I expect that in most cases having an object-level value V should make you behave as if you were also protecting the meta-value V’ of your valuing V, because your switching away from V can be detrimental to V. Also see my reply to torekp for a reason why you might want to return to your past values even though they don’t coincide with the current ones.
It certainly seems that valuing V implies valuing valuing V and valuing^3 V and so on. But, if we try to formalise a bit the notion of value, doesn’t it produce some unexpected paradoxes? I haven’t thought about it in detail, so perhaps there is no problem, but I am not convinced.
I don’t understand the relevance of your reply to torekp.
I don’t see how paradoxes could arise. For example, if you have a value V of having value V, that’s a perfectly well-defined function on future states of the world and you know what to do to maximize it. (You can remove explicit self-reference by using quining), aka the diagonal lemma.) Likewise for the value W of not having value W. The actions of an agent having such a value will be pretty bizarre, but Bayesian-rational.
I don’t understand the relevance of your reply to torekp.
It shows a possible reason why you might want to return to your past values once you approach TDT-ish reflective consistency, even if you don’t want that in your current state. I’m not sure it’s correct, though.
I expect that in most cases having an object-level value V should make you behave as if you were also protecting the meta-value V’ of your valuing V, because your switching away from V can be detrimental to V. Also see my reply to torekp for a reason why you might want to return to your past values even though they don’t coincide with the current ones.
It certainly seems that valuing V implies valuing valuing V and valuing^3 V and so on. But, if we try to formalise a bit the notion of value, doesn’t it produce some unexpected paradoxes? I haven’t thought about it in detail, so perhaps there is no problem, but I am not convinced.
I don’t understand the relevance of your reply to torekp.
I don’t see how paradoxes could arise. For example, if you have a value V of having value V, that’s a perfectly well-defined function on future states of the world and you know what to do to maximize it. (You can remove explicit self-reference by using quining), aka the diagonal lemma.) Likewise for the value W of not having value W. The actions of an agent having such a value will be pretty bizarre, but Bayesian-rational.
It shows a possible reason why you might want to return to your past values once you approach TDT-ish reflective consistency, even if you don’t want that in your current state. I’m not sure it’s correct, though.