Motasaurus

• Motasaurus 15 Dec 2019 10:40 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: RicardoFonseca’s comment on: Chap­ter 14: The Un­known and the Unknowable

  Guvf qbrfa’g jbex. Fvapr yngre ba jr yrnea gung lbh pna’g fraq nal vasbezngvba onpx zber guna 6uef, vg frrzf zber yvxryl gung Qhzoyrqber jnf hfvat gur pybnx gb genvy Uneel sbe gur ragver qnl (naq nyzbfg pregnvayl ba gur genva, naq creuncf rira va qvntba nyyrl).
  
  Juvpu zrnaf gung qhzoyrqber, va gur pybnx, jngpurq uneel, va gur pybnx, uryc uneel orsber ur tbg gur pybnx naq xarj ur unq gb tb onpx 6uef gb rafher gung uneel tbg gur pybnx 5uef rneyvre.

• Motasaurus 11 Jun 2019 5:24 UTC

  0 points

  on: In­tel­lec­tual Hip­sters and Meta-Contrarianism

  I can think of clear examples where a particular ideological foundation allows for death to be good, without requiring a contrarian or meta-contrarian position. One thought along such lines is whether religion would fall into the contrarian, or meta-contrarian view.

  If you ask most 5 year olds, they believe in the metaphysical.

  So could a triad be religious/​atheist/​religious? Or is there an extra level, where the first kind of atheist is the fedora tipping teenager on reddit, then there be a meta-meta atheist, or would perhaps the meta-meta position be agnostic?

  Is religion too complex for such an simplification?

• Motasaurus 8 Jan 2019 0:35 UTC

  1 point

  on: What does it mean to “be­lieve” a thing to be true?

  In the Greek πιστεύω ( pisteuó ) is to believe, and is derived from πείθω ( peithó ) , which is to be persuaded of what is true. There are undoubtedly different strengths and types of persuasion, but I find that this understanding (that is to believe something is to be persuaded of the truth of it) is useful in all situations and contexts.

• Motasaurus 13 Dec 2018 22:59 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: waveman’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  what is more important is the hard work of closely examining every assumption and every logical step.

  I agree. This was merely an introduction.

  It reminds me somehow of the way many Christians talk a lot about humility but in practice are extremely arrogant towards non-believers.

  I would assign a fairly high probability that this is more annoying to me than to you.

• Motasaurus 28 Nov 2018 21:25 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  
  Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.

  If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.

  I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.

  You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.

  I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.

• Motasaurus 26 Nov 2018 4:56 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.

  This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.

  And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.

  If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.

  Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.

• Motasaurus 26 Nov 2018 3:26 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.

  I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It’s not for nothing though, I don’t want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with “we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]” it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.

  I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power to steer and direct the definitions and the direction of the conversation.

  The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering.

  This is an excellent perspective.

  To be loving is to—within your power—reduce the suffering of a person, as perceived by them, as much as possible.

  I am going to write an example, and ask you if the person “A” is loving.

  A small child “B” is in the habit of running across the street after their ball.

  Their parent “A” has two options:

  If A allows B to continue then A has minimised suffering

  If A stops B then A has imposed suffering

  Is A loving by allowing B to continue running out onto the road unimpeded?

• Motasaurus 25 Nov 2018 23:26 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  What do you think IS the crux of the discussion?

  The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.

  if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.

  If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.

  If you will allow our discussion to focus on this statement, I have a question: from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?

• Motasaurus 24 Nov 2018 12:30 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Thank you for your definition.

  There exists emotional pain

  I am content taking this as a given.

  much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it.

  I am not sure this works as a statement of fact. Do you think we could try and come to some kind of agreement on a quantitative amount that does not have redeeming side effects? Or better still, how much of a redeeming side effect makes experiencing pain preferable to not experiencing it?

  A loving being would seek to reduce that pain

  Why? What is the likelihood that a loving being would do so? Does this become prescriptive? Do people who do not do so become unloving beings?

  If a being is as ultimate as God is described as, especially if it made the whole system in the first place, then reducing that pain is possible and an all-loving God would have done it.

  This follows logically from your previous statements—supposing that they are true. I don’t think this is the crux of the discussion.

  What are your thoughts? Where would you like to start?

• Motasaurus 24 Nov 2018 12:24 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: Benquo’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Why doesn’t this seem to you like a model grounded in empirical evidence?

  Aristotle never tested it—never even wrote of the possibility of testing the model. Post-hoc reasoning is not science. It’s inventing plausible (to the time) sounding explanations for observations, and then just leaving it at that.

  Which is why Aristotle (or any Aristotlean naturalist) never climbed up a cliff and dropped two balls—one made of lead the other of wood.

• Motasaurus 23 Nov 2018 8:13 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: Benquo’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  do you remember where he says this?

  In Physica—I have missed a part there which I apologise for. Only objects which are made of earth fall toward the noble position of earth—as is their want to be with their own in their own noble position. Things made of air will seek out the heavens (which is why smoke rises), things made of water will seek out water (which is why rivers flow into the sea), and things made of fire will seek out fire. For Aristotle, heavy objects contained more of the element earth—so naturally they moved quickest to reach their natural position.

  It’s from his argument of natural motions.

• Motasaurus 23 Nov 2018 6:27 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  I am content having the discussion here. I do think this is the appropriate space.

  I was hoping that you would be able to posit a specific definition, as opposed to a general boiling down to. One of the difficulties with this is that without a defining example what we are actually discussing may become confused with the examples.

  The reason I asked if you would be willing to offer the statement is so that I wouldn’t seem to be railroading you into a discussion in my favour. I have an example of such a statement, but I worry that by proposing it the definitive statement I make will become sticky and then influence yours—and so it would seem that I have railroaded you into a discussion in my favour.

  I have put an example below. Hopefully hidden in spoiler tags so you can decide for yourself if you want to see it before thinking of your own. If the spoiler tags don’t work then you’re going to have to choose to not read on.

  To be in pain is always worse than to not be in pain. To love someone is to reduce their pain in any way you can. If God loves people He would reduce their pain to zero. Since there is pain, either God is not loving or He is not capable of reducing their pain to zero.

• Motasaurus 23 Nov 2018 6:04 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: Benquo’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Can you explain how the story of Elijah widely changed the entire philosophical culture of the world into which it occurred, resulting in an evidence and testing based approach to natural philosophy?

  If my memory serves—and I admit it may not, and I have not looked this up, the Israelites returned to the worship of Baal and the Canaanite gods soon thereafter.

• Motasaurus 23 Nov 2018 3:03 UTC

  −1 points

  in reply to: waveman’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Motivated reasoning is so obvious and blatant when it concerns beliefs we don’t share ourselves.

  Isn’t it just. If only the OP had prefaced everything with some kind of comment acknowledging that.

  what follows is a descriptive narrative of my epistemology not a statement of universal fact (though some facts are contained therein).

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 23:54 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  I’m ok with being proselytized

  I am not convinced the moderators would be okay with you being proselytized.

  Thinking about this and about your question though I have considered ways that we could tangentially discuss it. Would you mind offering a definitive statement on the problem of pain that we could discuss from?

  I would rather not discuss from assumptions.

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 23:50 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Bucky’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  I’m not sure exactly what you were hoping for in response to your introduction but I hoped my experience might be interesting to you.

  I wasn’t hoping for anything. I had expectations that I had assigned prior probabilities to, and could have happily continued on reading without ever mentioning anything of my epistemology. To my mind that was not the rational approach—and the guidelines that are offered are to lay your underlying assumptions bare for discussion so that people can avoid straw-manning one another. This is what I have done.

  There is too much else in your comment to dissect each part, and I can’t deal with it fairly without dealing with all of it. I do appreciate your experience, and your frankness with me regarding it. It is not my experience though and you have misrepresented me in your mental model here:

  To me it feels like you’ve been discovering something new (rationality) and found a way to fit it into your existing belief system.

  We must be wary of what things feel like to us. Toward the end of the story section I wrote that I was doing my best to not believe—and pursued mathematics, rationality, and science toward those ends.

  Thank you again for your response.

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 19:58 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Pattern’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Yeah I wrote that as about my 3rd comment.

  The reaction to which is the inspiration for an introduction post in the first place.

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 19:56 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: anna_macdonald’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  I don’t have one that I think is rationally valid that would not come across as proselytizing.

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 19:50 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Pattern’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  It’s not too bad. Like most countries it has its own particular problems.

• Motasaurus 22 Nov 2018 19:06 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: shminux’s comment on: Je­sus Made Me Ra­tional (An In­tro­duc­tion)

  Funny how we find all kinds of ways to avoid facing uncomfortable questions head on!

  Is this prescriptive or descriptive? I did eventually make my way to answer your question head on. You asked me where does your imagination fail and my answer is that my imagination fails on imagining and internally consistent universe that is not internally consistent.

  Notice which of those worlds you instantly flinch away from.

  I instantly flinch away from neither. I spent approximately fifteen of my first twenty years imagining myself in a world where I was mistaken in my faith. But I did not believe it, no matter how fervently I believed that I believed.

  I have no instinctual flinching away from imagining a world in which I do not exist, either. I have imagining a world that is identical to this one (with me in it) in which I do not exist.