>It’s certainly not more moral (because the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus).
Not in the calculus as I run it. I consider a util to me, a util to Warren Buffett, and a util to an impoverished african farmer to be equivalent (insofar as interpersonal utility comparisons are possible etc. etc.). The only reason I consider a dollar donation to GiveDirectly>a dollar spent on ice cream>a dollar donation to Warren Buffett’s personal checking account is because “for a function to convert dollars to utils u($), u’($)>0, u″($)<0”.
>I believe the empirical evidence is that that argument is wrong, but it’s certainly not wrong in theory.
What empirical evidence? It’s a contrived thought experiment, not something I’m actually debating.
> the total value added is not relevant to the receivers, just to yourself, unless you use that extra value to trade or donate more.
Again, this is just plain wrong. Utilitarianism!=self-flagellation.
Some context. I do not, in fact, believe that Kaldor-Hicks efficent actions are inherently moral. But I do think that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a pretty good first-pass heuristic. This thought experiment was meant to set up a dilemma between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (which says to buy) and my moral intuitions (which says not to buy). The problem is that I can’t figure out exactly what my intuition is trying to tell me about what seems to be a fairly straightforward utility-maximizing transfer. For the purposes of this contrived thought experiment, suppose that the only decision is whether or not to buy from the commune. There isn’t an option to donate some or all of the money to GiveDirectly if I choose not to buy. Just buy a widget or buy $100 worth of ice cream.