I will point out to the defectors that the scenario described is no more plausible than creationism (after all it involves a deity behaving even more capriciously than the creationist one). If we postulate that your fictional self is believing in the scenario, surely your fictional self should no longer be quite so certain of the falsehood of creationism?
In this scenario you can actually replace Omega with a person (e.g. a mad scientist or something), who just happens to be the only one who has, say, a cure for the disease which is about to kill a couple of billion people.
Then you may well be 99% sure of the truth of evolution, but can you be 99% sure of the judgement an admitted madman will make? If not, you should give more thought to cooperating.
I will point out to the defectors that the scenario described is no more plausible than creationism (after all it involves a deity behaving even more capriciously than the creationist one). If we postulate that your fictional self is believing in the scenario, surely your fictional self should no longer be quite so certain of the falsehood of creationism?
This doesn’t sound like the most inconvenient world to me. Not all unlikely things are correlated, so choose a world where they’re not.
In this scenario you can actually replace Omega with a person (e.g. a mad scientist or something), who just happens to be the only one who has, say, a cure for the disease which is about to kill a couple of billion people.
Then you may well be 99% sure of the truth of evolution, but can you be 99% sure of the judgement an admitted madman will make? If not, you should give more thought to cooperating.