The first universe, as ever, has 50% probability (assuming that 50% in the problem statement referred to probability, and not just anticipation, or assuming that the two universes are sufficiently similar for indifference prior to set 50%). Anticipation of being in the first universe is probably greater than for being in second, but it’s unclear to what extent, since it’s a heuristic measurement that isn’t based on any simple rules, and has no normative imperative to be based on simple rules. There seems to be no reason to privilege 99% in particular, unless the copies operate independently and each copy has the same expected impact on overall utility which accumulates additively, so that the presence of copies in the first universe introduces 99 times more value than presence of the copy in the second universe.
(Based on my position described in this comment.)
The first universe, as ever, has 50% probability (assuming that 50% in the problem statement referred to probability, and not just anticipation, or assuming that the two universes are sufficiently similar for indifference prior to set 50%). Anticipation of being in the first universe is probably greater than for being in second, but it’s unclear to what extent, since it’s a heuristic measurement that isn’t based on any simple rules, and has no normative imperative to be based on simple rules. There seems to be no reason to privilege 99% in particular, unless the copies operate independently and each copy has the same expected impact on overall utility which accumulates additively, so that the presence of copies in the first universe introduces 99 times more value than presence of the copy in the second universe.