Author of meaningness.com, vividness.live, and other things.
MIT AI PhD, successful biotech entrepreneur, and other things.
Author of meaningness.com, vividness.live, and other things.
MIT AI PhD, successful biotech entrepreneur, and other things.
Have you read Minsky’s _Society of Mind_? It is an AI-flavored psychological model of subagents that draws heavily on psychotherapeutic ideas. It seems quite similar in flavor to what you propose here. It inspired generations of students at the MIT AI Lab (although attempts to code it never worked out).
Quote from Richard Feynman explaining why there are no objects here.
I’ve begun a STEM-compatible attempt to explain a “no objectively-given objects” ontology in “Boundaries, objects, and connections.” That’s supposed to be the introduction to a book chapter that is extensively drafted but not yet polished enough to publish.
Really glad you are working on this also!
[FWOMP Summoned spirit appears in Kaj’s chalk octogram. Gouts of eldritch flame, etc. Spirit squints around at unfamiliar environment bemusedly. Takes off glasses, holds them up to the candlelight, grimaces, wipes glasses on clothing, replaces on nose. Grunts. Speaks:]
Buddhism is a diverse family of religions, with distinct conceptions of enlightenment. These seem to be quite different and contradictory.
According to one classification of disparate doctrines, Buddhism can be divided into Vajrayana (Tantra plus Dzogchen) and Sutrayana (everything else, except maybe Zen). In this classification, Sutrayana aims at “emptiness,” which is a generalization of the Three Marks, including anatman (non-self). The central method of Sutrayana is renunciation. Renunciation of the self is a major aspect. For Sutrayana, clear sustained perception of anatman (or emptiness more generally) is enlightenment, by definition.
For Buddhist Tantra, experience of emptiness is the “base” or starting point. That’s the sense in which “enlightenment is the prerequisite”—but it’s enlightenment as understood in Sutrayana. Whereas Sutrayana is the path from “form” (ordinary appearances) to emptiness, Tantra is the path from emptiness to the non-duality of emptiness and form. The aim is to perceive everything as both simultaneously. That non-dual vision is the definition of enlightenment within Tantra. The “duality” referred to here is the duality between emptiness and form, rather than the duality between self and other—which is what is overcome in Sutrayana. The non-dual vision that is the end-point of Tantra, is then the base or starting point for Dzogchen.
(Probably the best thing I’ve written about this is “Beyond Emptiness: Zen, Tantra, and Dzogchen.” It may not be very clear but I hope at least it is entertaining. “Sutra, Tantra, and the Modern Worldview” is less fun but more concrete.)
seeing that the self is an arbitrary construct which you don’t need to take too seriously, can enable you to play with it in a tantric fashion
Yes, this is a Vajrayana viewpoint. For Sutrayana, the self is non-existent, or at least “empty”; for Vajrayana, it is empty form. That is, “self” is a label applied to various phenomena, which overall are found to be insubstantial, transient, boundaryless, discontinuous, and ambiguous—and yet which exhibit heft, durability, continence, extension, and specificity. This mild paradox is quite amusing—a starting point for tantric play.
I’ll say a bit more about “self” in response to Sarah Constantin’s comment on this post.
A puzzling question is why your brain doesn’t get this right automatically. In particular, deciding whether to gather some food before sleeping is an issue mammals have faced in the EEA for millions of years.
Temporal difference learning seems so basic that brains ought to implement it reasonably accurately. Any idea why we might do the wrong thing in this case?
I would not say that selves don’t exist (although it’s possible that I have done so somewhere, sloppily).
Rather, that selves are both nebulous and patterned (“empty forms,” in Tantric terminology).
Probably the clearest summary of that I’ve written so far is “Selfness,” which is supposed to be the introduction to a chapter of the Meaningness book that does not yet otherwise exist.
Renouncing the self is characteristic of Sutrayana.
Regarding the development of agreeableness/empathy: there are meditation techniques specifically intended to do this. (They are variously called “Metta”, “Lojong”, “Tonglen”, or (yuck) “loving kindness meditation”; all of which are pretty similar.) These originate in Mahayana Buddhism, but don’t have any specifically religious content. They are often taught in conjunction with mindfulness meditation.
I don’t know whether there have been any serious studies on these methods, but anecdotally they are highly effective. They seem not only to develop empathy, but also personal happiness (although that is not a stated goal). Generally, the serious studies that have been done on different meditation techniques have found that they work as advertised...
Hmm… given that the previous several boxes have either paid $2 or done nothing, it seems like that primes the hypothesis that the next in the series also pays $2 or does nothing. (I’m not actually disagreeing, but doesn’t that argument seem reasonable?)
This is interesting—it seems like the project here would be to construct a universal, hierarchical ontology of every possible thing a device could do? This seems like a very big job… how would you know you hadn’t left out important possibilities? How would you go about assigning probabilities?
(The approach I have in mind is simpler...)
A collection of advice for graduate students I put together some time ago: http://www.cs.indiana.edu/mit.research.how.to.html
It was meant specifically for people at the MIT AI Lab, but much of it is applicable to other STEM fields.
Oh, goodness, interesting, you do think I’m evil!
I’m not sure whether to be flattered or upset or what. It’s kinda cool, anyway!
So, let me try again to explain why I think this is missing the point… I wrote “a single probability value fails to capture everything you know about an uncertain event.” Maybe “simple” would have been better than “single”?
The point is that you can’t solve this problem without somehow reasoning about probabilities of probabilities. You can solve it by reasoning about the expected value of different strategies. (I said so in the OP; I constructed the example to make this the obviously correct approach.) But those strategies contain reasoning about probabilities within them. So the “outer” probabilities (about strategies) are meta-probabilistic.
[Added:] Evidently, my OP was unclear and failed to communicate, since several people missed the same point in the same way. I’ll think about how to revise it to make it clearer.
A collection of collections of advice for graduate students! http://vlsicad.ucsd.edu/Research/Advice/
Well, the problem I was thinking of is “the universe is not a bit string.” And any unbiased representation we can make of the universe as a bit string is going to be extremely large—much too large to do even sane sorts of computation with, never mind Solomonoff.
Maybe that’s saying the same thing you did? I’m not sure...
Yes, I’m not at all committed to the metaprobability approach. In fact, I concocted the black box example specifically to show its limitations!
Solomonoff induction is extraordinarily unhelpful, I think… that it is uncomputable is only one reason.
I think there’s a fairly simple and straightforward strategy to address the black box problem, which has not been mentioned so far...
We could also try to summarize some features of such epistemic states by talking about the instability of estimates—the degree to which they are easily updated by knowledge of other events
Yes, this is Jaynes’ A_p approach.
this will be a derived feature of the probability distribution, rather than an ontologically extra feature of probability.
I’m not sure I follow this. There is no prior distribution for the per-coin payout probabilities that can accurately reflect all our knowledge.
I reject that this is a good reason for probability theorists to panic.
Yes, it’s clear from comments that my OP was somewhat misleading as to its purpose. Overall, the sequence intends to discuss cases of uncertainty in which probability theory is the wrong tool for the job, and what to do instead.
However, this particular article intended only to introduce the idea that one’s confidence in a probability estimate is independent from that estimate, and to develop the A_p (meta-probability) approach to expressing that confidence.
Yup, it’s definitely wrong! I was hoping no one would notice. I thought it would be a distraction to explain why the two are different (if that’s not obvious), and also I didn’t want to figure out exactly what the right math was to feed to my plotting package for this case. (Is the correct form of the curve for the p=0 case obvious to you? It wasn’t obvious to me, but this isn’t my area of expertise...)
Thanks, Jonathan, yes, that’s how I understand it.
Jaynes’ discussion motivates A_p as an efficiency hack that allows you to save memory by forgetting some details. That’s cool, although not the point I’m trying to make here.
Hi!
I’ve been interested in how to think well since early childhood. When I was about ten, I read a book about cybernetics. (This was in the Oligocene, when “cybernetics” had only recently gone extinct.) It gave simple introductions to probability theory, game theory, information theory, boolean switching logic, control theory, and neural networks. This was definitely the coolest stuff ever.
I went on to MIT, and got an undergraduate degree in math, specializing in mathematical logic and the theory of computation—fields that grew out of philosophical investigations of rationality.
Then I did a PhD at the MIT AI Lab, continuing my interest in what thinking is. My work there seems to have been turned into a surrealistic novel by Ken Wilber, a woo-ish pop philosopher. Along the way, I studied a variety of other fields that give diverse insights into thinking, ranging from developmental psychology to ethnomethodology to existential phenomenology.
I became aware of LW gradually over the past few years, mainly through mentions by people I follow on Twitter. As a lurker, there’s a lot about the LW community I’ve loved. On the other hand, I think some fundamental, generally-accepted ideas here are limited and misleading. I began considering writing about that recently, and posted some musings about whether and how it might be useful to address these misconceptions. (This was perhaps ruder than it ought to have been.) It prompted a reply post from Yvain, and much discussion on both his site and mine.
I followed that up with a more constructive post on aspects of how to think well that LW generally overlooks. In comments on that post, several frequent LW contributors encouraged me to re-post that material here. I may yet do that!
For now, though, I’ve started a sequence of LW articles on the difference between uncertainty and probability. Missing this distinction seems to underlie many of the ways I find LW thinking limited. Currently my outline for the sequence has seven articles, covering technical explanations of this difference, with various illustrations; the consequences of overlooking the distinction; and ways of dealing with uncertainty when probability theory is unhelpful.
(Kaj Sotala has suggested that I ask for upvotes on this self-introduction, so I can accumulate enough karma to move the articles from Discussion to Main. I wouldn’t have thought to ask that myself, but he seems to know what he’s doing here! :-)
O&BTW, I also write about contemporary trends in Buddhism, on several web sites, including a serial, philosophical, tantric Buddhist vampire romance novel.