What I would want to experiment with is using prediction markets to “amplify” the judgement of well-known people with unusually good AGI Ruin models who are otherwise too busy to review thousands of mostly-terrible-by-their-lights proposals (e. g., Eliezer or John Wentworth). Fund the top N proposals the market expects the “amplified individual” to consider most promising, subject to their veto.
This would solve the bandwidth problem but doubles down on the correlation problem. if you peg the market to the approval of a few “amplified individuals”, you aren’t actually funding “alignment”, you are funding “simulations” of Eliezer/John. If their models have blind spots, the market will efficiently punish anyone trying to explore those blind spots.
This would solve the bandwidth problem but doubles down on the correlation problem. if you peg the market to the approval of a few “amplified individuals”, you aren’t actually funding “alignment”, you are funding “simulations” of Eliezer/John. If their models have blind spots, the market will efficiently punish anyone trying to explore those blind spots.