Reality, yes, normality, maybe not. There is at least an interpretation of “adding up to normality” rattling around in my head that seems to have been inspired by Eliezer’s post that would imply we would make the same choices in MWI as in an unbranching universe. I am not so sure about this.
I’m not sure I would, but “telling the two apart” seems like a weak criterion to stop me from making different choices, if I have a reason to believe the effects in the multiverse might be different, even if I will never know.
You should be careful about rejecting a theory of the universe because its ethical ramifications in particular ethical systems don’t add up to ethical normality.
Theoretically, I could construct an ethical system in which string theory implies that we should eat babies. (Trivially, add a moral axiom that “If string theory is true, utility is increased by eating babies.”) This doesn’t imply that I should reject string theory because it doesn’t add up to normality in some ethical system. It’s trivially easy in this case to see that the ethical system which no longer adds up to normality, not string theory.
If ethical normality can legitimately be used to reject propositions about the universe, then religious people who argue that God is necessary to morality are vindicated in believing that the existence of morality proves the existence of God; God’s nonexistence doesn’t add up to ethical normality.
You should be careful about rejecting a theory of the universe because its ethical ramifications in particular ethical systems don’t add up to ethical normality.
You’ll upvote anything that shows -what- doesn’t add up to normality—any concept or idea, or a specific one? And are you discussing decision theory as opposed to ethical decisions?
If ethical normality can legitimately be used to reject propositions about the universe, then religious people who argue that God is necessary to morality are vindicated in believing that the existence of morality proves the existence of God;
So you wouldn’t agree to this conditional: if the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, then this is good evidence for the reality of God? I think (and I think you think) the antecedent here is false, but that doesn’t make the conditional false.
That conditional is faulty, which isn’t the same as false. The correct conditional would be “If the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, and morality exists, then this is good evidence for the reality of God.” But it still doesn’t have truth value, either true or false, because it’s just a conditional, and one which, when you get down to the details and define morality and God, will almost always turn out to be a tautology. (I/e, morality being what God has decided is good, which turns the conditional into “If God, then God.”)
Reality, yes, normality, maybe not. There is at least an interpretation of “adding up to normality” rattling around in my head that seems to have been inspired by Eliezer’s post that would imply we would make the same choices in MWI as in an unbranching universe. I am not so sure about this.
If there is no way to tell the two apart, why would you make different choices in different cases?
I’m not sure I would, but “telling the two apart” seems like a weak criterion to stop me from making different choices, if I have a reason to believe the effects in the multiverse might be different, even if I will never know.
You should be careful about rejecting a theory of the universe because its ethical ramifications in particular ethical systems don’t add up to ethical normality.
Theoretically, I could construct an ethical system in which string theory implies that we should eat babies. (Trivially, add a moral axiom that “If string theory is true, utility is increased by eating babies.”) This doesn’t imply that I should reject string theory because it doesn’t add up to normality in some ethical system. It’s trivially easy in this case to see that the ethical system which no longer adds up to normality, not string theory.
If ethical normality can legitimately be used to reject propositions about the universe, then religious people who argue that God is necessary to morality are vindicated in believing that the existence of morality proves the existence of God; God’s nonexistence doesn’t add up to ethical normality.
Neither do I want to.
I’m puzzled by your meaning, then.
You’ll upvote anything that shows -what- doesn’t add up to normality—any concept or idea, or a specific one? And are you discussing decision theory as opposed to ethical decisions?
So you wouldn’t agree to this conditional: if the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, then this is good evidence for the reality of God? I think (and I think you think) the antecedent here is false, but that doesn’t make the conditional false.
That conditional is faulty, which isn’t the same as false. The correct conditional would be “If the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, and morality exists, then this is good evidence for the reality of God.” But it still doesn’t have truth value, either true or false, because it’s just a conditional, and one which, when you get down to the details and define morality and God, will almost always turn out to be a tautology. (I/e, morality being what God has decided is good, which turns the conditional into “If God, then God.”)