On standard (non eliminative) physicalism, zombies cannot be conceived without contradiction , because physicalism holds that consciousness is entirely physical, and a physical duplicate is a duplicate simpliciter.
This isn’t correct. The standard non-eliminative (type B) physicalist stance is to grant that zombies are conceivable a priori but deny the move to metaphysical possibility a posteriori. They’d say that physical brain states are identical to phenomena but we only find this a posteriori (analogous to water = H20 or heat = molecular motion.) You might find this view unsatisfying (as I do) but there are plenty of philosophers who take the line (Loar, Papineau, Tye etc..) and it’s not contradictory.
The physicalist move to deny zombie conceivability is eliminativist (type A) and is taken by e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Lewis etc..
There’s is a reason I mentioned conceivability without contradiction. I don’t particularly have it but into the standard framework about conceivability, metaphysical possibility, etc, and I dont. If you ground conceivability in non contradiction, then it has an objective basis, otherwise it’s just an opinion. P-zombies don’t contradict physics , but do contradict physicalism, which is why physicalists don’t believe in them.
This isn’t correct. The standard non-eliminative (type B) physicalist stance is to grant that zombies are conceivable a priori but deny the move to metaphysical possibility a posteriori. They’d say that physical brain states are identical to phenomena but we only find this a posteriori (analogous to water = H20 or heat = molecular motion.) You might find this view unsatisfying (as I do) but there are plenty of philosophers who take the line (Loar, Papineau, Tye etc..) and it’s not contradictory.
The physicalist move to deny zombie conceivability is eliminativist (type A) and is taken by e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Lewis etc..
There’s is a reason I mentioned conceivability without contradiction. I don’t particularly have it but into the standard framework about conceivability, metaphysical possibility, etc, and I dont. If you ground conceivability in non contradiction, then it has an objective basis, otherwise it’s just an opinion. P-zombies don’t contradict physics , but do contradict physicalism, which is why physicalists don’t believe in them.