Scott Alexander recently posted a link to this article which was very interesting. After reading it, the difference between postmodernism and LW rationality seems very large. It doesn’t directly address your point, but you may find it interesting.
Separately, I think that you are exaggerating the tendencies LW shares with postmodernism. While LessWrongers love going meta (and they seem to love it even more in person than on the site), what you actually see in discussions here and on rationality blogs is requests to go in either the meta or object-level directions as required by the interlocutor. CFAR specifically has lessons on going toward object-level. Comparing the jargon of postmodernism and LessWrong is not really an equal comparison either. Postmodernism is oftentimes intentionally obscure, and sometimes redefines words to very surprising meanings (see the above linked article), while on LessWrong people seem to go to some pains to coin new language only when old language is insufficient, and explicitly consider what appropriate names would be (the major exception to this is perhaps language coined during the time of the sequences that is still widely used). LW doesn’t have a strong need to justify itself to outsiders, but members of Less Wrong seem to mostly have explicit desire to spread rationality, so there is some need. Postmodernism, on the other hand, seems like mostly an insiders-only club. Compare Spreading Postmodernism with Spreading Rationality.
LessWrong people seem to go to some pains to coin new language only when old language is insufficient
The pains don’t always stretch to learning philosophy, which EY hasn’t done, and advises against, with the result that LW jargon in fact often does reinvent philosophical jargon.
Of course, that’s why I said “some pains” and not “great pains.” People are aware of the issue and generally avoid it when it’s easy to do so, or there will be comments pointing out that something is just a different name for an older term. Also, I excluded Eliezer’s sequences and the resulting jargon for a reason.
LW jargon in fact often does reinvent philosophical jargon.
… but does so in a way that is probably more accessible to the average 21th century geek than the original philosophical jargon was, so it’s not a great loss, because there are more geeks that don’t understand philosophical jargon than philosophers who don’t get geek references.
It is a great loss, because the original terms are nowhere to be seen. So if someone wants to read, say, non-amateur writing on the idea and its history, they’re out of luck.
I sorta agree—I guess it depends on how valuable it is to be able to read Philosophy; some (Lukeprog, Eliezer) seem to consider it mostly a waste of time, others don’t, and I’m not really qualified to tell.
We’re talking here specifically about the amateur philosophy, presented with neologisms as if it’s original thought, when it simply isn’t. You seem to be saying that it’s valuable if EY writes about it but not if professional philosophers do—surely that’s not what you mean?
It’s a great loss because it prevents constructive dialogue between the two communuties. There is quite a lot that US broken in the sequences...not so much in terms of being wrong as in terms of being unclear, addressing the wring question etc...and it looks likely to stay that way.
on LessWrong people seem to go to some pains to coin new language only when old language is insufficient
Are you sure? One of the biggest problems with LW is inventing jargon for philosophical ideas that have had names for a couple of thousand years. This is problematic if the interested reader wants to learn more.
That’s interesting. False balance doesn’t seem to replace anything with a continuum. In particular I’m having trouble rephrasing their examples as fallacy of grey examples.
Organisation A can be like organisation B in every way except their doctrine. It has been remarked, not least by rationalwiki that LW is like Any Rand’s Objectivism, although doctrinally they are poles apart.
It is perfectly possible for an organisation to pay lip service to outreach without making the changes and sacrifices needed for real engagement.
With respect to the point that two organizations CAN be similar except in doctrine, I agree, but I don’t think that’s true for Less Wrong and postmodernism, hence my comment. I was directly addressing the points of comparison the poster argued for.
If you are speaking of Objectivism the organization led by Ayn Rand rather than Objectivism the collective philosophy of Ayn Rand, the differences are pretty massive. Objectivism was a bona fide cult of personality, while the vast majority of people on Less Wrong have never met Eliezer and he no longer even engages with the site. Watch the first part of this interview and compare it with Less Wrong. Perhaps this could be argued specifically of the rationalists living in the Bay Area, but I don’t know enough to say.
The article on rationalwiki has been updated and now seems substantially fairer than it was when I last saw it a few years ago. It doesn’t draw any direct comparison to Objectivism, and now says that the “appearance of a cult has faded.” That said, I don’t put much stock in their opinions on such things.
It doesn’t seem to me that people on Less Wrong merely place lip service on outreach (although once again we are certainly in agreement that such a thing is possible!). There seem to be a lot of posts on meetups here, advice on how to get new attendees, etc. Making “changes and sacrifices needed for real engagement” isn’t straightforward in practice (and engagement isn’t an unqualified good). You have to draw new members without betraying your core principles and without it becoming a place the existing members don’t want to participate in.
It seems you are correct. I had a definition in mind for a cult of personality which was actually much narrower than what it actually means, upon looking it up. Nonetheless, so far you’ve implied a lot more than you’ve actually stated, and your arguments about “what is possible” are less interesting to me than arguments about “what is.” Frankly, I find argumentation by implication annoying, so I’m tapping out.
Scott Alexander recently posted a link to this article which was very interesting. After reading it, the difference between postmodernism and LW rationality seems very large. It doesn’t directly address your point, but you may find it interesting.
Separately, I think that you are exaggerating the tendencies LW shares with postmodernism. While LessWrongers love going meta (and they seem to love it even more in person than on the site), what you actually see in discussions here and on rationality blogs is requests to go in either the meta or object-level directions as required by the interlocutor. CFAR specifically has lessons on going toward object-level. Comparing the jargon of postmodernism and LessWrong is not really an equal comparison either. Postmodernism is oftentimes intentionally obscure, and sometimes redefines words to very surprising meanings (see the above linked article), while on LessWrong people seem to go to some pains to coin new language only when old language is insufficient, and explicitly consider what appropriate names would be (the major exception to this is perhaps language coined during the time of the sequences that is still widely used). LW doesn’t have a strong need to justify itself to outsiders, but members of Less Wrong seem to mostly have explicit desire to spread rationality, so there is some need. Postmodernism, on the other hand, seems like mostly an insiders-only club. Compare Spreading Postmodernism with Spreading Rationality.
The pains don’t always stretch to learning philosophy, which EY hasn’t done, and advises against, with the result that LW jargon in fact often does reinvent philosophical jargon.
Of course, that’s why I said “some pains” and not “great pains.” People are aware of the issue and generally avoid it when it’s easy to do so, or there will be comments pointing out that something is just a different name for an older term. Also, I excluded Eliezer’s sequences and the resulting jargon for a reason.
… but does so in a way that is probably more accessible to the average 21th century geek than the original philosophical jargon was, so it’s not a great loss, because there are more geeks that don’t understand philosophical jargon than philosophers who don’t get geek references.
It is a great loss, because the original terms are nowhere to be seen. So if someone wants to read, say, non-amateur writing on the idea and its history, they’re out of luck.
I sorta agree—I guess it depends on how valuable it is to be able to read Philosophy; some (Lukeprog, Eliezer) seem to consider it mostly a waste of time, others don’t, and I’m not really qualified to tell.
We’re talking here specifically about the amateur philosophy, presented with neologisms as if it’s original thought, when it simply isn’t. You seem to be saying that it’s valuable if EY writes about it but not if professional philosophers do—surely that’s not what you mean?
It’s a great loss because it prevents constructive dialogue between the two communuties. There is quite a lot that US broken in the sequences...not so much in terms of being wrong as in terms of being unclear, addressing the wring question etc...and it looks likely to stay that way.
That was supposed to be “IS”, right?
Yes, this is why I recommend that LWers read Robert Nozick.
Well, I like Nozick, but I like a lot of other people.as well.
Are you sure? One of the biggest problems with LW is inventing jargon for philosophical ideas that have had names for a couple of thousand years. This is problematic if the interested reader wants to learn more.
Example? I believe you, but every time I’ve personally gone looking for a term in the philosophy literature I’ve found it.
e.g. “fallacy of grey” is an entirely local neologism.
What’s the standard term?
It’s a form of the continuum fallacy.
gwern holds that it’s actually false balance. Might be a mix. But one or both should have been named IMO.
That’s interesting. False balance doesn’t seem to replace anything with a continuum. In particular I’m having trouble rephrasing their examples as fallacy of grey examples.
But, eh, I trust gwern.
Organisation A can be like organisation B in every way except their doctrine. It has been remarked, not least by rationalwiki that LW is like Any Rand’s Objectivism, although doctrinally they are poles apart.
It is perfectly possible for an organisation to pay lip service to outreach without making the changes and sacrifices needed for real engagement.
With respect to the point that two organizations CAN be similar except in doctrine, I agree, but I don’t think that’s true for Less Wrong and postmodernism, hence my comment. I was directly addressing the points of comparison the poster argued for.
If you are speaking of Objectivism the organization led by Ayn Rand rather than Objectivism the collective philosophy of Ayn Rand, the differences are pretty massive. Objectivism was a bona fide cult of personality, while the vast majority of people on Less Wrong have never met Eliezer and he no longer even engages with the site. Watch the first part of this interview and compare it with Less Wrong. Perhaps this could be argued specifically of the rationalists living in the Bay Area, but I don’t know enough to say.
The article on rationalwiki has been updated and now seems substantially fairer than it was when I last saw it a few years ago. It doesn’t draw any direct comparison to Objectivism, and now says that the “appearance of a cult has faded.” That said, I don’t put much stock in their opinions on such things.
It doesn’t seem to me that people on Less Wrong merely place lip service on outreach (although once again we are certainly in agreement that such a thing is possible!). There seem to be a lot of posts on meetups here, advice on how to get new attendees, etc. Making “changes and sacrifices needed for real engagement” isn’t straightforward in practice (and engagement isn’t an unqualified good). You have to draw new members without betraying your core principles and without it becoming a place the existing members don’t want to participate in.
Objectivism did and does have plenty of adherents who never met Rand. Personal contact isn’t a prerequisite for a personality cult.
It seems you are correct. I had a definition in mind for a cult of personality which was actually much narrower than what it actually means, upon looking it up. Nonetheless, so far you’ve implied a lot more than you’ve actually stated, and your arguments about “what is possible” are less interesting to me than arguments about “what is.” Frankly, I find argumentation by implication annoying, so I’m tapping out.
Quick question: how much do these doctrinal differences matter?
Matter to whom? If you join that kind of organisation, you are probably looking for answers. If not, maybe not.