I don’t completely understand your question. Of course I update on information that concerns my instances in a single universe: in the absence of new copying the rules reduce to ordinary probability theory, as far as I can see. Ditto if I’m in a small universe that undergoes a quantum branching, the act of observation removes me from one of the branches. As for large universes, Boltzmann brains, etc., I don’t think such matters are sufficiently settled to serve as decisive counterexamples right now.
The first universe, as ever, has 50% probability (assuming that 50% in the problem statement referred to probability, and not just anticipation, or assuming that the two universes are sufficiently similar for indifference prior to set 50%). Anticipation of being in the first universe is probably greater than for being in second, but it’s unclear to what extent, since it’s a heuristic measurement that isn’t based on any simple rules, and has no normative imperative to be based on simple rules. There seems to be no reason to privilege 99% in particular, unless the copies operate independently and each copy has the same expected impact on overall utility which accumulates additively, so that the presence of copies in the first universe introduces 99 times more value than presence of the copy in the second universe.
I don’t completely understand your question. Of course I update on information that concerns my instances in a single universe: in the absence of new copying the rules reduce to ordinary probability theory, as far as I can see. Ditto if I’m in a small universe that undergoes a quantum branching, the act of observation removes me from one of the branches. As for large universes, Boltzmann brains, etc., I don’t think such matters are sufficiently settled to serve as decisive counterexamples right now.
Let’s say there are two universes with 100 copies of you.
In the first, 99% will soon enter information state A and 1% state B In the second, 1% will enter state A and 99% state B.
You currently estimate 50⁄50 chances.
Then you find yourself in state A. What chances do you estimate of the first universe?
(Based on my position described in this comment.)
The first universe, as ever, has 50% probability (assuming that 50% in the problem statement referred to probability, and not just anticipation, or assuming that the two universes are sufficiently similar for indifference prior to set 50%). Anticipation of being in the first universe is probably greater than for being in second, but it’s unclear to what extent, since it’s a heuristic measurement that isn’t based on any simple rules, and has no normative imperative to be based on simple rules. There seems to be no reason to privilege 99% in particular, unless the copies operate independently and each copy has the same expected impact on overall utility which accumulates additively, so that the presence of copies in the first universe introduces 99 times more value than presence of the copy in the second universe.
Hmm. 99%, I think. Sorry, my brain had a hiccup and I omitted the word “prior” from the 2nd rule for some reason. Now it’s in.
There are 99 copies with your information state in one universe.
1 copy with your information state in the other.
To make those be equally valuable, you have to divide by the number of copies of you, not by the number of copies with your information state.
99%, I think. Sorry, my brain had a hiccup and I omitted the word “prior” from the 2nd rule for some reason while writing the post. Now it’s in.