Do your choices have causes? Do those causes have causes?
Determinism doesn’t have to mean epiphenomenalism. Metaphysically, epiphenomenalism—the belief that consciousness has no causal power—is a lot like belief in true free will—consciousness as an uncaused cause—in that it places consciousness half outside the chain of cause and effect, rather than wholly within it. (But subjectively they can be very different.)
Increase in consciousness increases the extent to which the causes of one’s choices and actions are themselves conscious in origin rather than unconscious. This may be experienced as liberation from cause and effect, but really it’s just liberation from unconscious causes. Choices do have causes, whether or not you’re aware of them.
Whether someone is a determinist or not should itself have been determined biologically including all discussions of this nature!
This is a point which throws many people, but again, it comes from an insufficiently broad concept of causality. Reason itself has causes and operates as a cause. We can agree, surely, that absurdly wrong beliefs have a cause; we can understand why a person raised in a cult may believe its dogmas. Correct beliefs also have a cause. Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
Nonetheless, despite this limited evolutionary gift, it may be true that we are deterministically doomed to fundamental error or ignorance in certain matters. Since the relationship of consciousness, knowledge, and reality is not exactly clear, it’s hard to be sure.
Do your choices have causes? Do those causes have causes?
Determinism doesn’t have to mean epiphenomenalism. Metaphysically, epiphenomenalism—the belief that consciousness has no causal power—is a lot like belief in true free will—consciousness as an uncaused cause—in that it places consciousness half outside the chain of cause and effect, rather than wholly within it. (But subjectively they can be very different.)
I don’t equate determinism with epiphenomenalism, but that even when it acts as a cause, it is completely determined meaning the apparent choice is simply the inability, at current level of knowledge, of being able to predict exactly what choice will be made.
Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
Not sure how that follows. Evolutionary survival can say nothing about emergence of sentient species, let alone some capacity for correct cognition in that species. If the popular beliefs and models of the universe until a few centuries ago are incorrect, that seems to point in the exact opposite direction of your claim.
It appears that the problem seems to be one of ‘generalisation from one example’. There exist beings with a consciousness that is not biologically determined and there exist those whose consciousness is completely biologically detemined. The former may choose determinism as a ‘belief in belief’ while the latter will see it as a fact, much like a self-aware AI.
… the apparent choice is simply the inability, at current level of knowledge, of being able to predict exactly what choice will be made.
That’s true. And there is no problem within it.
Evolutionary survival can say nothing about emergence of sentient species, let alone some capacity for correct cognition in that species.
If the cognition was totally incorrect, leading to beliefs unrelated to the outside world, it would be only a waste of energy to maintain such cognitive capacity. Correct beliefs about certain things (like locations of food and predators) are without doubt great evolutionary advantage.
If the popular beliefs and models of the universe until a few centuries ago are incorrect, that seems to point in the exact opposite direction of your claim.
Yes, but it is a very weak evidence (more so, if current models are correct). The claim stated that there was at least some capacity for correct cognition, not that the cognition is perfect.
There exist beings with a consciousness that is not biologically determined and there exist those whose consciousness is completely biologically detemined.
Can you explain the meaning? What are the former and what are the latter beings?
If the cognition was totally incorrect, leading to beliefs unrelated to the outside world, it would be only a waste of energy to maintain such cognitive capacity. Correct beliefs about certain things (like locations of food and predators) are without doubt great evolutionary advantage.
Not sure what kind of cognitive capacity the dinosaurs held, but that they roamed around for millions of years and then became extinct seems to indicate that evolution itself doesn’t care much about cognitive capacity beyond a point (that you already mentioned)
Can you explain the meaning? What are the former and what are the latter beings?
You are already familiar with the latter, those whose consciousness is biologically determined. How do you expect to recognise the former, those whose consciousness is not biologically determined?
Not sure what kind of cognitive capacity the dinosaurs held...
At least they probably hadn’t a deceptive cognitive capacity. That is, they had few beliefs, but that few were more or less correct. I am not saying that an intelligent species is universally better at survival than a dumb species. I said that of two almost identical species with same quantity of cognition (measured by brain size or better its energy consumption or number of distinct beliefs held) which differ only in quality of cognition (i.e. correspondence of beliefs and reality), the one which is easy deluded is in a clear disadvantage.
How do you expect to recognise the former, those whose consciousness is not biologically determined?
Well, what I know about nature indicates that any physical system evolves in time respecting rigid deterministic physical laws. There is no strong evidence that living creatures form an exception. Therefore I conclude that consciousness must be physically and therefore bilogically determined. I don’t expect to recognise “deterministic creatures” from “non-determinist creatures”, I simply expect the latter can’t exist in this world. Or maybe I even can’t imagine what could it possibly mean for consciousness to be not biologically determined. From my point of view, it could mean either a very bizarre form of dualism (consciousness is separated from the material world, but by chance it reflects correctly what happens in the material world), or it could mean that the natural laws aren’t entirely deterministic. But I don’t call the latter possibility “free will”, I call it “randomness”.
Your line of thought reminds me of a class of apologetics which claim that if we have evolved by random chance, then there is no guarantee that our cognition is correct, and if our cognition is flawed, we are not able to recognise that we have evolved by random chance; therefore, holding a position that we have evolved by random chance is incoherent and God must have been involved in the process. I think this class of arguments is called “presuppositionalist”, but I may be wrong.
Whatever is the name, the argument is a fallacy. That our cognition is correct is an assumption we must take, otherwise we may better not argue about anything. Although a carefully designed cognitive algorithm may have better chances to work correctly than by chance evolved cognitive algorithm, i.e. it is acceptable that p(correct|evolved)<p(correct|designed), it doesn’t necessarily mean that p(evolved|correct)<p(designed|correct), which is the conclusion the presuppositionalists essentially make.
Back to your argument, you seem to implicitly hold about cognition that p(correct|deterministic)<p(correct|indeterministic), for which I can’t see any reason, but even if that is valid, it isn’t automatically a strong argument for indeterminism.
I said that of two almost identical species with same quantity of cognition (measured by brain size or better its energy consumption or number of distinct beliefs held) which differ only in quality of cognition (i.e. correspondence of beliefs and reality), the one which is easy deluded is in a clear disadvantage.
Unless the delusions are related to survival and procreation, don’t see how they would present any evolutionary disadvantage.
Well, what I know about nature indicates that any physical system evolves in time respecting rigid deterministic physical laws. There is no strong evidence that living creatures form an exception.
Actually there is plenty of evidence to show that living creatures require additional laws to be predicted. Darwinian evolution itself is not required to describe the physical world. However what you probably meant was that there is no evidence that living creatures violate any physical laws, meaning laws governing the living are potentially reducible to physical laws. Someone else looking at the exact same evidence, can come to an entirely different conclusion, that we are actually on the verge of demonstrating what we always felt, that the living are more than physics. Both the positions are based on something that has not yet been demonstrated, the only “evidence” for either lying with the individual, a case of generalisation from one example.
Back to your argument, you seem to implicitly hold about cognition that p(correct|deterministic)<p(correct|indeterministic),...
Not at all. I was only questioning the logical consistency of an approach called ‘determinist consequentialism’. Determinism implies a future that is predetermined and potentially predictable. Consequentialism would require a future that is not predetermined and dependent on choices that we make now either because of a ‘free will’ or ‘randomness’.
Unless the delusions are related to survival and procreation, don’t see how they would present any evolutionary disadvantage.
Forming and holding any belief is costly. The time and energy you spend forming delusions can be used elsewhere.
Actually there is plenty of evidence to show that living creatures require additional laws to be predicted.
An example would be helpful. I don’t know what evidence you are speaking about.
However what you probably meant was that there is no evidence that living creatures violate any physical laws, meaning laws governing the living are potentially reducible to physical laws.
What is the difference between respecting physical laws and not violating them? Physical laws (and I am speaking mainly about the microscopical ones) determine the time evolution uniquely. Once you know the initial state in all detail, the future is logically fixed, there is no freedom for additional laws. That of course doesn’t mean that the predictions of future are practically feasible or even easy.
Consequentialism would require a future that is not predetermined and dependent on choices that we make now either because of a ‘free will’ or ‘randomness’.
Consequentialism doesn’t require either. The choices needn’t be principially unpredictable to be meaningful.
Forming and holding any belief is costly. The time and energy you spend forming delusions can be used elsewhere.
Perhaps. But do not see why that should present an evolutionary disadvantage if they do not impact survival and procreation. On the contrary it could present an evolutionary adavantage. A species that deluded itself inot believing that its has been the chosen species, might actually work energetically towards establshing its hegemony and gain an evolutionary advantage.
An example would be helpful. I don’t know what evidence you are speaking about.
The evidence was stated in the very next line, the Darwinian evolution, something that is not required to describe the evolution of non-biological systems.
What is the difference between respecting physical laws and not violating them?
Of course, none. The distinction I wanted to make was one between respecting/not-violating and being completely determined by.
Physical laws (and I am speaking mainly about the microscopical ones) determine the time evolution uniquely. Once you know the initial state in all detail, the future is logically fixed, there is no freedom for additional laws. That of course doesn’t mean that the predictions of future are practically feasible or even easy.
Nothing to differ there as a definition of determinism. It was exactly the point I was making too. If biological systems are, like us, are completely determined by physical laws, the apparent choice of making a decision by considering consequences is itself an illusion.
Consequentialism doesn’t require either. The choices needn’t be principially unpredictable to be meaningful.
In which case every choice every entity makes, regardless of how it arrives at it, is meaningful. In other words there are no meaningless choices in the real world.
But do not see why that should present an evolutionary disadvantage if they do not impact survival and procreation.
Large useless brain consumes a lot of energy, which means more dangerous hunting and faster consumption of supplies when food is insufficient. The relation to survival is straightforward.
A species that deluded itself inot believing that its has been the chosen species, might actually work energetically towards establshing its hegemony and gain an evolutionary advantage.
Sounds like a groupselection to me. And not much in accordance with observation. Although I don’t believe the Jews believe in their chosenness on genetical grounds, even if they did, they aren’t much sucessful after all.
the Darwinian evolution, something that is not required to describe the evolution of non-biological systems.
Depends on interpretation of “required”. If it means that practically one cannot derive useful statements about trilobites from Schrödinger equation, then yes, I agree. If it means that laws of evolution are logically independent laws which we would need to keep even if we overcome all computational and data-storage difficulties, then I disagree. I expect you meant the first interpretation, given your last paragraph.
Large useless brain consumes a lot of energy, which means more dangerous hunting and faster consumption of supplies when food is insufficient. The relation to survival is straightforward.
Peacock tails reduce their survival chances. Even so peacocks are around. As long as the organism survives until it is capable of procreation, any survival disadvantages don’t pose an evolutionary disadvantage.
Sounds like a group selection to me. And not much in accordance with observation.
I am more inclined towards the gene selection theory, not group selection. About the only species whose delusions we can observe are ourselves. So it is difficult to come out wth any significant objective observational data.
Although I don’t believe the Jews believe in their chosenness on genetical grounds, even if they did, they aren’t much sucessful after all.
I didn’t mean Jews, I meant human species. If delusions are not genetically determined, what would be their source, from a deterministic point of view?
Peacock tails reduce their survival chances. Even so peacocks are around. As long as the organism survives until it is capable of procreation, any survival disadvantages don’t pose an evolutionary disadvantage.
Peacock tail survival disadvantage isn’t limited to post-reproduction period. In order to explain the existence of the tails, it must be shown that their positive effect is greater than the negative.
I don’t dispute that (probably large) part of the human brain’s capacity is used in the peacock-tail manner as a signal of fitness. What I say is only that having two brains of same energetic demands, the one with more correct cognition is in advantage; their signalling value is the same, so any peacock mechanism shouldn’t favour the deluded one.
This doesn’t constitute proof of the correctness of human cognition, perhaps (almost certainly) some parts of our brain’s design is wrong in a way that no single mutation can repair, like the blind spot on human retina. But the evolutionary argument for correctness can’t be dismissed as irrelevant.
If delusions presented only survival dsiadvantages and no advantages, you are right. However, that need not be the case.
The delusion about an afterlife can co-exist with correct cognition in matters affecting immediate survival and when it does, it can enhance survival chances. So evolution doesn’t automatically lead to/enhance correct cognition. I am not saying correctness plays no role, but isn’t the sole deciding factor, at least not in the case of evolutionary selection.
Consequentialism would require a future that is not predetermined and dependent on choices that we make now either because of a ‘free will’ or ‘randomness’.
Not sure what kind of cognitive capacity the dinosaurs held, but that they roamed around for millions of years and then became extinct seems to indicate that evolution itself doesn’t care much about cognitive capacity beyond a point (that you already mentioned)
Huh? Presumably if the dinosaurs had the cognitive capacity and the opposable thumbs to develop rocket ships and divert incoming asteroids they would have survived. They died out because they weren’t smart enough.
I will side with Ganapati on this particular point. We humans are spending much more cognitive capacity, with much more success, on inventing new ways to make ourselves extinct than we do on asteroid defense. And dinosaurs stayed around much longer than us anyway. So the jury is still out on whether intelligence helps a species avoid extinction.
prase’s original argument still stands, though. Having a big brain may or may not give you a survival advantage, but having a big non-working brain is certainly a waste that evolution would have erased in mere tens of generations, so if you have a big brain at all, chances are that it’s working mostly correctly.
ETA: disregard that last paragraph. It’s blatantly wrong. Evolution didn’t erase peacock tails.
The asteroid argument aside it seems to me bordering on obvious that general intelligence is adaptive, even if taken to an extreme it can get a species into trouble. (1) Unless you think general intelligence is only helpful for sexual selection it has to be adaptive or we wouldn’t have it (since it is clearly the product of more than one mutation). (2) Intelligence appears to use a lot of energy such that if it wasn’t beneficial it would be a tremendous waste. (3) There are many obvious causal connections between general intelligence and survival. It enabled us to construct axes, spears harness fire, communicate hunting strategies, pass down hunting and gathering techniques to the next generation, navigate status hierarchies etc. All technologies that have fairly straight forward relations to increased survival.
And the fact that we’re doing more to invent new ways to kill ourselves instead of protect ourselves can be traced pretty directly to collective action problems and a whole slew of evolved features other than intelligence that were once adaptive but have ceased to be—tribalism most obviously.
The fact that only a handful of species have high intelligence suggests that there are very few niches that actually support it. There’s also evidence that human intelligent is due in a large part to runaway sexual selection (like a peacock’s tail). See Norretranders’s “The Generous Man”″ for example. A number of biologists such as Dawkins take this hypothesis very seriously.
There’s also evidence that human intelligent is due in a large part to runaway sexual selection (like a peacock’s tail).
Thats an explanation that explains the increase in intelligence from apes to humans and my comment was a lot about that but the original disputed claim was
Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
And there are less complex adaptive behaviors that require correct cognition: identifying prey, identifying predators, identifying food, identifying cliffs, path-finding etc. I guess there is an argument to be had about what a ‘conscious species’ but that doesn’t seem to be worthwhile. Also, there is a subtle difference between what human intelligence is due to and what the survival benefits of it are. It may have taken sexual selection to jump start it but our intelligence has made us far less vulnerable than we once were (with the exception of the problems we created for ourselves). Humans are rarely eaten by giant cats, for one thing.
The fact that only a handful of species have high intelligence suggests that there are very few niches that actually support it.
No species have as high intelligence as humans but lots of species of high intelligence relative to, say, clams. --- Okay, that’s a little facetious but tool use has arisen independently throughout the animal again and again, not to mention the less complex behaviors mentioned above.
Are people really disputing whether or not accurate beliefs about the world are adaptive? Or that intelligence increases the likelihood of having accurate beliefs about the world?
Are people really disputing whether or not accurate beliefs about the world are adaptive? Or that intelligence increases the likelihood of having accurate beliefs about the world?
Well, having more accurate beliefs only matters if you are an entity intelligence enough to general act on those beliefs. To make an extreme case, consider the hypothetical of say an African Grey Parrot able to do calculus problems. Is that going to actually help it? I would suspect generally not. Or consider a member of a species that gains the accurate belief that it can sexually self-stimulate and then engages in that rather than mating. Here we have what is non-adaptive trait (masturbation is a very complicated trait and so isn’t non-adaptive in all cases but one can easily see situations where it seems to be). Or consider a pair of married humans Alice and Bob who have kids that Bob believes are his. Then Bob finds out that his wife had an affair with Bob’s brother Charlie and the kids are all really Charlie’s. If Bob responds by cutting off support for the kids this is likely non-adaptive. Indeed, one can take it a step further and suppose that Bob and Charlie are identical twins. So that Bob’s actions are completely anti-adaptive.
Your second point seems more reasonable. However, I’d suggest that intelligence increases the total number of beliefs one has about the world but that it may not increase the likelyhood of beliefs being accurate. Even if it does, the number of incorrect beliefs is likely to increase as well. It isn’t clear that the average ratio of correct beliefs to total beliefs is actually increasing (I’m being deliberately vague here in that it would likely be very difficult to measure how many beliefs one has without a lot more thought). A common ape may have no incorrect beliefs even as the common human has many incorrect beliefs. So it isn’t clear that intelligence leads to more accurate beliefs.
Edit: I agree that overall intelligence has been a helpful trait for human survival over the long haul.
Are people really disputing whether or not accurate beliefs about the world are adaptive?
That seems a likely area of dispute. Having accurate beliefs seems, ceteris paribus, to be better for you than inaccurate beliefs (though I can make up as many counterexamples as you’d like). But that still leaves open the question of whether it’s better than no beliefs at all.
Mammals are a clade while reptiles are paraphyletic. Well, dinosaurs are too when birds are excluded, but I would gladly leave the birds in. In any case, dinosaurs win over mammals, so it wasn’t probably a good nitpick after all.
No dinosaur species did live along with humans, so direct competition didn’t take place.
they roamed around for millions of years and then became extinct
I don’t think one should compare humans and dinos. Maybe mammals and dinos or something like that. Many dinosaurs went extinct during the era, our ancestors where many different “species”. Successful enough, that we are still around. As were some dinos which gave birds to Earth.
Do your choices have causes? Do those causes have causes?
Determinism doesn’t have to mean epiphenomenalism. Metaphysically, epiphenomenalism—the belief that consciousness has no causal power—is a lot like belief in true free will—consciousness as an uncaused cause—in that it places consciousness half outside the chain of cause and effect, rather than wholly within it. (But subjectively they can be very different.)
Increase in consciousness increases the extent to which the causes of one’s choices and actions are themselves conscious in origin rather than unconscious. This may be experienced as liberation from cause and effect, but really it’s just liberation from unconscious causes. Choices do have causes, whether or not you’re aware of them.
This is a point which throws many people, but again, it comes from an insufficiently broad concept of causality. Reason itself has causes and operates as a cause. We can agree, surely, that absurdly wrong beliefs have a cause; we can understand why a person raised in a cult may believe its dogmas. Correct beliefs also have a cause. Simple Darwinian survival ensures that any conscious species that has been around for hundreds of thousands of years must have at least some capacity for correct cognition, however that is achieved.
Nonetheless, despite this limited evolutionary gift, it may be true that we are deterministically doomed to fundamental error or ignorance in certain matters. Since the relationship of consciousness, knowledge, and reality is not exactly clear, it’s hard to be sure.
I don’t equate determinism with epiphenomenalism, but that even when it acts as a cause, it is completely determined meaning the apparent choice is simply the inability, at current level of knowledge, of being able to predict exactly what choice will be made.
Not sure how that follows. Evolutionary survival can say nothing about emergence of sentient species, let alone some capacity for correct cognition in that species. If the popular beliefs and models of the universe until a few centuries ago are incorrect, that seems to point in the exact opposite direction of your claim.
It appears that the problem seems to be one of ‘generalisation from one example’. There exist beings with a consciousness that is not biologically determined and there exist those whose consciousness is completely biologically detemined. The former may choose determinism as a ‘belief in belief’ while the latter will see it as a fact, much like a self-aware AI.
That’s true. And there is no problem within it.
If the cognition was totally incorrect, leading to beliefs unrelated to the outside world, it would be only a waste of energy to maintain such cognitive capacity. Correct beliefs about certain things (like locations of food and predators) are without doubt great evolutionary advantage.
Yes, but it is a very weak evidence (more so, if current models are correct). The claim stated that there was at least some capacity for correct cognition, not that the cognition is perfect.
Can you explain the meaning? What are the former and what are the latter beings?
Not sure what kind of cognitive capacity the dinosaurs held, but that they roamed around for millions of years and then became extinct seems to indicate that evolution itself doesn’t care much about cognitive capacity beyond a point (that you already mentioned)
You are already familiar with the latter, those whose consciousness is biologically determined. How do you expect to recognise the former, those whose consciousness is not biologically determined?
At least they probably hadn’t a deceptive cognitive capacity. That is, they had few beliefs, but that few were more or less correct. I am not saying that an intelligent species is universally better at survival than a dumb species. I said that of two almost identical species with same quantity of cognition (measured by brain size or better its energy consumption or number of distinct beliefs held) which differ only in quality of cognition (i.e. correspondence of beliefs and reality), the one which is easy deluded is in a clear disadvantage.
Well, what I know about nature indicates that any physical system evolves in time respecting rigid deterministic physical laws. There is no strong evidence that living creatures form an exception. Therefore I conclude that consciousness must be physically and therefore bilogically determined. I don’t expect to recognise “deterministic creatures” from “non-determinist creatures”, I simply expect the latter can’t exist in this world. Or maybe I even can’t imagine what could it possibly mean for consciousness to be not biologically determined. From my point of view, it could mean either a very bizarre form of dualism (consciousness is separated from the material world, but by chance it reflects correctly what happens in the material world), or it could mean that the natural laws aren’t entirely deterministic. But I don’t call the latter possibility “free will”, I call it “randomness”.
Your line of thought reminds me of a class of apologetics which claim that if we have evolved by random chance, then there is no guarantee that our cognition is correct, and if our cognition is flawed, we are not able to recognise that we have evolved by random chance; therefore, holding a position that we have evolved by random chance is incoherent and God must have been involved in the process. I think this class of arguments is called “presuppositionalist”, but I may be wrong.
Whatever is the name, the argument is a fallacy. That our cognition is correct is an assumption we must take, otherwise we may better not argue about anything. Although a carefully designed cognitive algorithm may have better chances to work correctly than by chance evolved cognitive algorithm, i.e. it is acceptable that p(correct|evolved)<p(correct|designed), it doesn’t necessarily mean that p(evolved|correct)<p(designed|correct), which is the conclusion the presuppositionalists essentially make.
Back to your argument, you seem to implicitly hold about cognition that p(correct|deterministic)<p(correct|indeterministic), for which I can’t see any reason, but even if that is valid, it isn’t automatically a strong argument for indeterminism.
Unless the delusions are related to survival and procreation, don’t see how they would present any evolutionary disadvantage.
Actually there is plenty of evidence to show that living creatures require additional laws to be predicted. Darwinian evolution itself is not required to describe the physical world. However what you probably meant was that there is no evidence that living creatures violate any physical laws, meaning laws governing the living are potentially reducible to physical laws. Someone else looking at the exact same evidence, can come to an entirely different conclusion, that we are actually on the verge of demonstrating what we always felt, that the living are more than physics. Both the positions are based on something that has not yet been demonstrated, the only “evidence” for either lying with the individual, a case of generalisation from one example.
Not at all. I was only questioning the logical consistency of an approach called ‘determinist consequentialism’. Determinism implies a future that is predetermined and potentially predictable. Consequentialism would require a future that is not predetermined and dependent on choices that we make now either because of a ‘free will’ or ‘randomness’.
Forming and holding any belief is costly. The time and energy you spend forming delusions can be used elsewhere.
An example would be helpful. I don’t know what evidence you are speaking about.
What is the difference between respecting physical laws and not violating them? Physical laws (and I am speaking mainly about the microscopical ones) determine the time evolution uniquely. Once you know the initial state in all detail, the future is logically fixed, there is no freedom for additional laws. That of course doesn’t mean that the predictions of future are practically feasible or even easy.
Consequentialism doesn’t require either. The choices needn’t be principially unpredictable to be meaningful.
Perhaps. But do not see why that should present an evolutionary disadvantage if they do not impact survival and procreation. On the contrary it could present an evolutionary adavantage. A species that deluded itself inot believing that its has been the chosen species, might actually work energetically towards establshing its hegemony and gain an evolutionary advantage.
The evidence was stated in the very next line, the Darwinian evolution, something that is not required to describe the evolution of non-biological systems.
Of course, none. The distinction I wanted to make was one between respecting/not-violating and being completely determined by.
Nothing to differ there as a definition of determinism. It was exactly the point I was making too. If biological systems are, like us, are completely determined by physical laws, the apparent choice of making a decision by considering consequences is itself an illusion.
In which case every choice every entity makes, regardless of how it arrives at it, is meaningful. In other words there are no meaningless choices in the real world.
Large useless brain consumes a lot of energy, which means more dangerous hunting and faster consumption of supplies when food is insufficient. The relation to survival is straightforward.
Sounds like a group selection to me. And not much in accordance with observation. Although I don’t believe the Jews believe in their chosenness on genetical grounds, even if they did, they aren’t much sucessful after all.
Depends on interpretation of “required”. If it means that practically one cannot derive useful statements about trilobites from Schrödinger equation, then yes, I agree. If it means that laws of evolution are logically independent laws which we would need to keep even if we overcome all computational and data-storage difficulties, then I disagree. I expect you meant the first interpretation, given your last paragraph.
Peacock tails reduce their survival chances. Even so peacocks are around. As long as the organism survives until it is capable of procreation, any survival disadvantages don’t pose an evolutionary disadvantage.
I am more inclined towards the gene selection theory, not group selection. About the only species whose delusions we can observe are ourselves. So it is difficult to come out wth any significant objective observational data.
I didn’t mean Jews, I meant human species. If delusions are not genetically determined, what would be their source, from a deterministic point of view?
Peacock tail survival disadvantage isn’t limited to post-reproduction period. In order to explain the existence of the tails, it must be shown that their positive effect is greater than the negative.
I don’t dispute that (probably large) part of the human brain’s capacity is used in the peacock-tail manner as a signal of fitness. What I say is only that having two brains of same energetic demands, the one with more correct cognition is in advantage; their signalling value is the same, so any peacock mechanism shouldn’t favour the deluded one.
This doesn’t constitute proof of the correctness of human cognition, perhaps (almost certainly) some parts of our brain’s design is wrong in a way that no single mutation can repair, like the blind spot on human retina. But the evolutionary argument for correctness can’t be dismissed as irrelevant.
If delusions presented only survival dsiadvantages and no advantages, you are right. However, that need not be the case.
The delusion about an afterlife can co-exist with correct cognition in matters affecting immediate survival and when it does, it can enhance survival chances. So evolution doesn’t automatically lead to/enhance correct cognition. I am not saying correctness plays no role, but isn’t the sole deciding factor, at least not in the case of evolutionary selection.
This post is relevant.
Huh? Presumably if the dinosaurs had the cognitive capacity and the opposable thumbs to develop rocket ships and divert incoming asteroids they would have survived. They died out because they weren’t smart enough.
I will side with Ganapati on this particular point. We humans are spending much more cognitive capacity, with much more success, on inventing new ways to make ourselves extinct than we do on asteroid defense. And dinosaurs stayed around much longer than us anyway. So the jury is still out on whether intelligence helps a species avoid extinction.
prase’s original argument still stands, though. Having a big brain may or may not give you a survival advantage, but having a big non-working brain is certainly a waste that evolution would have erased in mere tens of generations, so if you have a big brain at all, chances are that it’s working mostly correctly.
ETA: disregard that last paragraph. It’s blatantly wrong. Evolution didn’t erase peacock tails.
The asteroid argument aside it seems to me bordering on obvious that general intelligence is adaptive, even if taken to an extreme it can get a species into trouble. (1) Unless you think general intelligence is only helpful for sexual selection it has to be adaptive or we wouldn’t have it (since it is clearly the product of more than one mutation). (2) Intelligence appears to use a lot of energy such that if it wasn’t beneficial it would be a tremendous waste. (3) There are many obvious causal connections between general intelligence and survival. It enabled us to construct axes, spears harness fire, communicate hunting strategies, pass down hunting and gathering techniques to the next generation, navigate status hierarchies etc. All technologies that have fairly straight forward relations to increased survival.
And the fact that we’re doing more to invent new ways to kill ourselves instead of protect ourselves can be traced pretty directly to collective action problems and a whole slew of evolved features other than intelligence that were once adaptive but have ceased to be—tribalism most obviously.
The fact that only a handful of species have high intelligence suggests that there are very few niches that actually support it. There’s also evidence that human intelligent is due in a large part to runaway sexual selection (like a peacock’s tail). See Norretranders’s “The Generous Man”″ for example. A number of biologists such as Dawkins take this hypothesis very seriously.
Thats an explanation that explains the increase in intelligence from apes to humans and my comment was a lot about that but the original disputed claim was
And there are less complex adaptive behaviors that require correct cognition: identifying prey, identifying predators, identifying food, identifying cliffs, path-finding etc. I guess there is an argument to be had about what a ‘conscious species’ but that doesn’t seem to be worthwhile. Also, there is a subtle difference between what human intelligence is due to and what the survival benefits of it are. It may have taken sexual selection to jump start it but our intelligence has made us far less vulnerable than we once were (with the exception of the problems we created for ourselves). Humans are rarely eaten by giant cats, for one thing.
No species have as high intelligence as humans but lots of species of high intelligence relative to, say, clams. --- Okay, that’s a little facetious but tool use has arisen independently throughout the animal again and again, not to mention the less complex behaviors mentioned above.
Are people really disputing whether or not accurate beliefs about the world are adaptive? Or that intelligence increases the likelihood of having accurate beliefs about the world?
Well, having more accurate beliefs only matters if you are an entity intelligence enough to general act on those beliefs. To make an extreme case, consider the hypothetical of say an African Grey Parrot able to do calculus problems. Is that going to actually help it? I would suspect generally not. Or consider a member of a species that gains the accurate belief that it can sexually self-stimulate and then engages in that rather than mating. Here we have what is non-adaptive trait (masturbation is a very complicated trait and so isn’t non-adaptive in all cases but one can easily see situations where it seems to be). Or consider a pair of married humans Alice and Bob who have kids that Bob believes are his. Then Bob finds out that his wife had an affair with Bob’s brother Charlie and the kids are all really Charlie’s. If Bob responds by cutting off support for the kids this is likely non-adaptive. Indeed, one can take it a step further and suppose that Bob and Charlie are identical twins. So that Bob’s actions are completely anti-adaptive.
Your second point seems more reasonable. However, I’d suggest that intelligence increases the total number of beliefs one has about the world but that it may not increase the likelyhood of beliefs being accurate. Even if it does, the number of incorrect beliefs is likely to increase as well. It isn’t clear that the average ratio of correct beliefs to total beliefs is actually increasing (I’m being deliberately vague here in that it would likely be very difficult to measure how many beliefs one has without a lot more thought). A common ape may have no incorrect beliefs even as the common human has many incorrect beliefs. So it isn’t clear that intelligence leads to more accurate beliefs.
Edit: I agree that overall intelligence has been a helpful trait for human survival over the long haul.
That seems a likely area of dispute. Having accurate beliefs seems, ceteris paribus, to be better for you than inaccurate beliefs (though I can make up as many counterexamples as you’d like). But that still leaves open the question of whether it’s better than no beliefs at all.
Dinosaurs weren’t a single species, though. Maybe better compare dinosaurs to mammals than to humans.
Or we could pick a partciular species of dinaosaur that survived for a few million years and compare to humans.
Do you expect any changes to the analysis if we did that?
Nitpicking huh? Two can play at that game!
Maybe better compare mammals to reptiles than to dinosaurs.
Many individual species of dinosaurs have existed for longer than humans have.
Dinosaurs as a whole probably didn’t go extinct, we see their descendants everyday as birds.
Okay, this isn’t much to argue about :-)
I love nitpicking!
Mammals are a clade while reptiles are paraphyletic. Well, dinosaurs are too when birds are excluded, but I would gladly leave the birds in. In any case, dinosaurs win over mammals, so it wasn’t probably a good nitpick after all.
No dinosaur species did live along with humans, so direct competition didn’t take place.
I can’t find a nit to pick it here.
Are you claiming that the human species will last a million years or more and not become extinct before then? What are the grounds for such a claim?
I don’t think one should compare humans and dinos. Maybe mammals and dinos or something like that. Many dinosaurs went extinct during the era, our ancestors where many different “species”. Successful enough, that we are still around. As were some dinos which gave birds to Earth.
Just a side note,