot be improbable. Sometimes people say that it is P(1). But consider: if I spill a box of 1,000 fair coins (an event which has already happened) and then look and find every one of those 1,000 fair coins has landed heads, is it not still stupendously improbable an occurrence? Consider too, if I check them one at a time, and find each one I check is heads. The fact that this is the result of a past event is no cause to dismiss the improbability of such an occurrence. And for the same reason, we cannot dismiss the improbability of having been born on account of it having already happened.
Now consider if there were two possibilities for what we just observed:
1. The box contained 1,000 fair coins, or
2. The box did not contain fair coins, but 1,000 double-headed coins
Would you agree it would be valid to reason that it is overwhelming more likely that the box contained double-headed coins, rather than fair coins? In other words, we can infer hypothesis #2. If so, can you explain why we cannot use a similar reasoning, to justify Universalism—which just as with the case of double-headed coins, obviates the improbability.
There is no outside view for my experience of myself. I am a singleton in the multiverse—literally there is exactly one set of experiences that I have access to. One cannot apply probabilities to a singleton. One cannot generalize from a single datum.
Well, no. it was stupendously improbable before I saw it, but once observed, I assign it p(1). Reminder: probability is subjective—it’s my estimate of what I might experience in the future. I would need further observations to determine whether the box had fair-seeming coins or double-headed coins, but I’d assign much higher probability before that observation to the double-headed expectation. Probability of that is also just uncertainty in my mind, which may or may not be reduced by future observations.
Acknowledged, and I agree. But that has no bearing on the argument as far as I can see.
If I am to understand you correctly, you are saying that if you see a box of 1,000 spilled coins, all of which landed “heads” you could not reason (from this singleton event) that it is more probable the box of coins contained double-headed, rather than fair coins? This seems obviously false to me, but I am open to hearing your arguments for why we could not draw this conclusion.
Consider if you won the national lottery 5 times in a row. While everyone else is increasingly shocked at your luck, you dismiss your win each time saying “don’t worry, it was P(1), nothing strange is going on.”
Should the lottery commission take your claim that it was P(1) at face value and not investigate to see if something fishy is going on? If they are justified in an investigation, what do you see that justification being?
I think this is a needless limitation of probability. When we observe something we didn’t expect, that can serve as a basis to revise one’s original assumptions. If you see a box of coins spill and all land heads up, you can revise your original assumption that all the coins were fair, as it would be stupendously improbable to observe what you just observed had they been fair coins. If the lottery commission observes you win 5 times in a row, they too are justified in revising their opinion that the game is fair, and are thereby justified to investigate further and question the legitimacy of your winning streak. And finally, the observation that you have been born (despite it being much less likely than winning the lottery 5 times in a row) can serve as a justification to question the legitimacy of the “Usual View.”
I agree you would need to check the coins to be 100% sure, but would you agree that you would not need to make any further observations to be >99.99999999% sure the coins are not fair (for reference the odds of seeing this happen when the coins are fair are ~1 in 10^301).