Yes but it’s also not rare for legal scholars to see “legislative intention” as nothing but a convenient fiction that courts employ to retain some semblance of objectivity. In principle, they could drop such language and refer directly to their interpretation of the statutory text, right? The intellectual labor involved is unchanged: each judge considers their community’s surrounding norms and common sense assumptions to understand what a law is “really” trying to do. Whether or not this interpretation is ascribed to authorial intention is basically superfluous.
Yes but it’s also not rare for legal scholars to see “legislative intention” as nothing but a convenient fiction that courts employ to retain some semblance of objectivity. In principle, they could drop such language and refer directly to their interpretation of the statutory text, right? The intellectual labor involved is unchanged: each judge considers their community’s surrounding norms and common sense assumptions to understand what a law is “really” trying to do. Whether or not this interpretation is ascribed to authorial intention is basically superfluous.