As Eliezer points out in his article here, a zombie duplicate of yourself would profess that it is conscious, when asked whether it had any conscious experience it would say “yes!” and when given tests designed to demonstrate its conscious experience it would pass
EY also thinks we are zombies wrt. free will—we say we have it for reasons other than having it.
This seems false? Eliezer believes we have free will? See Thou Art Physics.
Or perhaps I should say, “If the future were not determined by reality, it could not be determined by you,” or “If the future were not determined by something, it could not be determined by you.” You don’t need neuroscience or physics to push naive definitions of free will into incoherence. If the mind were not embodied in the brain, it would be embodied in something else; there would be some real thing that was a mind. If the future were not determined by physics, it would be determined by something, some law, some order, some grand reality that included you within it.
He also argues against FW, in the sense of libertarian free will. Above , he argues for compatibilist free will. As usual, its not much of a consolation prize. To be able to determine the future in a way that is itself determined falls short of being able to steer to a future of your choosing.
ETA:
He also seems to think that merely being part of a wider system means you are determined. Nope.
Here is what he says about “compatibilism” in the above linked article
“Compatibilism” is the philosophical position that “free will” can be intuitively and satisfyingly defined in such a way as to be compatible with deterministic physics. “Incompatibilism” is the position that free will and determinism are incompatible.
My position might perhaps be called “Requiredism.” When agency, choice, control, and moral responsibility are cashed out in a sensible way, they require determinism—at least some patches of determinism within the universe. If you choose, and plan, and act, and bring some future into being, in accordance with your desire, then all this requires a lawful sort of reality; you cannot do it amid utter chaos. There must be order over at least those parts of reality that are being controlled by you. You are within physics, and so you/physics have determined the future. If it were not determined by physics, it could not be determined by you.
here he argues directly against “To be able to determine the future in a way that is itself determined falls short of being able to steer to a future of your choosing.”, so I suggest you read the article before saying you know what Eliezer thinks!
My position might perhaps be called “Requiredism.” When agency, choice, control, and moral responsibility are cashed out in a sensible way, they require determinism—at least some patches of determinism within the universe. If you choose, and plan, and act, and bring some future into being, in accordance with your desire, then all this requires a lawful sort of reality; you cannot do it amid utter chaos.
But choice..choice between options, any of which could possibly occur..is incompatible with determinism, because determinism means there is only ever one possible (and therefore necessary) outcome … even if determinism is useful in other ways. You can still have a deterministic decision making process...but it is only some clockwork gets you to an outcome that was predetermined before you were born.
A libertarian choice is an actual fork in the road, and a Laplace’s Demon wouldn’t be able to see past it.
So, he thinks that compatibilist FW is as good as libertarian FW, because he thinks they both involve the same notion of choice...but they aren’t.
Also, “utter chaos” isn’t the only alternative to strict determinism. That would be false dichotomy. Lawful probabilistic causation is a thing.
EY also thinks we are zombies wrt. free will—we say we have it for reasons other than having it.
This seems false? Eliezer believes we have free will? See Thou Art Physics.
He also argues against FW, in the sense of libertarian free will. Above , he argues for compatibilist free will. As usual, its not much of a consolation prize. To be able to determine the future in a way that is itself determined falls short of being able to steer to a future of your choosing.
ETA:
He also seems to think that merely being part of a wider system means you are determined. Nope.
Here is what he says about “compatibilism” in the above linked article
here he argues directly against “To be able to determine the future in a way that is itself determined falls short of being able to steer to a future of your choosing.”, so I suggest you read the article before saying you know what Eliezer thinks!
Maybe you are referring to this passage.
But choice..choice between options, any of which could possibly occur..is incompatible with determinism, because determinism means there is only ever one possible (and therefore necessary) outcome … even if determinism is useful in other ways. You can still have a deterministic decision making process...but it is only some clockwork gets you to an outcome that was predetermined before you were born.
A libertarian choice is an actual fork in the road, and a Laplace’s Demon wouldn’t be able to see past it.
So, he thinks that compatibilist FW is as good as libertarian FW, because he thinks they both involve the same notion of choice...but they aren’t.
Also, “utter chaos” isn’t the only alternative to strict determinism. That would be false dichotomy. Lawful probabilistic causation is a thing.