How it works for zombies of the second kind: the ones with inverted spectrum? Imagine there is a parallel universe, exactly the same as ours, everyone is conscious, but quale of green is replaced with quale of red for everyone.
It would be an example of some facts about minds being different despite same physical states. Personally I find it less plausible than the zombie argument because it’s assuming a symmetry in qualia that might not hold.
Like, red and green are “interchangeable”, if they were flipped there would be no behavioral difference. This is somewhat dubious because the experience of red might include various intuitive associations with red. Also because maybe red and green are neurally encoded differently.
Not quite; my point in the linked comment is not about neural encoding, but about functional asymmetry—perception of red and perception of green have different functional properties, in humans. (Of course this does also imply differences in neurobiological implementation details, but we need not concern ourselves with that.)
(For instance, the perceptual (photometric) lightness of red is considerably lower than the perceptual lightness of green at a given equal level of actual (radiometric) lightness. This is an inherent part of the perceptual experience of those colors. If “my red were your green”, then, if presented with two color fields, one of rgb(255,0,0) and one of rgb(0,255,0), and asked to point to the one that looked lighter, we would answer differently—a clear behavioral difference.)
How it works for zombies of the second kind: the ones with inverted spectrum? Imagine there is a parallel universe, exactly the same as ours, everyone is conscious, but quale of green is replaced with quale of red for everyone.
It would be an example of some facts about minds being different despite same physical states. Personally I find it less plausible than the zombie argument because it’s assuming a symmetry in qualia that might not hold.
what do you mean by “symmetry in qualia”
Like, red and green are “interchangeable”, if they were flipped there would be no behavioral difference. This is somewhat dubious because the experience of red might include various intuitive associations with red. Also because maybe red and green are neurally encoded differently.
Said Achmiz argues here that (if I’m understanding correctly) they are indeed encoded differently.
Not quite; my point in the linked comment is not about neural encoding, but about functional asymmetry—perception of red and perception of green have different functional properties, in humans. (Of course this does also imply differences in neurobiological implementation details, but we need not concern ourselves with that.)
(For instance, the perceptual (photometric) lightness of red is considerably lower than the perceptual lightness of green at a given equal level of actual (radiometric) lightness. This is an inherent part of the perceptual experience of those colors. If “my red were your green”, then, if presented with two color fields, one of rgb(255,0,0) and one of rgb(0,255,0), and asked to point to the one that looked lighter, we would answer differently—a clear behavioral difference.)