Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
He doesn’t show much sign of embracing the validity of all circular argument ss, and neither do you.
I never said all circular arguments are valid
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?