When we say “art is good” and “physics theory is good” we do not mean the same thing by “good”.
In the first case we mean “aesthically pleasing”, “though provoking”, “satisfies a specific the definition of ‘art’”. In the second we mean “represents the reality”.
Taboo the words “subjective” and “objective”—they are the legacy of the times when people didn’t understand map-territory relations. You have a much better vocabulary now, you do not need to carry on the confusions of ancient philosophy.
Model of reality is a map. This map can either represent the territory or not. People consensus about a map is also a map, that can either represent a territory or not. Consensus that the map represents the territory isn’t the same as map representing the territory.
When we say “art is good” and “physics theory is good” we do not mean the same thing by “good”.
No we dont. The point is what good, as in good physics, isn’t. It isn’t objective, and it isn’t correspondence to reality per se...only a proxy, at best.
Consensus that the map represents the territory isn’t the same as map representing the territory.
What is? We hope that the physics we consider to be good represents the territory, but we have no way of checking directly. You can use the map/territory distinction to define truth, etc, but it doesn’t tell you how to achieve it. So it doesn’t actually solve the problem.
X=X. Why do you think that something other than X have to be X? We are using whatever imperfect approximations we have. As you’ve said yourself:
We hope that the physics we consider to be good represents the territory, but we have no way of checking directly.
And it’s important to keep in mind that an imperfect approximation isn’t the same as the thing it approximates or you can get confused.
You can use the map/territory distinction to define truth, etc, but it doesn’t tell you how to achieve it.
It can help you deal with the cases where you confuse map and a territory, or map of a map with the map of a territory, or map of a map of a map with the map of a map of a territory, etc. And if it’s this confusion that prevents you from achieving truth, then why—it’s a way to achieve truth.
So it doesn’t actually solve the problem.
What problem are you talking about? How can any map, in principle, represent a territory?
X=X. Why do you think that something other than X have to be X? We are using whatever imperfect approximations we have.
It’s important to understand how imperfect they are.
We hope that the physics we consider to be good represents the territory, but we have no way of checking directly.
And it’s important to keep in mind that an imperfect approximation isn’t the same as the thing it approximates or you can get confused.
Who has that problem? I’m pointing out another problem: we can’t quantify how correspondent a theory is. We can quantify how well it predicts, but not how close it is to reality. We don’t know how much closeness-to-=reality an extra significant digit of accuracy buys you. Measurement accuracy is objective, closeness-to-reality isn’t. We can’t even say it’s an approximation, because we don’t know the error bar.
It can help you deal with the cases where you confuse map and a territory, or map of a map with the map of a territory, or map of a map of a map with the map of a map of a territory, etc. And if it’s this confusion that prevents you from achieving truth, then why—it’s a way to achieve truth.
You’re holding a hammer, that doesn’t mean I’m holding a nail.
M/T can help you avoid some mistakes...but not the one I have mentioned. It’s not a universal solvent.
So it doesn’t actually solve the problem.
What problem are you talking about? How can any map, in principle, represent a territory?
No...how we can know it does.
If you have every possible map in some library, then one of them will correspond exactly. But if you don’t know which one, the library contains no useful information.
A lot of people. Topic starter included, apparently.
I’m pointing out another problem
Yes you do, and I’m not sure why bring up this separate issue here.
I’m pointing out another problem: we can’t quantify how correspondent a theory is. We can quantify how well it predicts, but not how close it is to reality. We don’t know how much closeness-to-=reality an extra significant digit of accuracy buys you.
Predicts what, dare I ask? For the first approximation we can define “reality” by the outcomes that we predict or fail to predict. If the “true reality” is something completely and utterly different that it’s not captured by the outcomes we interact with, then either it doesn’t exist or doesn’t concern us.
You’re holding a hammer, that doesn’t mean I’m holding a nail. M/T can help you avoid some mistakes...but not the one I have mentioned. It’s not a universal solvent.
From my perspective it looks as if I’ve successfully nailed a thing and now you are telling me out of blue that it’s not enough to build a house. Yeah, sure, not that I claimed otherwise. What I actually claim, is that having a hammer and nails is very helpful for construction purposes, much more helpful than trying to hold things together with ropes, even though it’s not the only things that are required.
If you have every possible map in some library, then one of them will correspond exactly. But if you don’t know which one, the library contains no useful information.
There is a valid question here. It’s not likely that a randomly selected map fits the territory. So where does the improbability of a map corresponding to the territory comes from? The answer is that the process wasn’t random, that our maps and mapmaking tools are designed by the territory to be able to represent it and are part of the territory itself.
Yes you do, and I’m not sure why bring up this separate issue here.
Because it’s relevant to the OP. OP says physics is subjective. You say it’s approximate, but still objective. I say that instrumentalism/measurement is objectively approximate, but realism/correspondence isn’t .. it can’t be calculated or measured.
Predicts what, dare I ask?
Observations.
For the first approximation we can define “reality” by the outcomes that we predict or fail to predict.
No, that’s not reality in the realism versus instrumentalism sense.
If the “true reality” is something completely and utterly different that it’s not captured by the outcomes we interact with, then either it doesn’t exist or doesn’t concern us.
Everybody has their own values. If it concerns you personally,it concerns you. If you care whether or not your in a simulation, whether or there is a deistic deity, which interpretation of QM is true, it concerns you.
There is a valid question here. It’s not likely that a randomly selected map fits the territory. So where does the improbability of a map corresponding to the territory comes from? The answer is that the process wasn’t random, that our maps and mapmaking tools are designed by the territory to be able to represent it
Why would the territory care about our ability to represent it? Natural selection kills an organism for failure to predict, not for getting fundamental ontology wrong.
and are part of the territory itself.
How does that help? All epistemology, good bad , or indifferent, is in the territory.
No I don’t. I specifically advise against using objective/subjective distinction in order to describe the phenomena that OP is trying to describe.
Observations.
While it’s technically possible to build a purely experience-based epistemology it quickly becomes too complex in the Occamian sense.
No
Yes we can. Try and see for yourself
that’s not reality in the realism versus instrumentalism sense.
Too bad. But that’s the failure of the framework, not the method. Because realism versus instrumentalism is another confused dichotomy which is systematically leading people astray.
Everybody has their own values. If it concerns you personally,it concerns you. If you care whether or not your in a simulation, whether or there is a deistic deity, which interpretation of QM is true, it concerns you.
Feel free to pursue your values and/or try to answer ontological questions about deities simulations and QM interpretations. This is not relevant to the epistemological question at hand.
Why would the territory care about our ability to represent it? Natural selection kills an organism for failure to predict
You’ve just answered your question.
not for getting fundamental ontology wrong
As long as “fundamental ontology” is correlated with our observations we were selected for getting it somewhat right. See discovering QM even though our ancestors were not directly selected for particle physics scholarship. And if it’s not—it’s some other territory then. Maybe it’s fundamentally unknowable for us, or maybe we will manage to correlate our observations to it later, if so we can still describe it using the same epistemological framework of map territory relations. Though I hope we will have something even better then.
How does that help? All epistemology, good bad , or indifferent, is in the territory.
Just another example how of M/T framework is superior to subjective/objective one. The latter treats subjectivity and objectivity as separate realms opposing each other: X is either subjective or objective, thus missing the fact of our embedment in the territory.
No I don’t. I specifically advise against using objective/subjective distinction in order to describe the phenomena that OP is trying to describe.
You need to say why it is wrong, or why your approach is better.
Just another example how of M/T framework is superior to subjective/objective one. The latter treats subjectivity and objectivity as separate realms opposing each other: X is either subjective or objective, thus missing the fact of our embedment in the territory.
Subjectivity and objectivity aren’t ontological realms at all. They are epistemological terms.
While it’s technically possible to build a purely experience-based epistemology it quickly becomes too complex in the Occamian sense.
Is there some proof of that? Because it would imply that everything a Solomonoff inductor does is “too complex in the Occamian sense”.
For the first approximation we can define “reality” by the outcomes that we predict or fail to predict.
No, that’s not reality in the realism versus instrumentalism sense.
Changing the definition of “realism” doesn’t allow you to achieve realism, any more than calling a tail a leg proves a dog has five legs.
realism versus instrumentalism is another confused dichotomy which is systematically leading people astray.
You need to prove that.
This is not relevant to the epistemological question at hand.
The question—according to the OP—is whether physics is objective. A lot of people want physics to tell them what reality is objectively. If you personally don;’t, that has no impact on them.
not for getting fundamental ontology wrong
As long as “fundamental ontology” is correlated with our observations we were selected for getting it somewhat right.
More than one ontology can predict the same observations—that’s part of the problem.
See discovering QM even though our ancestors were not directly selected for particle physics scholarship.
We don’t know which fundamental ontology QM indicates. That’s the whole problem of interpretation of QM.
And if it’s not—it’s some other territory then. Maybe it’s fundamentally unknowable for us,
So you concede that we don’t have some easy, automatic method of figuring out ontology. And you also can’t say that it doesn’t matter objectively,...only that you don’t care subjectively.
You need to say why it is wrong, or why your approach is better.
Being doing it for quite some time. Your next citation is literally about that.
Subjectivity and objectivity aren’t ontological realms at all. They are epistemological terms.
I didn’t claim that they are ontological realms. The claim was that they are defined as opposing each other. As if something is subjective it’s not objective and vice versa and that this framework harms out understanding.
Is there some proof of that? Because it would imply that everything a Solomonoff inductor does is “too complex in the Occamian sense”.
Not too complex to exist. To complex to be considered the best hypothesis by the Solomonoff inductor. At some moment it’s just simpler to postulate some “shared reality” than disjointed experiences. And yes most of the hypothesis that Solomonoff inductor consider would naturally be too complex in this sense.
Changing the definition of “realism” doesn’t allow you to achieve realism, any more than calling a tail a leg proves a dog has five legs.
Unless, of course the tail was originally called a leg by mistake and I’m now using a better fitting term.
You need to prove that.
Yeah, I’m going to write a whole sequence on these matters eventually.
The question—according to the OP—is whether physics is objective. A lot of people want physics to tell them what reality is objectively. If you personally don;’t, that has no impact on them.
As always people have different definitions of “reality”. I’m pointing the author towards definitions that I find less confused. You claim that they are not the same definitions you like. Which is true, and not to their credit. But more importantly what definitions you prefer to use isn’t really relevant to the point I’m trying to make.
More than one ontology can predict the same observations—that’s part of the problem.
And yet only one of the hypothesis is the most accurate and the least complex considering all evidence. Come on, you brought up Solomonoff inductor yourself, you have to understand the underlying principle.
We don’t know which fundamental ontology QM indicates. That’s the whole problem of interpretation of QM.
Yes, that’s the next question in chain. This doesn’t contradict my point that we’ve already answered so many.
So you concede that we don’t have some easy, automatic method of figuring out ontology. And you also can’t say that it doesn’t matter objectively,...only that you don’t care subjectively.
Only in the narrow edge case of “metaphysical reality” being completely uncorrelated with our observations. Do you concede that in every other case we do? Not sure what you mean by “matter objectively”. I’m expecting that the best map describing the territory it’s actually correlated to, isn’t confused that it doesn’t describe some other territory that it’s not correlated to.
I didn’t claim that they are *ontological *realms. The claim was that they are defined as opposing each other.
Lots of things are. Why would tha matter?
As if something is subjective it’s not objective and vice versa and that this framework harms out understanding
At some moment it’s just simpler to postulate some “shared reality” than disjointed experiences.
So what you mean by experience based explanation isn’t empiricism, it’s something like solipsism or idealism...?
Unless, of course the tail was originally called a leg by mistake and I’m now using a better fitting term.
That would be an extraordinary claim in need of supporr.
The question—according to the OP—is whether physics is objective. A lot of people want physics to tell them what reality is objectively. If you personally don;’t, that has no impact on them.
As always people have different definitions of “reality”. I’m pointing the author towards definitions that I find less confused.
Without explaining why.
More than one ontology can predict the same observations—that’s part of the problem.
And yet only one of the hypothesis is the most accurate and the least complex considering all evidence.
There’s multiple simplicity criteria, too.
Come on, you brought up Solomonoff inductor yourself, you have to understand the underlying principle.
Yes. In fact, unlike a lot of people here, I can see its drawbacks.
SIs try to process an infinite list of programmes in a finite time. To acheve this, the process cess shorter candidate rgramnes first. In other words, the way they work has a justification that has nothing to do with their probability of successfully representing the territory , assuming they can be unproblematically translated into hypotheses. It might conveniently be the case that the same simplicity criterion does the job, but it doesn’t have to be
So you concede that we don’t have some easy, automatic method of figuring out ontology. And you also can’t say that it doesn’t matter objectively,...only that you don’t care subjectively.
Only in the narrow edge case of “metaphysical reality” being completely uncorrelated with our observations.
No, in the cases where metaphysical reality is not completely correlated. That’s why you need simplicity criteria.
Do you concede that in every other case we do? Not sure what you mean by “matter objectively”.
According to some universal values.
I’m expecting that the best map describing the territory it’s actually correlated to, isn’t confused that it doesn’t describe some other territory that it’s not correlated to.
Again , the problem is *knowing that you have axhieved correspondence.
When we say “art is good” and “physics theory is good” we do not mean the same thing by “good”.
In the first case we mean “aesthically pleasing”, “though provoking”, “satisfies a specific the definition of ‘art’”. In the second we mean “represents the reality”.
Taboo the words “subjective” and “objective”—they are the legacy of the times when people didn’t understand map-territory relations. You have a much better vocabulary now, you do not need to carry on the confusions of ancient philosophy.
Model of reality is a map. This map can either represent the territory or not. People consensus about a map is also a map, that can either represent a territory or not. Consensus that the map represents the territory isn’t the same as map representing the territory.
No we dont. The point is what good, as in good physics, isn’t. It isn’t objective, and it isn’t correspondence to reality per se...only a proxy, at best.
What is? We hope that the physics we consider to be good represents the territory, but we have no way of checking directly. You can use the map/territory distinction to define truth, etc, but it doesn’t tell you how to achieve it. So it doesn’t actually solve the problem.
X=X. Why do you think that something other than X have to be X? We are using whatever imperfect approximations we have. As you’ve said yourself:
And it’s important to keep in mind that an imperfect approximation isn’t the same as the thing it approximates or you can get confused.
It can help you deal with the cases where you confuse map and a territory, or map of a map with the map of a territory, or map of a map of a map with the map of a map of a territory, etc. And if it’s this confusion that prevents you from achieving truth, then why—it’s a way to achieve truth.
What problem are you talking about? How can any map, in principle, represent a territory?
It’s important to understand how imperfect they are.
Who has that problem? I’m pointing out another problem: we can’t quantify how correspondent a theory is. We can quantify how well it predicts, but not how close it is to reality. We don’t know how much closeness-to-=reality an extra significant digit of accuracy buys you. Measurement accuracy is objective, closeness-to-reality isn’t. We can’t even say it’s an approximation, because we don’t know the error bar.
You’re holding a hammer, that doesn’t mean I’m holding a nail. M/T can help you avoid some mistakes...but not the one I have mentioned. It’s not a universal solvent.
No...how we can know it does.
If you have every possible map in some library, then one of them will correspond exactly. But if you don’t know which one, the library contains no useful information.
A lot of people. Topic starter included, apparently.
Yes you do, and I’m not sure why bring up this separate issue here.
Predicts what, dare I ask? For the first approximation we can define “reality” by the outcomes that we predict or fail to predict. If the “true reality” is something completely and utterly different that it’s not captured by the outcomes we interact with, then either it doesn’t exist or doesn’t concern us.
From my perspective it looks as if I’ve successfully nailed a thing and now you are telling me out of blue that it’s not enough to build a house. Yeah, sure, not that I claimed otherwise. What I actually claim, is that having a hammer and nails is very helpful for construction purposes, much more helpful than trying to hold things together with ropes, even though it’s not the only things that are required.
There is a valid question here. It’s not likely that a randomly selected map fits the territory. So where does the improbability of a map corresponding to the territory comes from? The answer is that the process wasn’t random, that our maps and mapmaking tools are designed by the territory to be able to represent it and are part of the territory itself.
Because it’s relevant to the OP. OP says physics is subjective. You say it’s approximate, but still objective. I say that instrumentalism/measurement is objectively approximate, but realism/correspondence isn’t .. it can’t be calculated or measured.
Observations.
No, that’s not reality in the realism versus instrumentalism sense.
Everybody has their own values. If it concerns you personally,it concerns you. If you care whether or not your in a simulation, whether or there is a deistic deity, which interpretation of QM is true, it concerns you.
Why would the territory care about our ability to represent it? Natural selection kills an organism for failure to predict, not for getting fundamental ontology wrong.
How does that help? All epistemology, good bad , or indifferent, is in the territory.
No I don’t. I specifically advise against using objective/subjective distinction in order to describe the phenomena that OP is trying to describe.
While it’s technically possible to build a purely experience-based epistemology it quickly becomes too complex in the Occamian sense.
Yes we can. Try and see for yourself
Too bad. But that’s the failure of the framework, not the method. Because realism versus instrumentalism is another confused dichotomy which is systematically leading people astray.
Feel free to pursue your values and/or try to answer ontological questions about deities simulations and QM interpretations. This is not relevant to the epistemological question at hand.
You’ve just answered your question.
As long as “fundamental ontology” is correlated with our observations we were selected for getting it somewhat right. See discovering QM even though our ancestors were not directly selected for particle physics scholarship. And if it’s not—it’s some other territory then. Maybe it’s fundamentally unknowable for us, or maybe we will manage to correlate our observations to it later, if so we can still describe it using the same epistemological framework of map territory relations. Though I hope we will have something even better then.
Just another example how of M/T framework is superior to subjective/objective one. The latter treats subjectivity and objectivity as separate realms opposing each other: X is either subjective or objective, thus missing the fact of our embedment in the territory.
You need to say why it is wrong, or why your approach is better.
Subjectivity and objectivity aren’t ontological realms at all. They are epistemological terms.
Is there some proof of that? Because it would imply that everything a Solomonoff inductor does is “too complex in the Occamian sense”.
Changing the definition of “realism” doesn’t allow you to achieve realism, any more than calling a tail a leg proves a dog has five legs.
You need to prove that.
The question—according to the OP—is whether physics is objective. A lot of people want physics to tell them what reality is objectively. If you personally don;’t, that has no impact on them.
More than one ontology can predict the same observations—that’s part of the problem.
We don’t know which fundamental ontology QM indicates. That’s the whole problem of interpretation of QM.
So you concede that we don’t have some easy, automatic method of figuring out ontology. And you also can’t say that it doesn’t matter objectively,...only that you don’t care subjectively.
Being doing it for quite some time. Your next citation is literally about that.
I didn’t claim that they are ontological realms. The claim was that they are defined as opposing each other. As if something is subjective it’s not objective and vice versa and that this framework harms out understanding.
Not too complex to exist. To complex to be considered the best hypothesis by the Solomonoff inductor. At some moment it’s just simpler to postulate some “shared reality” than disjointed experiences. And yes most of the hypothesis that Solomonoff inductor consider would naturally be too complex in this sense.
Unless, of course the tail was originally called a leg by mistake and I’m now using a better fitting term.
Yeah, I’m going to write a whole sequence on these matters eventually.
As always people have different definitions of “reality”. I’m pointing the author towards definitions that I find less confused. You claim that they are not the same definitions you like. Which is true, and not to their credit. But more importantly what definitions you prefer to use isn’t really relevant to the point I’m trying to make.
And yet only one of the hypothesis is the most accurate and the least complex considering all evidence. Come on, you brought up Solomonoff inductor yourself, you have to understand the underlying principle.
Yes, that’s the next question in chain. This doesn’t contradict my point that we’ve already answered so many.
Only in the narrow edge case of “metaphysical reality” being completely uncorrelated with our observations. Do you concede that in every other case we do? Not sure what you mean by “matter objectively”. I’m expecting that the best map describing the territory it’s actually correlated to, isn’t confused that it doesn’t describe some other territory that it’s not correlated to.
Lots of things are. Why would tha matter?
So what you mean by experience based explanation isn’t empiricism, it’s something like solipsism or idealism...?
That would be an extraordinary claim in need of supporr.
Without explaining why.
There’s multiple simplicity criteria, too.
Yes. In fact, unlike a lot of people here, I can see its drawbacks.
SIs try to process an infinite list of programmes in a finite time. To acheve this, the process cess shorter candidate rgramnes first. In other words, the way they work has a justification that has nothing to do with their probability of successfully representing the territory , assuming they can be unproblematically translated into hypotheses. It might conveniently be the case that the same simplicity criterion does the job, but it doesn’t have to be
No, in the cases where metaphysical reality is not completely correlated. That’s why you need simplicity criteria.
According to some universal values.
Again , the problem is *knowing that you have axhieved correspondence.