Okay, I take the word “should” to refer to a spectrum with ethics on one end (strong “should”) and aesthetics on the other (weak “should”). It’s possible that this is a wider use of the word “ethics” or “aesthetics” as others would have. Maybe those other things people are thinking about don’t lie on a linear spectrum?
So, for example, when you’re doing an algebra problem, “you should subtract the same amount from both sides of the equation, not just one side,” is a choice to stay within the rules of algebra. Not doing so leads to less interesting results (everything being “equal” to everything else). I’m not sure whether that’s closer to the ethics end or the aesthetics end; maybe it depends on whether the math is pure or applied.
But getting back to my meaning in that paragraph, the Sequences had a large section on ethics, and choosing to be rational comes through the text as a strong imperative. And then, having opinions on a “should” statement (whether you call it “ethics” or not) comes from beyond-experimental reasoning, because (by David Hume), an “is” does not imply a “should.”
Despite what Hume says , it is fairly standard to derive instrumental “shoulds”, such as how you should build a bridge or win at chess, from a mass of empirical and logical information. Ethical shoulds are often held to be a different matter.
Saying that one should do x rather than y seems to mean that act x is better than act y. In which case we can reduce an ought to an is. And what “good” or “better” means, seems to have do with maximizing expected utility. And there are arguably objective facts about what maximizes utility. E.g. murdering people is pretty bad for maximizing utility. So there seem to be objective facts about what is good. And therefore about what one should do.
Murdering people and harvesting their organs to save n>1 lives is pretty good for expected utility. But a lot of people feel that its wrong:its intuitive that what is ethically good is doing what is right. As well as well as intuitive that it is ethically good is to increase utility. There are different intuitions about ethics, which is why it is still an open problem. Focussing on one intuition is privileging the hypothesis.
Sometimes sacrificing one life for many others can have overall more negative indirect consequences, e.g. people distrusting hospitals because their organs might get harvested for other people. But even if utilitarianism is wrong, the correct ethical theory would apparently be one that correctly analyzes the meaning of “good” or “better” in terms of similar objective criteria.
If there is none, it would mean a world where everyone suffers horribly forever is not objectively worse than one where everyone is eternally happy. But I think that’s just not compatible with what words like “good” or “worse” mean! If we imagine a world where everything is the same as in ours, except that people call things “bad” we call “good”, and “good” what we call “bad”—would that mean they believe suffering is good? Of course not. They just use different words for the same concepts we have! Believing that, other things being equal, suffering is bad seems to be like believing that bachelors are unmarried, or that even numbers are divisible by two without rest. It seems to be a conceptual truth, an objective fact about the concepts in question. Which is incompatible with ethical statements not being able to be objectively true or false, because whether someone suffers, or not, is an objective psychological fact.
To acknowledge this I don’t think we need to actually finish a complete ethical theory which translates all statements about goodness into statements about expected utility or suffering or preferences or such. Otherwise this would be like saying “If you don’t have a precise analysis of the term ‘rational’, it can be doubted there are any objective facts about what is rational or irrational”. We don’t need to know a perfect theory of rationality to know that some things are definitely rational and some others are definitely irrational, which already rules out the view that there is nothing objective about rationality. The same holds for morality.
Consider a world where everyone suffers horribly, and it’s no ones fault , and it’s impossible or to change. Is it morally wrong , even though the the elements of intentionality and obligation are absent?
But it is clearly “morally” bad? It is just not a morally wrong action. Actions are wrong insofar their expected outcomes are bad, but an outcome can be bad without being the result of anyone’s action.
(You might say that morality is only a theory of actions. Then saying that a world, or any outcome, is “morally” bad, would be a category mistake. Fine then, call “ethics” the theory both of good and bad outcomes, and of right and wrong actions. Then a world where everyone suffers is bad, ethically bad.)
I wasn’t intending to take a side in utilitarianism/consequentialism; I just meant that, ultimately, a decision is made from intuition. It can’t be deductive all the way down.
The ethical “should” doesn’t have to be the only. “Should”. Maybe he means that its your interests to be rational.
Okay, I take the word “should” to refer to a spectrum with ethics on one end (strong “should”) and aesthetics on the other (weak “should”). It’s possible that this is a wider use of the word “ethics” or “aesthetics” as others would have. Maybe those other things people are thinking about don’t lie on a linear spectrum?
So, for example, when you’re doing an algebra problem, “you should subtract the same amount from both sides of the equation, not just one side,” is a choice to stay within the rules of algebra. Not doing so leads to less interesting results (everything being “equal” to everything else). I’m not sure whether that’s closer to the ethics end or the aesthetics end; maybe it depends on whether the math is pure or applied.
But getting back to my meaning in that paragraph, the Sequences had a large section on ethics, and choosing to be rational comes through the text as a strong imperative. And then, having opinions on a “should” statement (whether you call it “ethics” or not) comes from beyond-experimental reasoning, because (by David Hume), an “is” does not imply a “should.”
Despite what Hume says , it is fairly standard to derive instrumental “shoulds”, such as how you should build a bridge or win at chess, from a mass of empirical and logical information. Ethical shoulds are often held to be a different matter.
Saying that one should do x rather than y seems to mean that act x is better than act y. In which case we can reduce an ought to an is. And what “good” or “better” means, seems to have do with maximizing expected utility. And there are arguably objective facts about what maximizes utility. E.g. murdering people is pretty bad for maximizing utility. So there seem to be objective facts about what is good. And therefore about what one should do.
Murdering people and harvesting their organs to save n>1 lives is pretty good for expected utility. But a lot of people feel that its wrong:its intuitive that what is ethically good is doing what is right. As well as well as intuitive that it is ethically good is to increase utility. There are different intuitions about ethics, which is why it is still an open problem. Focussing on one intuition is privileging the hypothesis.
Sometimes sacrificing one life for many others can have overall more negative indirect consequences, e.g. people distrusting hospitals because their organs might get harvested for other people. But even if utilitarianism is wrong, the correct ethical theory would apparently be one that correctly analyzes the meaning of “good” or “better” in terms of similar objective criteria.
If you can’t give a robust example of an objective ethical theory, it can be doubted that there is one.
If there is none, it would mean a world where everyone suffers horribly forever is not objectively worse than one where everyone is eternally happy. But I think that’s just not compatible with what words like “good” or “worse” mean! If we imagine a world where everything is the same as in ours, except that people call things “bad” we call “good”, and “good” what we call “bad”—would that mean they believe suffering is good? Of course not. They just use different words for the same concepts we have! Believing that, other things being equal, suffering is bad seems to be like believing that bachelors are unmarried, or that even numbers are divisible by two without rest. It seems to be a conceptual truth, an objective fact about the concepts in question. Which is incompatible with ethical statements not being able to be objectively true or false, because whether someone suffers, or not, is an objective psychological fact.
To acknowledge this I don’t think we need to actually finish a complete ethical theory which translates all statements about goodness into statements about expected utility or suffering or preferences or such. Otherwise this would be like saying “If you don’t have a precise analysis of the term ‘rational’, it can be doubted there are any objective facts about what is rational or irrational”. We don’t need to know a perfect theory of rationality to know that some things are definitely rational and some others are definitely irrational, which already rules out the view that there is nothing objective about rationality. The same holds for morality.
Consider a world where everyone suffers horribly, and it’s no ones fault , and it’s impossible or to change. Is it morally wrong , even though the the elements of intentionality and obligation are absent?
The terms “right” and “wrong” apply just to actions. This world is bad, without someone doing something wrong.
An imperfect world might be in various ways, such as being undesirable, but if it is not morally bad, it implies nothing about objective morality.
But it is clearly “morally” bad? It is just not a morally wrong action. Actions are wrong insofar their expected outcomes are bad, but an outcome can be bad without being the result of anyone’s action.
(You might say that morality is only a theory of actions. Then saying that a world, or any outcome, is “morally” bad, would be a category mistake. Fine then, call “ethics” the theory both of good and bad outcomes, and of right and wrong actions. Then a world where everyone suffers is bad, ethically bad.)
No, that’s the point.
Yep, but you still need to show its morally bad even if it is unintentional.
I wasn’t intending to take a side in utilitarianism/consequentialism; I just meant that, ultimately, a decision is made from intuition. It can’t be deductive all the way down.