With regards to the bridge-based dualism that you discuss here, and indeed every single flavour of pluralism, I would argue that if you’re making a gradual distinction between X and Y through a bridge Z, then it is not logical to say that either X, Y, or Z has an implicit existence outside of the whole {X,Y,Z} set, which could be inferred as a monism. All flavours of pluralism fall into this format, in which people pick certain world-qualities and claim they are different to one another (which is true) but then do not understand that by fact of their having-to-interact, this means that they have to share at least some gradient-similarity.
Here’s another formulation of that:
A) If there are differences of type between X and Y that are expressible in a gradient, then there’s a function that can explain this, which would have to explain both X and Y, and could be regarded as an X-Y monism.
B) And if there is a flat discontinuity between X and Y, then how can they interact? There would be no bridging function Z(X,Y), and there would be no possibility of them having any sort of linked existence.
So either A) is true and {X,Y} is explicable by monism, or B) is true and X and Y cannot interact, and therefore cannot both exist.
∴ A) has to be true.
I would argue that my arguments put forth here do prove a monism of sorts, but merely a logical one. We actually have to use this logic (which I have done partially in another comment, but I’m rate-limited right now...) in order to move towards an explanation of a physical monism.
And as for the exploration of metaphysical questions, I’d say that this point of looking at things “from the inside” is an incredibly interesting one. If we know we are looking at something from the inside at all? If we know we are inside something, then can we infer the existence of an ‘outside’ from this concept? These are all very complex questions and I think we’d be able to argue for days on them.
B) And if there is a flat discontinuity between X and Y, then how can they interact? There would be no bridging function Z(X,Y), and there would be no possibility of them having any sort of linked existence.
Yes, but what’s the argument for why such a function Z could not exist? What does it mean for there to be a discontinuity between X and Y?
We create functions (or rather functors) between different categories of things all the time, and there always exists at least one functor between any two categories (other than between the empty category and any non empty category). This seems to trivially prove that we could have two different categories of stuff that don’t interact and yet nonetheless are bridged, even if that bridge is trivial.
Your second paragraph reads to me in this way: We can create functions between anything that exists, as long as it exists. (ie. the empty category is simply non-existence) — I hope I’m right in reading that, since that argument is exactly what I’m trying to get at.
According to that statement, it is logically impossible to have a flat discontinuity between X and Y that could not be trivially bridged by a function — ∴ such a function Z could not not exist, which then proves that every X-Y pair can be bridged, which means that B) in my previous argument cannot be the case, then A) has to be the case, and therefore we arrive at a logical monism.
–––
I’d also say that if things do not interact, but then are bridged, then they interact by virtue of that bridging. Assigning a function which bridges two disparate, non-interlinked concepts makes them linked. For example, I could merely state that a rock on an extremely distant planet and my computer are not linked (by virtue of their being too far apart to ever possibly interact) — but even by linking them in this trivial fashion, they are linked. In fact, how would I know about this rock, and link with it, if they were too far apart to interact?
I would go one step further and say that I can even trivially link with things that don’t actually exist. The only thing I’d say that you are unable to create a bridging function to is, as you said, the empty category.
–––
Also, can I just say thanks for taking the time to read through this. I’ve been lurking for a while on LW and the response I’ve gotten for writing this post has been lovely. Cheers.
According to that statement, it is logically impossible to have a flat discontinuity between X and Y that could not be trivially bridged by a function — ∴ such a function Z could not not exist, which then proves that every X-Y pair can be bridged, which means that B) in my previous argument cannot be the case, then A) has to be the case, and therefore we arrive at a logical monism.
Yes, so to return to case A:
A) If there are differences of type between X and Y that are expressible in a gradient, then there’s a function that can explain this, which would have to explain both X and Y, and could be regarded as an X-Y monism.
I kinda want to just say “wtf X-Y monism is not monism it’s now made up of two things that’s definitionally not what monism is”.
To get a little more into why I think it’s not worth doing metaphysics, there’s this common pattern where, in order to describe reality, all metaphysical claims must converge to account for our observations. See, for example, this post on how moral realism and antirealism, in order to respond to objections, end up being more like two ways of framing the same theory rather than two actually different theories.
I think we’re seeing that with your case A. Dualism posits that there are two things, like mind and matter or perhaps phenomena and noumena, and to explain how it is that we observe these two things interacting, we describe them as having a bridge between them, such as some special thing ensouled in humans. You argue this means there is one thing, but dualist counter that thoughts and things like mathematical objects aren’t real in the same way a tree is because you can touch a tree but you can’t touch a rectangle (though you can tough a thing that approximates the shape of rectangle), thus there are two things. Monism argues that since there’s a way to link the two they must be the same thing, that thing being made up of X, Y, and Z.
But now both positions have converged to give functionally equivalent accounts of the world. I further claim that any version of any metaphysical claim that is true with respect to observed evidence will be similarly functionally equivalent, which means we have no way to distinguish them except by non-observable evidence, which we can’t observe, so we can’t use it to make a determination between them. Thus disagreeing but true with respect to observed evidence metaphysical positions collapse, and end up being more like an argument between people looking at an optical illusion that’s both a duck and rabbit.
I think there is some value in figuring out metaphysics insofar as it helps us to dispense with obviously false metaphysical theories that people get sucked in by, but once we get to metaphysical theories that are coherent w.r.t all observed evidence, we hit a wall at which point doing more metaphysics can’t tell us anything we don’t already know, and exactly which flavor of metaphysical framing we adopt is mostly a matter of opinion, taste, and usefulness for our own thinking.
To get a little more into why I think it’s not worth doing metaphysics
Surely you can value whatever you like...or are you saying its not possible to make progress in metaphysics ?
all metaphysical claims must converge to account for our observations.
They must retrodict the same observations—phenomena—but that doesn’t mean they have to agree on the behind-the-scenes mechanisms .
which means we have no way to distinguish them except by non-observable evidence,
Non observable “evidence” can consist of conditions like simplicity and consistency, which are accessible, even if not to the senses. They are also used in science.
They must retrodict the same observations—phenomena—but that doesn’t mean they have to agree on the behind-the-scenes mechanisms .
That’s true. But the behind-the-scenes mechanisms kind of don’t matter then, other than as useful intuitive models. And I’m not saying there’s no value to be had in good intuitive models. Just that treating metaphysics as something other than looking for fake frameworks is not useful.
It you place a terminal value on knowing how things really work, then it has a value for you, even if it’s basically academic and lacking in instrumental value
Instrumental value doesn’t float free of terminal value..it’s got to be instrumental for something.
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.
mathematical objects aren’t real in the same way a tree is
I’d argue that this is largely meaningless, since if it is a purely mental concept, and all mental concepts have to supervene on physical reality (for it makes no sense to have a thought without something actually existing — this is not to say that I think that qualia doesn’t exist) — then mathematical objects are real in the same way that a tree is, through our understanding of them.
exactly which flavor of metaphysical framing we adopt is mostly a matter of opinion, taste, and usefulness for our own thinking.
Ok, I’d say that this particular definition of the world as a monistic thing is extremely useful, and the proofs that you can get with regards to physics retroactively justify the world being a monistic thing.
Dualism makes no sense because if you agree that the two things interact through some sort of bridging concept, then surely, the concept as a whole must be continuous, and therefore one thing. Sure, I can say that yesterday and today are two different things, but I understand how they interact with one another. Yesterday becomes today via a process called a calendar, which explains both yesterday and today. Yesterday and today are just second-order concepts to the first-order concept of the calendar. (And I suppose the zeroth-order concept of time...)
Plus: Occam’s Razor! I know it’s a lazy, incomplete argument to rely on, but I really think that this sort of monistic metaphysics solves literally every problem. Argument? You’re both one. Debate? You came from the same place. Physics? That’s for my future LW posts!
Plus: Occam’s Razor! I know it’s a lazy, incomplete argument to rely on, but I really think that this sort of monistic metaphysics solves literally every problem. Argument? You’re both one. Debate? You came from the same place. Physics? That’s for my future LW posts!
Good luck!
(This is not sarcastic, I mean it sincerely, because even though I assign a high probability to your failure, I think you’ll learn a lot in the process.)
I’d argue that this is largely meaningless, since if it is a purely mental concept, and all mental concepts have to supervene on physical reality (for it makes no sense to have a thought without something actually existing — this is not to say that I think that qualia doesn’t exist) — then mathematical objects are real in the same way that a tree is, through our understanding of them.
I don’t exactly disagree here, and just to be clear I’m not actually trying to make a case for monism or dualism or pluralism or any metaphysical stance, but a dualist would obviously object that you are eliding the important difference between mind and matter because humans have a good bridge between the two and it allows them to interact with the mental as if it were physical, which is the whole point of the mapping.
(What I am fundamentally trying to get you to see, if it’s not clear, is that metaphysical arguments are actually arguments about intuitions disguised as arguments about the nature of reality, and that you can make any set of intuitions comport with observation given the right framing.)
I very much understand your comments on metaphysics and its general circularity, or ability to only prove things which they take as axiomatic.
So, if this is such a stumbling block, then how about we start by just assuming the single-substance universe, and work up from there with the physics? Have you read my response to Mitchell_Porter? I’m extremely interested in getting into the meat of things, because as much as what I’m saying is ridiculous, I’ve really put together the maths and it does largely check out.
I’d say, come up with a model, see if it explains known physics, then see if it predicts previously unobserved evidence. If your model does that, it’s a useful model of physics!
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.
With regards to the bridge-based dualism that you discuss here, and indeed every single flavour of pluralism, I would argue that if you’re making a gradual distinction between X and Y through a bridge Z, then it is not logical to say that either X, Y, or Z has an implicit existence outside of the whole {X,Y,Z} set, which could be inferred as a monism. All flavours of pluralism fall into this format, in which people pick certain world-qualities and claim they are different to one another (which is true) but then do not understand that by fact of their having-to-interact, this means that they have to share at least some gradient-similarity.
Here’s another formulation of that:
A) If there are differences of type between X and Y that are expressible in a gradient, then there’s a function that can explain this, which would have to explain both X and Y, and could be regarded as an X-Y monism.
B) And if there is a flat discontinuity between X and Y, then how can they interact? There would be no bridging function Z(X,Y), and there would be no possibility of them having any sort of linked existence.
So either A) is true and {X,Y} is explicable by monism, or B) is true and X and Y cannot interact, and therefore cannot both exist.
∴ A) has to be true.
I would argue that my arguments put forth here do prove a monism of sorts, but merely a logical one. We actually have to use this logic (which I have done partially in another comment, but I’m rate-limited right now...) in order to move towards an explanation of a physical monism.
And as for the exploration of metaphysical questions, I’d say that this point of looking at things “from the inside” is an incredibly interesting one. If we know we are looking at something from the inside at all? If we know we are inside something, then can we infer the existence of an ‘outside’ from this concept? These are all very complex questions and I think we’d be able to argue for days on them.
Yes, but what’s the argument for why such a function Z could not exist? What does it mean for there to be a discontinuity between X and Y?
We create functions (or rather functors) between different categories of things all the time, and there always exists at least one functor between any two categories (other than between the empty category and any non empty category). This seems to trivially prove that we could have two different categories of stuff that don’t interact and yet nonetheless are bridged, even if that bridge is trivial.
Your second paragraph reads to me in this way: We can create functions between anything that exists, as long as it exists. (ie. the empty category is simply non-existence) — I hope I’m right in reading that, since that argument is exactly what I’m trying to get at.
According to that statement, it is logically impossible to have a flat discontinuity between X and Y that could not be trivially bridged by a function — ∴ such a function Z could not not exist, which then proves that every X-Y pair can be bridged, which means that B) in my previous argument cannot be the case, then A) has to be the case, and therefore we arrive at a logical monism.
–––
I’d also say that if things do not interact, but then are bridged, then they interact by virtue of that bridging. Assigning a function which bridges two disparate, non-interlinked concepts makes them linked. For example, I could merely state that a rock on an extremely distant planet and my computer are not linked (by virtue of their being too far apart to ever possibly interact) — but even by linking them in this trivial fashion, they are linked. In fact, how would I know about this rock, and link with it, if they were too far apart to interact?
I would go one step further and say that I can even trivially link with things that don’t actually exist. The only thing I’d say that you are unable to create a bridging function to is, as you said, the empty category.
–––
Also, can I just say thanks for taking the time to read through this. I’ve been lurking for a while on LW and the response I’ve gotten for writing this post has been lovely. Cheers.
Yes, so to return to case A:
I kinda want to just say “wtf X-Y monism is not monism it’s now made up of two things that’s definitionally not what monism is”.
To get a little more into why I think it’s not worth doing metaphysics, there’s this common pattern where, in order to describe reality, all metaphysical claims must converge to account for our observations. See, for example, this post on how moral realism and antirealism, in order to respond to objections, end up being more like two ways of framing the same theory rather than two actually different theories.
I think we’re seeing that with your case A. Dualism posits that there are two things, like mind and matter or perhaps phenomena and noumena, and to explain how it is that we observe these two things interacting, we describe them as having a bridge between them, such as some special thing ensouled in humans. You argue this means there is one thing, but dualist counter that thoughts and things like mathematical objects aren’t real in the same way a tree is because you can touch a tree but you can’t touch a rectangle (though you can tough a thing that approximates the shape of rectangle), thus there are two things. Monism argues that since there’s a way to link the two they must be the same thing, that thing being made up of X, Y, and Z.
But now both positions have converged to give functionally equivalent accounts of the world. I further claim that any version of any metaphysical claim that is true with respect to observed evidence will be similarly functionally equivalent, which means we have no way to distinguish them except by non-observable evidence, which we can’t observe, so we can’t use it to make a determination between them. Thus disagreeing but true with respect to observed evidence metaphysical positions collapse, and end up being more like an argument between people looking at an optical illusion that’s both a duck and rabbit.
I think there is some value in figuring out metaphysics insofar as it helps us to dispense with obviously false metaphysical theories that people get sucked in by, but once we get to metaphysical theories that are coherent w.r.t all observed evidence, we hit a wall at which point doing more metaphysics can’t tell us anything we don’t already know, and exactly which flavor of metaphysical framing we adopt is mostly a matter of opinion, taste, and usefulness for our own thinking.
Surely you can value whatever you like...or are you saying its not possible to make progress in metaphysics ?
They must retrodict the same observations—phenomena—but that doesn’t mean they have to agree on the behind-the-scenes mechanisms .
Non observable “evidence” can consist of conditions like simplicity and consistency, which are accessible, even if not to the senses. They are also used in science.
That’s true. But the behind-the-scenes mechanisms kind of don’t matter then, other than as useful intuitive models. And I’m not saying there’s no value to be had in good intuitive models. Just that treating metaphysics as something other than looking for fake frameworks is not useful.
It you place a terminal value on knowing how things really work, then it has a value for you, even if it’s basically academic and lacking in instrumental value
Instrumental value doesn’t float free of terminal value..it’s got to be instrumental for something.
Sure, but I argue that you can’t know metaphysics anyway, so it has no value even if you think you know it!
Know for certain? I think you have.conceded that some metaphysical claims are less likely than others.
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.
I’d argue that this is largely meaningless, since if it is a purely mental concept, and all mental concepts have to supervene on physical reality (for it makes no sense to have a thought without something actually existing — this is not to say that I think that qualia doesn’t exist) — then mathematical objects are real in the same way that a tree is, through our understanding of them.
Ok, I’d say that this particular definition of the world as a monistic thing is extremely useful, and the proofs that you can get with regards to physics retroactively justify the world being a monistic thing.
Dualism makes no sense because if you agree that the two things interact through some sort of bridging concept, then surely, the concept as a whole must be continuous, and therefore one thing. Sure, I can say that yesterday and today are two different things, but I understand how they interact with one another. Yesterday becomes today via a process called a calendar, which explains both yesterday and today. Yesterday and today are just second-order concepts to the first-order concept of the calendar. (And I suppose the zeroth-order concept of time...)
Plus: Occam’s Razor! I know it’s a lazy, incomplete argument to rely on, but I really think that this sort of monistic metaphysics solves literally every problem. Argument? You’re both one. Debate? You came from the same place. Physics? That’s for my future LW posts!
Good luck!
(This is not sarcastic, I mean it sincerely, because even though I assign a high probability to your failure, I think you’ll learn a lot in the process.)
I don’t exactly disagree here, and just to be clear I’m not actually trying to make a case for monism or dualism or pluralism or any metaphysical stance, but a dualist would obviously object that you are eliding the important difference between mind and matter because humans have a good bridge between the two and it allows them to interact with the mental as if it were physical, which is the whole point of the mapping.
(What I am fundamentally trying to get you to see, if it’s not clear, is that metaphysical arguments are actually arguments about intuitions disguised as arguments about the nature of reality, and that you can make any set of intuitions comport with observation given the right framing.)
I very much understand your comments on metaphysics and its general circularity, or ability to only prove things which they take as axiomatic.
So, if this is such a stumbling block, then how about we start by just assuming the single-substance universe, and work up from there with the physics? Have you read my response to Mitchell_Porter? I’m extremely interested in getting into the meat of things, because as much as what I’m saying is ridiculous, I’ve really put together the maths and it does largely check out.
I’d say, come up with a model, see if it explains known physics, then see if it predicts previously unobserved evidence. If your model does that, it’s a useful model of physics!
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.