Conditional beliefs (if X then Y) are just normal predictions, with the same truth and usefulness dimensions. That’s distinct from beliefs about how things should be (often called “values”) - these _also_ have truth (will it actually be good if it happens?) and usefulness (is there a path to there?) dimensions, but they are somewhat different in application.
Normative beliefs only have objective truth conditions if moral realism is true. But the model of an agent trying to realise its normative beliefs is always valid, however subjective they are. Usefulness, and in turn, the can only be defined in terms of goals or values.
There is an important subset of beliefs which predict only if acted on, namely beliefs about how things should be.
Conditional beliefs (if X then Y) are just normal predictions, with the same truth and usefulness dimensions. That’s distinct from beliefs about how things should be (often called “values”) - these _also_ have truth (will it actually be good if it happens?) and usefulness (is there a path to there?) dimensions, but they are somewhat different in application.
Normative beliefs only have objective truth conditions if moral realism is true. But the model of an agent trying to realise its normative beliefs is always valid, however subjective they are. Usefulness, and in turn, the can only be defined in terms of goals or values.