Overall, reading the post and the comment section, I feel that, if I reject Newcomb’s Problem as a test, I can only ever write things that will not meet your prize criterion of usefully engaging with ‘circular dependency’.
Firstly, I don’t see why that would interfere with evaluating possible arguments for and against circular dependency. It’s possible for an article to be here’s why these 3 reasons why we might think counterfactuals are circular are all false (not stating that an article would have to necessarily engage with 3 different arguments to win).
Secondly, I guess my issue with most of the attempts to say “use system X for counterfactuals” is that people seem to think merely not mentioning counterfactuals means that there isn’t a dependence on them. So there likely needs to be some part of such an article discussing why things that look counterfactual really aren’t.
I briefly skimmed your article and I’m sure if I read it further I’d learn something interesting, but merely as is it wouldn’t be on scope.
It’s possible for an article to be here’s why these 3 reasons why we might think counterfactuals are circular are all false
OK, so if I understand you correctly, you posit that there is something called ‘circular epistemology’. You said in the earlier post you link to at the top:
You might think that the circularity is a problem, but circular epistemology turns out to be viable (see Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom). And while circular reasoning is less than ideal, if the comparative is eventually hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all, then circular justification might not seem so bad after all.
You further suspect that circular epistemology might have something useful to say about counterfactuals, in terms of offering a justification for them without ‘hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all’. And you have a bounty for people writing more about this.
Yeah, I believe epistemology to be inherently circular. I think it has some relation to counterfactuals being circular, but I don’t see it as quite the same as counterfactuals seem a lot harder to avoid using than most other concept. The point of mentioning circular epistemology was to persuade people that my theory isn’t as absurd as it sounds at first.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
So I think I am still struggling to see what flavour of philosophical thought you want people to engage with, when you mention ‘circular’.
Mind you, I see ‘hitting a point where we provide no justification at all’ as a positive thing in a mathematical system, a physical theory, or an entire epistemology, as long as these points are clearly identified.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?
What I mean is that some people seem to think that if they can describe a system that explains counterfactuals without mentioning counterfactuals when explaining them that they’ve avoided a circular dependence. When of course, we can’t just take things at face value, but have to dig deeper than that.
Firstly, I don’t see why that would interfere with evaluating possible arguments for and against circular dependency. It’s possible for an article to be here’s why these 3 reasons why we might think counterfactuals are circular are all false (not stating that an article would have to necessarily engage with 3 different arguments to win).
Secondly, I guess my issue with most of the attempts to say “use system X for counterfactuals” is that people seem to think merely not mentioning counterfactuals means that there isn’t a dependence on them. So there likely needs to be some part of such an article discussing why things that look counterfactual really aren’t.
I briefly skimmed your article and I’m sure if I read it further I’d learn something interesting, but merely as is it wouldn’t be on scope.
OK, so if I understand you correctly, you posit that there is something called ‘circular epistemology’. You said in the earlier post you link to at the top:
You further suspect that circular epistemology might have something useful to say about counterfactuals, in terms of offering a justification for them without ‘hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all’. And you have a bounty for people writing more about this.
Am I understanding you correctly?
Yeah, I believe epistemology to be inherently circular. I think it has some relation to counterfactuals being circular, but I don’t see it as quite the same as counterfactuals seem a lot harder to avoid using than most other concept. The point of mentioning circular epistemology was to persuade people that my theory isn’t as absurd as it sounds at first.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
So I think I am still struggling to see what flavour of philosophical thought you want people to engage with, when you mention ‘circular’.
Mind you, I see ‘hitting a point where we provide no justification at all’ as a positive thing in a mathematical system, a physical theory, or an entire epistemology, as long as these points are clearly identified.
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
He doesn’t show much sign of embracing the validity of all circular argument ss, and neither do you.
I never said all circular arguments are valid
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?
??? I don’t follow. You meant to write “use system X instead of using system Y which calls itself a definition of counterfactuals ”?
What I mean is that some people seem to think that if they can describe a system that explains counterfactuals without mentioning counterfactuals when explaining them that they’ve avoided a circular dependence. When of course, we can’t just take things at face value, but have to dig deeper than that.
OK thanks for explaining. See my other recent reply for more thoughts about this.