That’s certainly the case for some wars; I’m certainly not claiming that no war is won quickly by an overwhelming force.
On the other hand, look at the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. The outcomes of these wars were determined much more by political forces (in both of the relevant countries) than by overwhelming force.
If assassinations are so easy and are obviously the right thing to do, shouldn’t they happen more often?
Regarding assassinations specifically: they are not obviously the right move, in many circumstances. In many cases, one leader killed will quickly be replaced by another of similar competence. Or a group will be replaced by another group. Nonetheless, they are a useful tool, and if you think they don’t happen often then I wonder why you believe that to be the case. Would you have heard about it?
Without examples, the ideas in this post seem unmoored from any real assessment about what’s hard vs easy.
I basically agree with this. The lack of examples is not because they’re hard to find, but because I didn’t want to spend a week on the post (and make it 3-4x as long).
I’m just finishing Nixonland, which focuses on the military/political intersection of the Vietnam war from the American perspective.
In Vietnam, the decision of whether or not to get involved in the first place, and whether or not to pull out, was indeed highly political. We got entangled (after initially supporting Hochimin) because France claimed that they’d fall under Soviet influence if we didn’t help them keep their colony. Then it was the domino effect theory. And then it was (under Nixon) a hard to parse concern that losing Vietnam would harm America’s stature as a superpower.
Perversely, it was these political concerns that drove some of the intensity of the punishing American bombing. Nixon wanted to show off how violent he could be. There’s a parallel here to the decision to bomb Nagasaki and Hiroshima partly to show off our willingness to use a nuclear bomb to the Soviets.
As another example, a key victory in driving the French out was when Hochimin slaughtered an entire dug-in French army corps in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. He lost 3x the men, but it showed France just how much death they’d have to suffer to continue colonizing Vietnam. They did assassinate bureaucrats too. But a lot of those bureaucrats were Vietnamese mandarins. The French already thought they were inferior people, so why would they care? There’s nothing like wiping out a huge number of enemy troops to make them think twice about pressing on.
Violence is a form of signaling. And signaling your willingness to use, escalate, and sustain violence by doing so is part of the political theater. So I’m not really convinced that history shows alternatives to violence to achieve political ends being the norm.
On the other hand, look at the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. The outcomes of these wars were determined much more by political forces (in both of the relevant countries) than by overwhelming force.
Insurgencies aren’t a good comparison for conventional wars like the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
That’s certainly the case for some wars; I’m certainly not claiming that no war is won quickly by an overwhelming force.
On the other hand, look at the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. The outcomes of these wars were determined much more by political forces (in both of the relevant countries) than by overwhelming force.
Regarding assassinations specifically: they are not obviously the right move, in many circumstances. In many cases, one leader killed will quickly be replaced by another of similar competence. Or a group will be replaced by another group. Nonetheless, they are a useful tool, and if you think they don’t happen often then I wonder why you believe that to be the case. Would you have heard about it?
I basically agree with this. The lack of examples is not because they’re hard to find, but because I didn’t want to spend a week on the post (and make it 3-4x as long).
I’m just finishing Nixonland, which focuses on the military/political intersection of the Vietnam war from the American perspective.
In Vietnam, the decision of whether or not to get involved in the first place, and whether or not to pull out, was indeed highly political. We got entangled (after initially supporting Hochimin) because France claimed that they’d fall under Soviet influence if we didn’t help them keep their colony. Then it was the domino effect theory. And then it was (under Nixon) a hard to parse concern that losing Vietnam would harm America’s stature as a superpower.
Perversely, it was these political concerns that drove some of the intensity of the punishing American bombing. Nixon wanted to show off how violent he could be. There’s a parallel here to the decision to bomb Nagasaki and Hiroshima partly to show off our willingness to use a nuclear bomb to the Soviets.
As another example, a key victory in driving the French out was when Hochimin slaughtered an entire dug-in French army corps in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. He lost 3x the men, but it showed France just how much death they’d have to suffer to continue colonizing Vietnam. They did assassinate bureaucrats too. But a lot of those bureaucrats were Vietnamese mandarins. The French already thought they were inferior people, so why would they care? There’s nothing like wiping out a huge number of enemy troops to make them think twice about pressing on.
Violence is a form of signaling. And signaling your willingness to use, escalate, and sustain violence by doing so is part of the political theater. So I’m not really convinced that history shows alternatives to violence to achieve political ends being the norm.
For every dead enemy soldier, you create 2 bereaved parents, 1.5 bereaved siblings, many bereaved friends and a country full of terrified draftees.
Insurgencies aren’t a good comparison for conventional wars like the Nagorno-Karabakh war.