On standard physicalism zombies would be conceivable
On standard (non eliminative) physicalism, zombies cannot be conceived without contradiction , because physicalism holds that consciousness is entirely physical, and a physical duplicate is a duplicate simpliciter. So the inconceivability of zombies is not a USP of RM.
The bite of the zombie argument is that zombies are conceivable given physics … physics does not predict phenomenal properties, so absence of phenomenal properties does not lead to contradiction.
I could also imagine other flavours of Monism (which might be better labelled as property dualism?) for which the intrinsic categorical properties are contingent rather than necessary
Phenomenal “properties” are more necessary under DAT than RM, because they are not even separate properties, but arise from the subjective perspective on the underlying reality.
On standard (non eliminative) physicalism, zombies cannot be conceived without contradiction , because physicalism holds that consciousness is entirely physical, and a physical duplicate is a duplicate simpliciter.
This isn’t correct. The standard non-eliminative (type B) physicalist stance is to grant that zombies are conceivable a priori but deny the move to metaphysical possibility a posteriori. They’d say that physical brain states are identical to phenomena but we only find this a posteriori (analogous to water = H20 or heat = molecular motion.) You might find this view unsatisfying (as I do) but there are plenty of philosophers who take the line (Loar, Papineau, Tye etc..) and it’s not contradictory.
The physicalist move to deny zombie conceivability is eliminativist (type A) and is taken by e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Lewis etc..
There’s is a reason I mentioned conceivability without contradiction. I don’t particularly have it but into the standard framework about conceivability, metaphysical possibility, etc, and I dont. If you ground conceivability in non contradiction, then it has an objective basis, otherwise it’s just an opinion. P-zombies don’t contradict physics , but do contradict physicalism, which is why physicalists don’t believe in them.
On standard (non eliminative) physicalism, zombies cannot be conceived without contradiction , because physicalism holds that consciousness is entirely physical, and a physical duplicate is a duplicate simpliciter. So the inconceivability of zombies is not a USP of RM.
The bite of the zombie argument is that zombies are conceivable given physics … physics does not predict phenomenal properties, so absence of phenomenal properties does not lead to contradiction.
Phenomenal “properties” are more necessary under DAT than RM, because they are not even separate properties, but arise from the subjective perspective on the underlying reality.
This isn’t correct. The standard non-eliminative (type B) physicalist stance is to grant that zombies are conceivable a priori but deny the move to metaphysical possibility a posteriori. They’d say that physical brain states are identical to phenomena but we only find this a posteriori (analogous to water = H20 or heat = molecular motion.) You might find this view unsatisfying (as I do) but there are plenty of philosophers who take the line (Loar, Papineau, Tye etc..) and it’s not contradictory.
The physicalist move to deny zombie conceivability is eliminativist (type A) and is taken by e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Lewis etc..
There’s is a reason I mentioned conceivability without contradiction. I don’t particularly have it but into the standard framework about conceivability, metaphysical possibility, etc, and I dont. If you ground conceivability in non contradiction, then it has an objective basis, otherwise it’s just an opinion. P-zombies don’t contradict physics , but do contradict physicalism, which is why physicalists don’t believe in them.