jschulter

Karma: 160

jschulter Apr 12, 2011, 3:42 AM
0 points
on: Student meetups
I’d be very happy if a meetup somehow materialized at my school, but I don’t think I personally have the energy to arrange one. I also have no idea how many people would even show up- our undergraduate population is huge, but not significantly above the sanity waterline on average, so I wouldn’t estimate the number of lesswrongers to be very high. The Skeptics club might be willing to help set one up though. Feel free to PM me if you want to go into details.

jschulter Apr 12, 2011, 3:10 AM
0 points
on: How would you respond to the Philpapers “What are your Philosophical Positions” Survey?
A priori knowledge: yes or no? no.

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? not Platonism. don’t know if the other is simply the opposite or a separate claim.

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? subjective

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? leaning no based on a brief reading of the literature

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? don’t know.

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? non-skeptical realism

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? compatibilism, I guess.

God: theism or atheism? atheism

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? empiricism

Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? contextualism

Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? non-Humean (examples in favor of this were numerous on the page defining it), but it doesn’t really matter. I’m not even sure the actual laws upon which the universe runs are expressible within it, we might only be able to asymptotically approach them.

Logic: classical or non-classical? classical

Mental content: internalism or externalism? externalism

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? moral anti-realism

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? naturalism

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? physicalism

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? don’t know.

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? externalism

Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes? I am committed to one-boxing. (You hear that Omega!?)

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? consequentialism

Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Whichever one Dennet espouses. not sure which of these that is.

Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? I think it would be psychological view? If it thinks and acts indistinguishably from me, it is me.

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? libertarianism kinda.

Proper names: Fregean or Millian? don’t care.

Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? scientific realism mostly

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? survival-see personal identity

Time: A-theory or B-theory? both of these are stupid. The jury’s out on whether physics is timeless, but in the meantime, I understand and can utilize special relativity(and perhaps general soon), which is an entirely sufficient description.

Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don’t switch? switch. I take the consequentialist view(whichever action kills the least people) on all the trolley problems, despite some internal disquietude.

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? correspondence I think? not clear on the terms

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? inconcievable!

jschulter Apr 12, 2011, 2:12 AM
0 points
in reply to: Scott Alexander’s comment on: What are you working on? April 2011
well, when you do, I’d definitely like to play :)

jschulter Apr 9, 2011, 12:59 AM
1 point
on: Science Fiction Recommendations
I can highly recommend everything I have read by Niven. Many of his works are really well done fairly “hard” Sci-fi, particularly the Ringworld series (the titular object is related to Dyson spheres, and has been called a “Niven ring” in his honor). I just finished Destiny’s Road, and I couldn’t put it down. The Mote In Gods Eye is an amazing collaboration with Pournelle, and a classic to boot. The last is the only one I saw mentioned elsewhere, but if you enjoy any of these, you’ll likely enjoy the rest too.

jschulter Apr 9, 2011, 12:26 AM
1 point
on: What are you working on? April 2011
I’m currently writing a program (in C) for my continuum mechanics class to simulate crowd physics (just in 2D) using nearest neighbor potentials. Once I get it running, I’ll simulate a “Black Friday” type event with a linear attractive potential and various barriers, and then see if I can get and then avoid crushing “deaths”. I’m also in the process of trying to be more social, actually actively trying to make friends and interact with my peers instead of holing up in my room all day. Thus far, I’ve noticed a distinct increase in my overall happiness as a result of this so far, and my academic performance unexpectedly hasn’t even wavered.

jschulter Apr 9, 2011, 12:14 AM
0 points
in reply to: Scott Alexander’s comment on: What are you working on? April 2011
Were you planning on running the game in person, or would there be a chance of doing it remotely. I’ve only had a little experiences with role-playing games, but I enjoyed it quite a lot.

jschulter Apr 8, 2011, 11:36 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Rationality Quotes: April 2011
Well, of course we would! Executing an action based on the truth of a hypothesis while trying to determine whether its true or not would be somewhat odd.

jschulter Apr 8, 2011, 10:52 PM
3 points
in reply to: matt1’s comment on: Rationality Quotes: April 2011
Another option:
- it’s morally acceptable to terminate a conscious program if it wants to be terminated
- it’s morally questionable(wrong, but to lesser degree) to terminate a conscious program against its will if it is also possible to resume execution
- it is horribly wrong to turn off a conscious program against its will if it cannot be resumed(murder fits this description currently)
- performing other operations on the program that it desires would likely be morally acceptable, unless the changes are socially unacceptable
- performing other operations on the program against its will is morally unacceptable to a variable degree (brainwashing fits in this category)
These seem rather intuitive to me, and for the most part I just extrapolated from what it is moral to do to a human. Conscious program refers here to one running on any system, including wetware, such that these apply to humans as well. I should note that I am in favor of euthanasia in many cases, in case that part causes confusion.

jschulter Apr 2, 2011, 6:38 AM
1 point
in reply to: Risto_Saarelma’s comment on: Dense Math Notation
I’m taking note of the latter and adding it to my list of “books to read when I have time and motivation for independent education.” The addition of Scheme to the application of mechanics does seem quite useful from what I can tell after a cursory look. And there’s a nice bit more mathematical rigor than I had the luxury of in my physics classes. Overall, it looks like this text takes an approach that I’ll like a lot, once I get to it.

For the record, I’m a physics and mathematics undergrad, graduating next May. My schools physics program recently decided to actually start making us apply that programming they had us learn; I might consider trying Scheme instead of C if I feel like it.

jschulter Apr 2, 2011, 5:59 AM
0 points
in reply to: prase’s comment on: An Anchoring Experiment
I suppose the correct value is probably around 3000 m.

I know of no large mountains to be found in Sweden, so I’m guessing what seems to be a reasonably low number.

jschulter Mar 28, 2011, 10:19 PM
0 points
in reply to: wobster109’s comment on: Rationality Boot Camp
I’m a college student too, and just about finished with my application. The form really does make it seem like it’s targeted at people who have already received at least one degree, but I wouldn’t be surprised if some promising undergrads made it in.

jschulter Mar 20, 2011, 12:47 PM
3 points
in reply to: MoreOn’s comment on: The Nature of Offense
Well, I have encountered people being (or claiming to be) offended by what in all rights would be an assault on someone else’s status. This could be a form of empathy, or in many cases an attempt to gain status themselves through a show of sympathy. This does seem like a potential occurrence of legitimate offense not caused by a perceived direct or indirect threat to the status of the person being offended, iff the offense is genuine- something which I cannot personally attest to, never having experienced this myself.

“How to Have a Rational Discussion”

jschulterMar 20, 2011, 10:22 AM

8 points

24 comments1 min readLW link

jschulter Mar 20, 2011, 5:20 AM
1 point
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Being a teacher
I think one of the things that makes learning things hard, given this interpretation, would be difficulty in actually updating the model. It may be that large amounts of surprise, being related to large differences in model produced by updating, make it hard to update, and this is certainly one level of hardness felt when learning. But additionally, there is also likely to be some variance in general ability to update certain models: some people have limited kinesthetic senses would not only be operating with less data to update on, but may also have a more rigid model.

Model rigidity seems to me like a good candidate for the variance between students’ subjective experience of the hardness of learning certain things. It also seems like it would be strongly correlated to the appropriate types of intelligence- kinesthetic intelligence relates to a more easily changed model of physical syntax, procedural intelligence relates to a more easily changed model of procedural syntax, &c.

This also seems to correspond well to my own personal experiences with what is hard and easy to learn- my understanding of how the different elements of the problem can interact changes with speed proportional to how easy the subject seems, eg I can change my understanding of how abstract quantities/qualities interact fairly quickly making math easy to learn, my understanding of systems of social interaction changes very slowly (due in part to difficulty collecting evidence) and thus I was socially awkward for a long time, and it took a lot of effort to overcome.

jschulter Mar 5, 2011, 3:35 AM
4 points
in reply to: NihilCredo’s comment on: Rationality Quotes: March 2011
I saw it more as opposing restrictions on one’s ability to hit oneself in the head with a baseball bat every week. I’m not saying anyone should do it, but if they really want to I don’t feel I have the right to stop them.

jschulter Mar 2, 2011, 11:02 PM
1 point
on: The Anthropic Trilemma
The odds of winning the lottery are ordinarily a billion to one. But now the branch in >which you win has your “measure”, your “amount of experience”, temporarily >multiplied by a trillion. So with the brief expenditure of a little extra computing power, >you can subjectively win the lottery—be reasonably sure that when next you open >your eyes, you will see a computer screen flashing “You won!”

As I see it, the odds of being any one of those trillion “me”s in 5 seconds is 10^21 to one(one trillion times one billion). since there are a trillion ways for me to be one of those, the total probability of experiencing winning is still a billion to one. To be more formal:

P(“experiencing winning”)=sum(P(“winning”|”being me #n”)P(“being me #n”)) =sum(P(“winning” and “being me #n”))=10^12*10^-21=10^-9 since “being me #n” partitions the space.

Overall this means I:
- anticipate not winning at 5 sec.
- anticipate not winning at 15 sec.
- don’t have super-psychic-anthropic powers
- don’t see why anyone has an issue with this
Checking consistency just in case:

p(“experience win after 15s”) = p(“experience win after 15s”|”experience win after >5s”)p(“experience win after 5s”) + p(“experience win after 15s”|”experience not-win >after 5s”)p(“experience not-win after 5s”).

p(“experience win after 15s”) = (~1)*(10^-9) + (~0)(1-10^-9)=~10^-9=~p(“experience win after 5s”)

Additionally, I should note that the total amount of “people who are me who experience winning” will be 1 trillion at 5 sec. and exactly 1 at 15 sec. This is because those trillion “me”s must all have identical experiences for merging to work, meaning the merged copy only has one set of consistent memories of having won the lottery. I don’t see this as a problem, honestly.
What links here?
- jacob_cannell's comment on The Anthropic Trilemma by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Dec 12, 2011, 9:36 PM; 0 points)

jschulter Mar 1, 2011, 7:08 AM
1 point
on: Ability to react
Posting this before reading the comments to give a summary/response based on my own internal experiences. Quick note: I’m extremely good at internalizing/manipulating information, and about proficient at “reacting”. It might also be worth noting sex (I’m male), since I could definitely see these kinds of thought processes being different on the two standard systems.

This analysis is definitely subject to the “generalizing from one example” problem, considering some large differences between the thought mechanisms you mention and my own. One telling example is the programming/reacting analogy: when programming(and writing, after the first stage of composition) I have this tendency to “hold the whole program in my head” as I’ve heard it called, and in doing so I don’t use an internal monologue at all. In fact, when I’m solving most problems(math, spatial manipulations, logic puzzles) in my mind, my internal monologue is silent, and rather I’m working silently in my headspace- my reasoning methods feel spatial, rather than verbal. When working in a group (cooking is the closest example of “reacting” that I can relate to in terms of necessitated efficiency/urgency) the monologue is still silent and I’m solving problems through psuedospatial manipulation; the significantly smaller amount of problem solving necessary does tend to allow the problem/solution to just remain static in my head for most of the time though while I engage in physical tasks, rather than actively solving it. This for me, leads to a sense that very little focus is used while reacting; some tasks (mincing garlic, dicing onions(crying makes it harder), &c.) however may require close attention, if physically complicated, and this might be the other kind of focus you mention. I can, overall, add another confirming data point to the “silencing your internal monologue is helpful/necessary for reacting properly” hypothesis though.

I also have some possible suggestions, though mileage will likely vary very extremely:

silencing ones internal monologue can be aided by meditation- in fact, they are practically equivalent- so the initial meditation exercises, to “clear ones mind” may prove useful in getting used to doing this, and possibly make it easier.

there’s no need to practice silencing your internal monologue only while “reacting”-try doing it during everyday tasks where intense thought isn’t necessary(eg brushing your teeth), and it might become that much easier.

if your brain works like mine, you may be able to delegate certain tasks to parts of your mind not directly linked to what you consider “you” (one notably common example is how sometimes you realize the solution to a problem you were working on a while ago but not actively thinking about), and if you can get good at this, it works better(for me) than memorizing responses- just let yourself respond on automatic.

jschulter 15 Feb 2011 8:25 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Miller’s comment on: IBM’s “Watson” program to compete against “Jeopardy” champions tonight
From what I saw, it seems they figured out that that was their best bet (somehow) fairly quickly. Once Watson lost control, the other two lost very little time in going for the big points.

jschulter 21 Jan 2011 6:12 UTC
0 points
in reply to: JGWeissman’s comment on: 3 Levels of Rationality Verification
This is even easier to game: assuming the school has any merit, any individual you ask should have good incentive to simply say “50%” guaranteeing a perfect score. The very first time you used the test it might be okay, but only if nobody knew that the school’s reputation was at stake.

jschulter 19 Jan 2011 2:16 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Vladimir_Golovin’s comment on: Why Our Kind Can’t Cooperate
They surprised me too. (I actually felt the urge to use an unnecessary exclamation point there the priming’s made me so enthusiastic...)

And I think that the status gained from the fact that you noticed being primed probably outweighed any lost due to it us being told it happened. Though now that we’re noticing it, we need to decide which frequency of upvoting we should be using so we can avoid the effect.

jschulter

“How to Have a Ra­tional Dis­cus­sion”

“How to Have a Rational Discussion”