If ethical normality can legitimately be used to reject propositions about the universe, then religious people who argue that God is necessary to morality are vindicated in believing that the existence of morality proves the existence of God;
So you wouldn’t agree to this conditional: if the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, then this is good evidence for the reality of God? I think (and I think you think) the antecedent here is false, but that doesn’t make the conditional false.
That conditional is faulty, which isn’t the same as false. The correct conditional would be “If the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, and morality exists, then this is good evidence for the reality of God.” But it still doesn’t have truth value, either true or false, because it’s just a conditional, and one which, when you get down to the details and define morality and God, will almost always turn out to be a tautology. (I/e, morality being what God has decided is good, which turns the conditional into “If God, then God.”)
So you wouldn’t agree to this conditional: if the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, then this is good evidence for the reality of God? I think (and I think you think) the antecedent here is false, but that doesn’t make the conditional false.
That conditional is faulty, which isn’t the same as false. The correct conditional would be “If the reality of God is a necessary condition on morality, and morality exists, then this is good evidence for the reality of God.” But it still doesn’t have truth value, either true or false, because it’s just a conditional, and one which, when you get down to the details and define morality and God, will almost always turn out to be a tautology. (I/e, morality being what God has decided is good, which turns the conditional into “If God, then God.”)