Sure, but then why is it strange to do the same with duplication? You’re shifting your relative probability of seeing A, by creating extra versions of you that see A.
Predicted observation. You know you’ll be observing waking up on Monday (or, at least, that every thread going on from you to will observe waking up on Monday). And yet you are not, now, currently in the epistemic state you will be on Monday, despite know exactly what you will observe.
Bbtw, death and birth/creating are opposites, and neither is really a problem in anthropic probability. The opposite of duplication is merger—much more difficult to achieve, but, yes, it has similar issues to duplication.
“The thread of my experience has forked/merged” is something probability theories were not built to deal with; unlike threads of experience ending and starting, which is can deal with fine.
Every thread going on from you will observe something in Roulette too. (The threads that die don’t go on from you, then.)
When predicting your future experiences, you automatically condition on the fact that there will be future experiences, so they won’t always match objective probabilities. And you can also adjust for some versions of you having more experiences than others.
It’s more fragile than that. E.g. suppose a coin is flipped and on tails, you’ll be given a false memory of being asked your credence for heads, and answering “100%”. On heads you’ll simply be asked the question with no memory alterations. Then in both cases you’ll be asked “are you sure?”
If you’re in the situation of remembering having been asked the question but not answering, then you must be in the heads case, and should answer “100%”. But then when you’re asked “are you sure”, you are no longer sure because you now have exactly the same sort of memories that would have had in the tails case. Your memory hasn’t been altered in this case and you have no new information, so why are you now uncertain about something you were previously rationally certain of?
Sure, but then why is it strange to do the same with duplication? You’re shifting your relative probability of seeing A, by creating extra versions of you that see A.
Predicted observation. You know you’ll be observing waking up on Monday (or, at least, that every thread going on from you to will observe waking up on Monday). And yet you are not, now, currently in the epistemic state you will be on Monday, despite know exactly what you will observe.
Bbtw, death and birth/creating are opposites, and neither is really a problem in anthropic probability. The opposite of duplication is merger—much more difficult to achieve, but, yes, it has similar issues to duplication.
“The thread of my experience has forked/merged” is something probability theories were not built to deal with; unlike threads of experience ending and starting, which is can deal with fine.
I don’t buy this distinction.
Every thread going on from you will observe something in Roulette too. (The threads that die don’t go on from you, then.)
When predicting your future experiences, you automatically condition on the fact that there will be future experiences, so they won’t always match objective probabilities. And you can also adjust for some versions of you having more experiences than others.
It’s more fragile than that. E.g. suppose a coin is flipped and on tails, you’ll be given a false memory of being asked your credence for heads, and answering “100%”. On heads you’ll simply be asked the question with no memory alterations. Then in both cases you’ll be asked “are you sure?”
If you’re in the situation of remembering having been asked the question but not answering, then you must be in the heads case, and should answer “100%”. But then when you’re asked “are you sure”, you are no longer sure because you now have exactly the same sort of memories that would have had in the tails case. Your memory hasn’t been altered in this case and you have no new information, so why are you now uncertain about something you were previously rationally certain of?