I’d argue that this is largely meaningless, since if it is a purely mental concept, and all mental concepts have to supervene on physical reality (for it makes no sense to have a thought without something actually existing — this is not to say that I think that qualia doesn’t exist) — then mathematical objects are real in the same way that a tree is, through our understanding of them.
I don’t exactly disagree here, and just to be clear I’m not actually trying to make a case for monism or dualism or pluralism or any metaphysical stance, but a dualist would obviously object that you are eliding the important difference between mind and matter because humans have a good bridge between the two and it allows them to interact with the mental as if it were physical, which is the whole point of the mapping.
(What I am fundamentally trying to get you to see, if it’s not clear, is that metaphysical arguments are actually arguments about intuitions disguised as arguments about the nature of reality, and that you can make any set of intuitions comport with observation given the right framing.)
I very much understand your comments on metaphysics and its general circularity, or ability to only prove things which they take as axiomatic.
So, if this is such a stumbling block, then how about we start by just assuming the single-substance universe, and work up from there with the physics? Have you read my response to Mitchell_Porter? I’m extremely interested in getting into the meat of things, because as much as what I’m saying is ridiculous, I’ve really put together the maths and it does largely check out.
I’d say, come up with a model, see if it explains known physics, then see if it predicts previously unobserved evidence. If your model does that, it’s a useful model of physics!
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.
I don’t exactly disagree here, and just to be clear I’m not actually trying to make a case for monism or dualism or pluralism or any metaphysical stance, but a dualist would obviously object that you are eliding the important difference between mind and matter because humans have a good bridge between the two and it allows them to interact with the mental as if it were physical, which is the whole point of the mapping.
(What I am fundamentally trying to get you to see, if it’s not clear, is that metaphysical arguments are actually arguments about intuitions disguised as arguments about the nature of reality, and that you can make any set of intuitions comport with observation given the right framing.)
I very much understand your comments on metaphysics and its general circularity, or ability to only prove things which they take as axiomatic.
So, if this is such a stumbling block, then how about we start by just assuming the single-substance universe, and work up from there with the physics? Have you read my response to Mitchell_Porter? I’m extremely interested in getting into the meat of things, because as much as what I’m saying is ridiculous, I’ve really put together the maths and it does largely check out.
I’d say, come up with a model, see if it explains known physics, then see if it predicts previously unobserved evidence. If your model does that, it’s a useful model of physics!
Yes, of course, because metaphysical claims are still claims, and some of them are clearly false because they contradict available evidence. However, once we have a metaphysical claim that can’t easily be disproven, now we have a claim that’s up against the limits of our ability to know, and an important aspect we’re leaving out here is that metaphysical claims make claims about the unknowable (otherwise they would be physical claims, not metaphysical ones).
The best outcome a metaphysical claim can hope for is “not yet proven wrong”.