Jonnan

Karma: 34

Jonnan 21 Apr 2011 23:53 UTC
3 points
on: Offense versus harm minimization
This is one of those philosophical arguments where the premise is so absurdist as to make it impossible to take seriously, but at the end of the day I’m far less inclined to kowtow to the British example than the Islam.

Restricting an image is, at it’s heart, restricting thought. Restricting nerve impulses and the way they interact with the brain. The Islam restriction is, to an extent, silly in this day and age—there are no pictures of Mohammed, therefore there can be no pictures of Mohammad; You can’t commit that ‘sin’ anymore than you can commit the sin of operating heavy machinery while deceased.

Unless I go to the trouble of labelling, you can’t even know I tried

O

/|\ <-- May or may not be Stick Man representation of Mohammad in XKCD

/ \

We obtain data from pictures, and the blow to nature photographers, is hardly the issue. Think about the problems regarding ecologists, wildlife preservationists, biologists, fisherman, et al.

As a matter which impinges upon no impulse to do so past contrarily labeling stickmen, of course I can politely consent not to draw Mohammed. Not photographing Salmon causes active harm.

Jonnan

Jonnan 21 Apr 2011 23:09 UTC
−4 points
on: Learned Blankness
A lot of the ‘learned blankness’ or black box problem (I prefer that) seems to me to be directly related to how afraid someone is of feeling (or worse, looking) stupid.

There are exceptions of course, but by and large the people that seem to hit that wall (or, at least have a higher than average number of those walls to hit) are people that were told over and over that they’re dumb, or that pursuing ‘X’ is dumb.

And—they become that, or at least an unreasonable facsimile thereof. Within the realm of their expertise it’s very obvious they’re highly intelligent, but they either assume they are just as much an authority in unrelated realms without actually educating themselves in that realm, or they get out of their comfort zone and they stop—two divergent attempts to attempt to avoid looking dumb.

I’m convinced the average IQ is actually 300+ and we simply evoke it more and more as we’re less and less afraid of feeling stupid.

Jonnan

Jonnan 11 Jul 2009 3:32 UTC
2 points
on: Not Technically Lying
The one thing that stands out for me in this is that it seems to go from the same “figures don’t lie but liars sure can figure” assumption that NTL is much easier fool people with than making stuff up.

But, in my experience, that’s not true. There are indicators when someone is NTL, versus actually being honest, just as I’ve noticed over the years that there are indications when a statistic is being taken out of context.

Most forms of deceit are either very short term, or fall quite rapidly to logic of the form “If this is true as it stands, what else would that imply?”

And maybe that’s my advantage—I’m not entirely sure I consider myself all that principled a person as such, I simply noticed at a very young age that deception doesn’t actually work all that well. Simpler to convince people you are right because you’re actually right and can tell people why.

Jonnan 30 Jun 2009 9:40 UTC
6 points
on: What’s In A Name?
But you’ve missed the most important point!

It means that the comic book tendency to get super-powers coincidentally related to your real name actually works!

Now if only I can figure out a superpower related to the name Jonnan, I can figure out what kind of radioactive bug to be bit by?

Jonnan

Jonnan 23 May 2009 3:53 UTC
0 points
in reply to: JGWeissman’s comment on: Catchy Fallacy Name Fallacy (and Supporting Disagreement)
I’m not entirely sure I understand your Correspondence Bias assertion, since I have made no actual assertions regarding whether the use of such vague definitions implied anything about someones personality. I certainly have my opinions on such, but they are irrelevant to the topic on hand.

That said—I’m not certain that what I title the Humpty Dumpty fallacy is a special case of Equivocation. Equivocation is typically defined as using two accurate definition as if they are interchangable, while Humpty Dumpty tends to use an inaccurate or vague definition as if it were perfectly interchangeable with the accurate and agreed upon definition.

They are obvious close relations, and I think there is a strong case to be made for it, but that is the difference between “Seems to Me” that such is the case and “Is” the case—I was merely putting it forward for consideration.

Please say Hi to Bizarro Jonnan for me, and tell him me hates him so much.

Thank—Jonnan

Jonnan 22 May 2009 23:00 UTC
0 points
on: Catchy Fallacy Name Fallacy (and Supporting Disagreement)
My personal definition for the general case of that is the ‘Humpty Dumpty Fallacy’ from Alice in Wonderland

‘And only ONE for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!’ I don’t know what you mean by “glory,”′ Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!”’ ‘But “glory” doesn’t mean “a nice knock-down argument,”’ Alice objected. ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’

Catchy Fallacy name fallacy seems to me to be a special case of that, which is in turn (to My mind) a special case of Equivocation (Using two different but accurate definitions as if they were identical). Except of course in Humpty Dumpty you’re using an inaccurate or vaguely defined definition, rather than an accurate one.

Just a thought—Jonnan

Edit: I once heard the same thought called, in quite formal tone, “The Spaniards Observation” in reference to The Princess Bride -

Inigo Montoya: “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.”

just so.

Jonnan 19 May 2009 3:00 UTC
0 points
on: Share Your Anti-Akrasia Tricks
I do not always agree with Kant, but his advice re (loose translation) “Act as if you were the leader of the world and everyone would copy their actions based on yours” has seemed to me to be good advice over the years.

Plus I get to pretend I run the world, instead of that cabal of unseen shadow-puppeteers secretly manipulating things from behind the scenes—I HATE them. HATE THEM HATE THEM HATE THEM . . . umm, have you read my resume yet?

Jonnan

Jonnan 15 May 2009 1:21 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Cameron_Taylor’s comment on: Hardened Problems Make Brittle Models
If Bayesian rational thought is not the best answer for questions such as “How long do you wait before giving up (on the flakey date)?”, then training oneself to think in those terms is training oneself to use a sub-optimal strategy for the real world.

The entire point, to me to using rational thought is because I believe rational thought is an optimal strategy. If it’s not, why would you do it?

I would prefer a parlor game for $10 any day - {G}

Jonnan

Jonnan 15 May 2009 0:22 UTC
1 point
in reply to: MichaelHoward’s comment on: Survey Results
Amusing article—I can’t quite get my mind around feeling that way abuoy quake, but I’ll cop to dreaming about Tetris when I was younger - .

Jonnane

Jonnan 14 May 2009 23:45 UTC
−10 points
on: A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies
Can I shoot them both for engaging in such an overextended and arbitrary metaphor?

Jonnan 5 May 2009 2:13 UTC
3 points
on: Allais Hack—Transform Your Decisions!
Looking at the original ‘Allais Paradox’ post—under what theorem is the reduction of uncertainty by 100% equivalent to the reduction of uncertainty by 1/67th?

It takes energy to plan ahead—the energy required to plan ahead with 100% certainty of outcome is considerably more than the energy required to plan ahead with 99% certainty. But there’s no such difference in energy consumption planning between the possibilities inherent in 67% and 66% - those are functionally equivalent.

So, um, why is this result even slightly surprising?

Edit: - Now, what would be interesting would be the question of the decisions made if the options are $24K with 94% probability to $27K with 93% probability, and variants thereof where the reduction in uncertainty exactly balances out the increase in value.

Jonnan 23 Apr 2009 21:14 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Jonnan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes—April 2009
Really? −4 for not liking a defense of marketing sophistry? One which literally noted “Advertise the color” as a positive virtue?

Sorry, if that’s not favoring the darkside, I’m not sure how you’re defining ‘darkside’, and karma around here is way too arbitrary - {G}. I will concede to a bias against marketing as a solution to anything—the marketing textbook I was subjected to in college was the most self-important ego-centric defense of a field I’ve ever seen - {G}.

Jonnan

Jonnan 23 Apr 2009 3:58 UTC
−3 points
in reply to: CronoDAS’s comment on: Rationality Quotes—April 2009
Don’t . . . get any of that on me please. Ick.

Jonnan 23 Apr 2009 3:20 UTC
13 points
on: Well-Kept Gardens Die By Pacifism
I think I fundamentally disagree with your premise. I concede, I have seen communities where this happened . . . but by and large, they have been the exception rather than the rule.

The fundamental standard I have seen in communities that survived such things, versus those that didn’t fall under two broad patterns.

A) Communities that survived were those where politeness was expected—a minimal standard that dropping below simply meant people had no desire to be seen with you.

B) Communities where the cultural context was that of (And I’ve never quite worded this correctly in my own mind) acknowledging that you were, in effect, not at home but at a friendly party at a friends house, and had no desire to embarrass yourself or your host by getting drunk and passing out on the porch - {G}.

Either of these attitude seems to be very nearly sufficient to prevent the entire issue (and seem to hasten recovery even on the occasion when it fails), combined they (in my experience) act as a near invulnerable bulwark against party crashers.

Now exactly how these attitudes are nurtured and maintained, I have never quite explained to my own satisfaction—it’s definitely an “I know it when I see it” phenomena, however unsatisfying that may be.

But given an expectation of politeness and a sense of being in a friendly venue, but one where there will be a group memory among people whose opinions have some meaning to you, the rest of this problem seems to be self-limiting.

Again, at least in my experience - {G}. Jonnan

Jonnan 23 Apr 2009 2:29 UTC
2 points
on: Escaping Your Past
This intuitively feels to me very similar to the questions I have about things like memory and the way people act when the situational context has been gamed to cause unethical behavior (see “The Lucifer Effect”).

One wants to believe that one’s personal memory is not only accurate, but indeed unbiased, but to what extent does the realization that it may not be actually help to mitigate the fact that it may not be? Does my awareness of things such as the Stanford Prison Experiment have any correlation with whether I will or will not be sucked into the group mindset under similar circumstances in reality?

Indeed, what would one do if the answer was “No”?

Jonnan

Jonnan 11 Apr 2009 2:42 UTC
0 points
in reply to: SoullessAutomaton’s comment on: Akrasia and Shangri-La
Nah—they’re cool

Jonnan 11 Apr 2009 2:18 UTC
1 point
in reply to: AlexU’s comment on: The Unfinished Mystery of the Shangri-La Diet
I can honestly say, I actually have healthy tastes—I actually like salad (I have a salad garden for exactly that reason), and do work on a small (3 acres) property when I’m not at my day job.

Although I do like most traditional deserts, they are not a typical portion of the meal, barring holidays. I do tend to eat ‘candy’ when it’s around . . . which is one reason I don’t keep it around.

So I sympathize entirely with the original poster when he says eating nothing but healthy foods doesn’t help. My ‘Vitamin Pill’ version of the Shangra-la diet lost me 30 pounds straight through the holidays when I was eating deserts . . . and stopped.

So there are definitely other factors that are being missed.

Jonnan

Jonnan 11 Apr 2009 2:04 UTC
0 points
on: The Unfinished Mystery of the Shangri-La Diet
What I find interesting is this matches, almost exactly, the 30 pounds I lost when I decided to consistently take a multi-vitamin with every meal on the theory that hunger was caused (at least at times) by vitamin deficiencies, and maybe making sure I was flush with vitamins would help.

Worked great for a month or so—I lost (and have kept off) 30 pounds (Unfortunately that means I’m down to 310). Then it just kinda stopped—I haven’t gone back up (indeed there have been moments when it acted like it might start going back down again, but so far I’m stuck in fluctuation mode).

But what it to me interesting is this is the second occasion that happened—the first time was four years ago when I started buying flavored carbonated waters, and drinking those on a regular basis—not fatty at all, and flavored (both in opposition to, arguably, the vitamins), but virtually identical results (I did regain that weight, but only at an identical rate to my previous weight gain.).

Maybe I can switch them out?

Jonnan

Jonnan 7 Apr 2009 4:02 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Cyan’s comment on: The Least Convenient Possible World
Not if omniscience is A) a necessary prerequisite to the existence of a deity, and B) by definition unverifiable to an entity that is not itself omniscient.

Without being omniscient myself, I can only adjudge the accuracy of Omega’s predictions based in the accuracy of it’s known predictions versus the accuracy of my own.

Unfortunately, the mere fact that I am not omniscient means I cannot, with 100% accuracy, know the accuracy of Omega’s decisions, because I am aware of the concepts of selection bias, and furthermore may not be capable of actually evaluating the accuracy of all Omega’s predictions.

I can take this further, but fundamentally, to be able to verify Omega’s omniscience, I actually have to be omniscient . Otherwise I can only adjudge that Omega’s ability to predict the future is greater, statistically, than my own, to some degree ‘x’, with a probable error on my part ‘y’, said error which may or may not place Omega’s accuracy equal to or greater than 100%.

Omega may in fact be omniscient, but that fact is itself unverifiable, and any philosophical problem that assumes A) I am rational, but not omniscient B) Omega is omniscient, and C) I accept B as true has a fundamental contradiction. By definition, I cannot be both rational and accept that Omega is Omniscient. At best I can only accept that Omega has, so far as I know, a flawless track record, because that is all I can observe.

Unfortunately, I think this seemingly small difference between “Omniscient” and “Has been correct to the limit of my ability to observe” makes a fairly massive difference in what the logical outcome of “Omega” style problems is.

Jonnan

Jonnan 1 Apr 2009 20:20 UTC
6 points
on: Money: The Unit of Caring
Umm—who are these people that would rather donate their time than their money?

I guess, I have never been one of those people—unless someone needs work in my realm of expertise (in my case, tweaking computers to do what you want it to do, fairly cheaply, or training people to use them), I don’t volunteer for very much at all.

I do love modern web banking—I can set my bank account to send $5 a month to my local NPR/PBS affiliate, 2nd week of the month, the Monday after my payday (So I can turn it off if I’m unexpectedly tight). The ACLU get it’s $5 on the 4th Monday, and if I’m doing well the EFF gets a donation on week 3. It’s been a bad year so I can’t honestly remember what I had toggled up for week one—it’s my weakest week financially (mortgage payment) so my lowest priority was there.

Giving money is great—let them hire who they need. If I show up at a soup kitchen, they needed a computer geek.

Jonnan