This is a nice post about an interesting topic. I think it may be helpful to mention that several of these points are discussed extensively in economics, polsci and game theory, though sometimes with a different vocabulary. (But maybe it is somehow intentional to not mention that, in order to keep the post shorter?)
“Successfully meeting up is still far more important than the location chosen, but given a successful meetup, you both disagree on preferred location.” This resembles the BoS game.
In the section “Powerless Underlings: Intentionally Destroying Communication Channels”, I like the idea of destroying communication channels after leaving a coordination message and find it an original idea. The store-clerk example could benefit from mentioning that there is a large literature on optimal delegation, for instance to a bureaucratic agent. This includes models of delegation as a commitment device, also modeling how much leeway you should leave to the agent you delegate to. Sometimes it makes sense to delegate to agents with preferences different from your own. In the 1980s that was the reason modeled in the literature on conservative central bankers. There are also papers on delegating the authority to bargain for you, I think I have seen that in the context of climate change papers.
Another point is that I think it would be helpful to define what exactly you call “negotiation game” more explicitly. Intuitively, I would say that the original usage of the term “Schelling point” or “focal point” suggests that it should be possible to write it down as a simultaneous-move game, and I don’t think that applies to every kind of negotiation (but I am no expert on how the term is used).
But maybe it is somehow intentional to not mention that, in order to keep the post shorter?
Yup, exactly. I was hoping someone would mention it in the comments, so thank you.