I don’t have the qualifications to reason about the internal mathematics of the paper.
However, I think that discounting non-person-affecting preferences does a lot of the moral heavy lifting to this argument.
If I’m understanding correctly, the logic in the paper is for this generation to risk the future of the species and of the earth, just so that we in particular might not meet death. I think most people do have real non-person-affecting preferences.
Does excluding non-person affecting preferences imply that a society of ten happy ageless people is many orders of magnitude more morally desirable than a society of ten happy people, which sustained itself through the regular patterns of reproduction and death?
I don’t have the qualifications to reason about the internal mathematics of the paper.
However, I think that discounting non-person-affecting preferences does a lot of the moral heavy lifting to this argument.
If I’m understanding correctly, the logic in the paper is for this generation to risk the future of the species and of the earth, just so that we in particular might not meet death. I think most people do have real non-person-affecting preferences.
Does excluding non-person affecting preferences imply that a society of ten happy ageless people is many orders of magnitude more morally desirable than a society of ten happy people, which sustained itself through the regular patterns of reproduction and death?