Are you suggesting that in the case of the hard problem, there may be some equivalent of the ‘flat earth’ assumption that the hard-problemists hold so tightly that they can’t even comprehend a ‘round earth’ explanation when it’s offered?
I wouldn’t say “can’t even comprehend” but my current theory is that one such detrimental assumption is “I have direct knowledge of content of my experiences”.
but my current theory is that one such detrimental assumption is “I have direct knowledge of content of my experiences”
It’s true this is the weakest link, since instances of the template “I have direct knowledge of X” sound presumptuous and have an extremely bad track record.
The only serious response in favor of the presumptuous assumption [edit] that I can think of is epiphenomenalism in the sense of “I simply am my experiences”, with self-identity (i.e. X = X) filling the role of “having direct knowledge of X”. For explaining how we’re able to have conversations about “epiphenomenalism” without it playing any local causal role in us having these conversations, I’m optimistic that observation selection effects could end up explaining this.
Similarly, I think that one inapplicable assumption is the idea that people can reliably self-analyze and come to accurate conclusions, thus being presumed reliable in their reports, including consciousness. I remember reading something that people’s ability to self-analyze correctly is basically 0, that is people are pretty much always incorrect about their own traits and thoughts.
The point is that they’re usually not even that useful, as bringing an outsider would probably help the situation, and therefore one of the basic assumptions of a lot of consciousness discourse and intuitions is false, and they don’t know this, and in particular, it’s why I now dislike a lot of consciousness intuitions, but this goes especially for dualism.
The fact that we are so bad at self-analysis is why we need outsider help so much.
Is there a reason why it is detrimental? Note that it “I have direct knowledge of content of my experiences”.doesn’t imply certain knowledge, a or non-physical ontology, or epiphenomenalism...
I think it’s detrimental because “direct” there prevents people from accepting weak forms of illusionism, and that creates problems additional to The Hard Problem like Mary or Chalmer’s conceivability of qualia’s structure. And because… I don’t want to say “the assumption is wrong” because knowledge is arbitrary high-level concept, but you can formulate a theory of knowledge where it doesn’t hold and that theory is better.
I wouldn’t say “can’t even comprehend” but my current theory is that one such detrimental assumption is “I have direct knowledge of content of my experiences”.
It’s true this is the weakest link, since instances of the template “I have direct knowledge of X” sound presumptuous and have an extremely bad track record.
The only serious response in favor of the presumptuous assumption [edit] that I can think of is epiphenomenalism in the sense of “I simply am my experiences”, with self-identity (i.e. X = X) filling the role of “having direct knowledge of X”. For explaining how we’re able to have conversations about “epiphenomenalism” without it playing any local causal role in us having these conversations, I’m optimistic that observation selection effects could end up explaining this.
Personally I wouldn’t say “I am my experiences” is epiphenomenalism—I have a casual role.
Response to what?
Response in favor of the assumption that Signer said was detrimental.
Similarly, I think that one inapplicable assumption is the idea that people can reliably self-analyze and come to accurate conclusions, thus being presumed reliable in their reports, including consciousness. I remember reading something that people’s ability to self-analyze correctly is basically 0, that is people are pretty much always incorrect about their own traits and thoughts.
Interpret things strictly enough and everyone is always wrong about everything. They can still be usefully right.
The point is that they’re usually not even that useful, as bringing an outsider would probably help the situation, and therefore one of the basic assumptions of a lot of consciousness discourse and intuitions is false, and they don’t know this, and in particular, it’s why I now dislike a lot of consciousness intuitions, but this goes especially for dualism.
The fact that we are so bad at self-analysis is why we need outsider help so much.
Is there a reason why it is detrimental? Note that it “I have direct knowledge of content of my experiences”.doesn’t imply certain knowledge, a or non-physical ontology, or epiphenomenalism...
Doesn’t “direct” have the implication of “certain” here?
Some people think so, other don’t. Indirectness adds extra uncertainty, but it’s not the only possible source of uncertainty.
I think it’s detrimental because “direct” there prevents people from accepting weak forms of illusionism, and that creates problems additional to The Hard Problem like Mary or Chalmer’s conceivability of qualia’s structure. And because… I don’t want to say “the assumption is wrong” because knowledge is arbitrary high-level concept, but you can formulate a theory of knowledge where it doesn’t hold and that theory is better.