The reason I ask is that antinatalism is a contrarian position we think is silly, but has some smart supporters.
Do people here really think that antinatalism is silly? I disagree with the position (very strongly) but it isn’t a view that I consider to be silly in the same way that I would consider say, most religious beliefs to be silly.
But keep in mind that having smart supporters is by no means a strong indication that a viewpoint is not silly. For example, Jonathan Sarfati is a prominent young earth creationist who before he became a YEC proponent was a productive chemist. He’s also a highly ranked chess master. He’s clearly a bright individual. Now, you might be able to argue that YECism has a higher proportion of people who aren’t smart (There’s some evidence to back this up. See for example this breakdown of GSS data and also this analysis. Note that the metric used in the first one, the GSS WORDSUM, is surprisingly robust under education levels by some measures so the first isn’t just measuring a proxy for education.) That might function as a better indicator of silliness. But simply having smart supporters seems insufficient to conclude that a position is not silly.
It does however seem that on LW there’s a common tendency to label beliefs silly when they mean “I assign a very low probability to this belief being correct.” Or “I don’t understand how someone’s mind could be so warped as to have this belief.” Both of these are problematic, the second more so than the first because different humans have different value systems. In this particular example, value systems that put harm to others as more bad are more likely to be able to make a coherent antinatalist position. In that regard, note that people are able to discuss things like paperclippers but seem to have more difficulty discussing value systems which are in many ways closer to their own. This may be simply because paperclipping is a simple moral system. It may also be because it is so far removed from their own moral systems that it becomes easier to map out in a consistent fashion where something like antinatalism is close enough to their own moral system that people conflate some of their own moral/ethical/value conclusions with those of the antinatalist, and that this occurs subtly enough for people not to notice.
Do people here really think that antinatalism is silly?
A data point: I don’t think antinatalism (as defined by Roko above - ‘it is a bad thing to create people’) is silly under every set of circumstances, but neither is it obviously true under all circumstances. If my standard of living is phenomenally awful, and I knew my child’s life would be equally bad, it’d be bad to have a child. But if I were living it up, knew I could be a good parent, and wanted a kid, what would be so awful about having one?
Let me restate what I mean more formally. Conditional on high living standards, high-quality parenting, and desire to raise a child, one can reasonably calculate that the expected utility (to myself, to the potential child and to others) of having the child is higher than the expected utility of not having a child. In which case I wouldn’t think the antinatalism position has legs.
one can reasonably calculate that the expected utility (to myself, to the potential child and to others) of having the child is higher than the expected utility of not having a child.
I’m not sure about this. It’s most likely that anything your kid does in life will get done by someone else instead. There is also some evidence that having children decreases your happiness (though there may be other reasons to have kids).
But even if this is true, it’s still not enough for antinatalism. Increasing total utility is not enough justification to create a life. The act of creation makes you responsible for the utility of the individual created, and you have a duty not to create an entity you have reason to think may have negative personal utility. (Strict utilitarians will disagree.)
I’m not sure about this. It’s most likely that anything your kid does in life will get done by someone else instead.
True—we might call the expected utility strangers get a wash because of this substitution effect. If we say the expected value most people get from me having a child is nil, it doesn’t contribute to the net expected value, but nor does it make it less positive.
There is also some evidence that having children decreases your happiness (though there may be other reasons to have kids).
It sounds as though that data’s based on samples of all types of parents, so it may not have much bearing on the subset of parents who (a) have stable (thanks NL!) high living standards, (b) are good at being parents, and (c) wanted their children. (Of course this just means the evidence is weak, not completely irrelevant.)
But even if this is true, it’s still not enough for antinatalism. Increasing total utility is not enough justification to create a life.
That’s a good point, I know of nothing in utilitarianism that says whose utility I should care about.
The act of creation makes you responsible for the utility of the individual created, and you have a duty not to create an entity you have reason to think may have negative personal utility. (Strict utilitarians will disagree.)
Whether or not someone agrees with this is going to depend on how much they care about risk aversion in addition to expected utility. (Prediction: antinatalists are more risk averse.) I think my personal level of risk aversion is too low for me to agree that I shouldn’t make any entity that has a chance of suffering negative personal utility.
I still think that it’s silly, because the common justification given for the position is highly suspect and borderline sophistry, and is, I suspect, not the causal reason for the values it purports to justify.
Yet because of moral antirealism, the mistake is subtle. And I have yet to find a critique of antinatalism that actually gives the correct (in my view) rebuttal. Most people who try to rebut it seem to also offer arguments that are tantamount sophistry, i.e. they are not the causal reason for the person disagreeing with the view.
And I worry, an I making a similarly subtle mistake? And as a contrarian with few good critics, would anyone present me with the correct counterargument?
I still think that it’s silly, because the common justification given for the position is highly suspect and borderline sophistry, and is, I suspect, not the causal reason for the values it purports to justify.
I’m curious what you think the causal justification is. I’m not a fan of imputing motives to people I disagree with rather than dealing with their arguments but one can’t help but notice that Heinrich Heine was paralyzed, blind and in constant pain for the last decade of his life. Moreover, his religious beliefs prevented him from committing suicide. In that context, antinatalism just in regards to one’s own life seems to make some sense. Thus one might think of antinatalism as arising in part from Other Optimizing
but one can’t help but notice that Heinrich Heine was paralyzed, blind and in constant pain for the last decade of his life. Moreover, his religious beliefs prevented him from committing suicide.
I promise that I genuinely did not know that when I wrote “I suspect, not the causal reason for the values it purports to justify.” and thought “these people were just born with low happiness set points and they’re rationalizing”
Do people here really think that antinatalism is silly? I disagree with the position (very strongly) but it isn’t a view that I consider to be silly in the same way that I would consider say, most religious beliefs to be silly.
But keep in mind that having smart supporters is by no means a strong indication that a viewpoint is not silly. For example, Jonathan Sarfati is a prominent young earth creationist who before he became a YEC proponent was a productive chemist. He’s also a highly ranked chess master. He’s clearly a bright individual. Now, you might be able to argue that YECism has a higher proportion of people who aren’t smart (There’s some evidence to back this up. See for example this breakdown of GSS data and also this analysis. Note that the metric used in the first one, the GSS WORDSUM, is surprisingly robust under education levels by some measures so the first isn’t just measuring a proxy for education.) That might function as a better indicator of silliness. But simply having smart supporters seems insufficient to conclude that a position is not silly.
It does however seem that on LW there’s a common tendency to label beliefs silly when they mean “I assign a very low probability to this belief being correct.” Or “I don’t understand how someone’s mind could be so warped as to have this belief.” Both of these are problematic, the second more so than the first because different humans have different value systems. In this particular example, value systems that put harm to others as more bad are more likely to be able to make a coherent antinatalist position. In that regard, note that people are able to discuss things like paperclippers but seem to have more difficulty discussing value systems which are in many ways closer to their own. This may be simply because paperclipping is a simple moral system. It may also be because it is so far removed from their own moral systems that it becomes easier to map out in a consistent fashion where something like antinatalism is close enough to their own moral system that people conflate some of their own moral/ethical/value conclusions with those of the antinatalist, and that this occurs subtly enough for people not to notice.
A data point: I don’t think antinatalism (as defined by Roko above - ‘it is a bad thing to create people’) is silly under every set of circumstances, but neither is it obviously true under all circumstances. If my standard of living is phenomenally awful, and I knew my child’s life would be equally bad, it’d be bad to have a child. But if I were living it up, knew I could be a good parent, and wanted a kid, what would be so awful about having one?
That your child might experience a great deal of pain which you could prevent by not having it.
That your child might regret being born and wish you had made the other decision.
That you can be a good parent, raise a kid, and improve someone’s life without having a kid (adopt).
That the world is already overpopulated and our natural resources are not infinite.
Points taken.
Let me restate what I mean more formally. Conditional on high living standards, high-quality parenting, and desire to raise a child, one can reasonably calculate that the expected utility (to myself, to the potential child and to others) of having the child is higher than the expected utility of not having a child. In which case I wouldn’t think the antinatalism position has legs.
I’d throw in considering how stable you think those high living standards are.
I’m not sure about this. It’s most likely that anything your kid does in life will get done by someone else instead. There is also some evidence that having children decreases your happiness (though there may be other reasons to have kids).
But even if this is true, it’s still not enough for antinatalism. Increasing total utility is not enough justification to create a life. The act of creation makes you responsible for the utility of the individual created, and you have a duty not to create an entity you have reason to think may have negative personal utility. (Strict utilitarians will disagree.)
True—we might call the expected utility strangers get a wash because of this substitution effect. If we say the expected value most people get from me having a child is nil, it doesn’t contribute to the net expected value, but nor does it make it less positive.
It sounds as though that data’s based on samples of all types of parents, so it may not have much bearing on the subset of parents who (a) have stable (thanks NL!) high living standards, (b) are good at being parents, and (c) wanted their children. (Of course this just means the evidence is weak, not completely irrelevant.)
That’s a good point, I know of nothing in utilitarianism that says whose utility I should care about.
Whether or not someone agrees with this is going to depend on how much they care about risk aversion in addition to expected utility. (Prediction: antinatalists are more risk averse.) I think my personal level of risk aversion is too low for me to agree that I shouldn’t make any entity that has a chance of suffering negative personal utility.
I still think that it’s silly, because the common justification given for the position is highly suspect and borderline sophistry, and is, I suspect, not the causal reason for the values it purports to justify.
Yet because of moral antirealism, the mistake is subtle. And I have yet to find a critique of antinatalism that actually gives the correct (in my view) rebuttal. Most people who try to rebut it seem to also offer arguments that are tantamount sophistry, i.e. they are not the causal reason for the person disagreeing with the view.
And I worry, an I making a similarly subtle mistake? And as a contrarian with few good critics, would anyone present me with the correct counterargument?
I’m curious what you think the causal justification is. I’m not a fan of imputing motives to people I disagree with rather than dealing with their arguments but one can’t help but notice that Heinrich Heine was paralyzed, blind and in constant pain for the last decade of his life. Moreover, his religious beliefs prevented him from committing suicide. In that context, antinatalism just in regards to one’s own life seems to make some sense. Thus one might think of antinatalism as arising in part from Other Optimizing
I promise that I genuinely did not know that when I wrote “I suspect, not the causal reason for the values it purports to justify.” and thought “these people were just born with low happiness set points and they’re rationalizing”