My confusion about this subject is that without moral naturalism, it seems moral philosophy can be derived from a psychological or sociological basis, which seems to me a much better model for producing results than philosophical arguments.
Perry Cai
Karma: 10
Possibly relevant:
By “should” I mean any currently accepted model that you can derive alturism from, of which the only one I know of so far is evolution or stems from evolution.
Could be referring to the relatively recent discovery of DNA sequencing, with only the UI being easily accessible.
Yes, I’m open to any framework that describes altruism in a way other than an evolutionary process.
I guess most arguments would need to start from Cogito, ergo sum to make much sense, and you couldn’t do much of anything without accepting that our observations of the world exist. But is there a set of premises that is generally accepted that can determine what one’s actions should be without stating them outright?
Anyone have a logical solution to exactly why we should act altruistically? I know it makes sense evolutionarily through game theory and statistics, but human decision making is still controlled by emotions, and it’s still most advantageous for an individual actor to follow their own self-interest to a degree in a social community. I know how altruistic actors develop, but not why unconstrained intelligences should choose to do so.
I was just thinking about if you could extend the practice to scenarios where adding something to the list would equal the value of the ball, like if the time and value needed to complete the list approached that of finding a lost child. Perhaps you could handle more balls if you allowed some to fall?
Is there a point where the cost to pick balls up and add new items to the checklist converge, and if so, what would be best to remedy that situation? or does this only apply to balls that have values sufficiently greater than checks?
My understanding is that a future civilization must simulate this time period at a fraction greater than others in order for the explanation to be valid. If this is so and some civilization exists until the heat death of the universe, does that imply that technology has reached a point of asymptotic improvement so almost all future times are uniform, and we are going through one of the last great filters?
I’m confused about how simulations disprove the doomsday argument. Why would a future civilization specifically choose to simulate many instances of the time we’re currently in if it doesn’t have a significance to that time period?
How would this differ from working with a friend/coworker who regularly checks in on you? (and vice versa)