I don’t see how paradoxes could arise. For example, if you have a value V of having value V, that’s a perfectly well-defined function on future states of the world and you know what to do to maximize it. (You can remove explicit self-reference by using quining), aka the diagonal lemma.) Likewise for the value W of not having value W. The actions of an agent having such a value will be pretty bizarre, but Bayesian-rational.
I don’t understand the relevance of your reply to torekp.
It shows a possible reason why you might want to return to your past values once you approach TDT-ish reflective consistency, even if you don’t want that in your current state. I’m not sure it’s correct, though.
I don’t see how paradoxes could arise. For example, if you have a value V of having value V, that’s a perfectly well-defined function on future states of the world and you know what to do to maximize it. (You can remove explicit self-reference by using quining), aka the diagonal lemma.) Likewise for the value W of not having value W. The actions of an agent having such a value will be pretty bizarre, but Bayesian-rational.
It shows a possible reason why you might want to return to your past values once you approach TDT-ish reflective consistency, even if you don’t want that in your current state. I’m not sure it’s correct, though.