Interesting. Reducing the scope of an agreement in this way also makes defection easier to detect, so it would be more feasible (in a gaming environment with the same group each time) to play the “violate agreements with me and I precommit to attacking you with everything I have” strategy. In which case you’re still vulnerable if you lack second strike capabilities, but it still could be useful.
I think the precommitment would be credible, because breaking it would render the strategy useless in the future with the same group.
An alternative that would reduce first-strike vulnerability might be to precommit to attack the defector with everything you have next game, iff he wins this one. This wouldn’t be fun, though, because he wouldn’t want to play next time when he knew he would lose—this would probably cause bad human dynamics and, possibly, resulting in everyone teaming up to blow you away next game as a result. In a tournament setting with a large number of games, though, I think it would be a good fix.
In my experience, precommitments are extremely dangerous to use in games in general.
They’re seen as somewhat rude—you’re doing something that will make you lose “just for spite”. Even if you’re clearly justified, people still think things like “it’s just a game! she’s taking it way too seriously!” or “wow, the point is to win, why would you just suicide yourself just to mess things up for someone?” This is especially the case if you’re only playing a few games in a row, so the reason for acting vengeful is less salient. In addition, aside from reputational damage, there’s also a serious risk of starting a tit-for-tat. Humans can be pretty vengeful, and believe that they’re almost always in the right, so if you precommit to attacking someone, they might say something like “well, okay, then I precommit to attacking you back if you execute that attack”—and they might follow through on it too. And then you both lose in a spiral of negativity as everyone else looks on in bemusement.
Well, this is mostly based on online games, though, maybe it’s a little better in real life.
A more efficient nuke would be to threaten to ensure the demise of the defector for this game, and the next. To avoid the spiral of hate going supercritical, you can also tell upfront (and in public) that any retaliation will not be met with further vengeance.
Alice: so, we don’t attack each other for the next 4 rounds.
Bob: okay
Alice: Oh, and if you break your promise, I swear I will do my best to make you lose this game, and the next
Bob: hey, it’s not cool! If you mess up with me on the next game, I will mess up with you on the second next!
Alice: retaliate if you will. I will play normally anyway.
Bob: Wait, you will not seek further revenge?
Alice: Of course not. What would be the point? I don’t want to lose every time, and so don’t you.
So, what are the expectations here? Let’s assume 6 players, with a base expectation of winning of 1⁄6. If Bob breaks the alliance for certain victory, we have Bob 1, Alice 0, Others 0. Then Alice follows through on her threat. Bob, 1, Alice 0, others 1⁄4. Then Bob retaliates. Bob 1, Alice 0, others 1⁄2. And then we play normally. It wouldn’t be wise of Bob to break the alliance for anything less than certain victory, because Alice would likely ensure his demise, leading to an eventual score of Bob 0, Alice 0, others 3⁄4.
Now this could go further, and kill the fun of the game. But I have reasons to believe it may not:
Alice’s promises makes Bob’s retaliation pointless. Not only will it not piss off Alice, but the retaliation will also cost Bob another game. Bob will be aware of this, and may think about it for two seconds.
The other players will be aware of the fight. They won’t be surprised to see Bob and Alice fight each other, and the game won’t be rigged.
Now, making oneself the enemy of the defector for one game and a half may be too much anyway. Just promising to refuse any further alliance for this game and the next may have the desired effect, without some of the nasty consequences.
I’m not sure how to formalize this, but I think you can be emotional in a playful way that sort of transparently emulates real emotional responses. I haven’t played many social board games so I can’t speak from experience, it’s just that imagining the situation my first response is “transparently act betrayed and insulted, so people understand both that you don’t mean it seriously and why you don’t help them”.
Interesting. Reducing the scope of an agreement in this way also makes defection easier to detect, so it would be more feasible (in a gaming environment with the same group each time) to play the “violate agreements with me and I precommit to attacking you with everything I have” strategy. In which case you’re still vulnerable if you lack second strike capabilities, but it still could be useful.
I think the precommitment would be credible, because breaking it would render the strategy useless in the future with the same group.
An alternative that would reduce first-strike vulnerability might be to precommit to attack the defector with everything you have next game, iff he wins this one. This wouldn’t be fun, though, because he wouldn’t want to play next time when he knew he would lose—this would probably cause bad human dynamics and, possibly, resulting in everyone teaming up to blow you away next game as a result. In a tournament setting with a large number of games, though, I think it would be a good fix.
In my experience, precommitments are extremely dangerous to use in games in general.
They’re seen as somewhat rude—you’re doing something that will make you lose “just for spite”. Even if you’re clearly justified, people still think things like “it’s just a game! she’s taking it way too seriously!” or “wow, the point is to win, why would you just suicide yourself just to mess things up for someone?” This is especially the case if you’re only playing a few games in a row, so the reason for acting vengeful is less salient. In addition, aside from reputational damage, there’s also a serious risk of starting a tit-for-tat. Humans can be pretty vengeful, and believe that they’re almost always in the right, so if you precommit to attacking someone, they might say something like “well, okay, then I precommit to attacking you back if you execute that attack”—and they might follow through on it too. And then you both lose in a spiral of negativity as everyone else looks on in bemusement.
Well, this is mostly based on online games, though, maybe it’s a little better in real life.
A more efficient nuke would be to threaten to ensure the demise of the defector for this game, and the next. To avoid the spiral of hate going supercritical, you can also tell upfront (and in public) that any retaliation will not be met with further vengeance.
So, what are the expectations here? Let’s assume 6 players, with a base expectation of winning of 1⁄6. If Bob breaks the alliance for certain victory, we have Bob 1, Alice 0, Others 0. Then Alice follows through on her threat. Bob, 1, Alice 0, others 1⁄4. Then Bob retaliates. Bob 1, Alice 0, others 1⁄2. And then we play normally. It wouldn’t be wise of Bob to break the alliance for anything less than certain victory, because Alice would likely ensure his demise, leading to an eventual score of Bob 0, Alice 0, others 3⁄4.
Now this could go further, and kill the fun of the game. But I have reasons to believe it may not:
Alice’s promises makes Bob’s retaliation pointless. Not only will it not piss off Alice, but the retaliation will also cost Bob another game. Bob will be aware of this, and may think about it for two seconds.
The other players will be aware of the fight. They won’t be surprised to see Bob and Alice fight each other, and the game won’t be rigged.
Now, making oneself the enemy of the defector for one game and a half may be too much anyway. Just promising to refuse any further alliance for this game and the next may have the desired effect, without some of the nasty consequences.
Wrap it in emotions. People understand emotions.
What do you mean, specifically? “Having fun” aside, being emotional about a game is socially harmful/uncool in the same way a precommitment can be.
I’m not sure how to formalize this, but I think you can be emotional in a playful way that sort of transparently emulates real emotional responses. I haven’t played many social board games so I can’t speak from experience, it’s just that imagining the situation my first response is “transparently act betrayed and insulted, so people understand both that you don’t mean it seriously and why you don’t help them”.