I agree. “I worked really hard on it” is neither necessary nor sufficient for research quality. We already know that lots of careful-looking, labor-intensive, neatly written work can still be wrong or non-replicable. Meanwhile, some valuable insights emerge from relatively simple “aha” moments, and some deep ideas are developed more clearly outside the formal journal pipeline (ex: The Bitter Lesson).
Instead of reverting back to the old imperfect proof-of-work proxy for truth, we should try figuring out how to use these new AI tools to help assess research merit more efficiently.
Granted, some research work will require expensive experiments or other forms of “hard work”, in which case proof-of-work can still function as a useful initial filter.
I agree that Cognitive Security will be a major issue going forward, but I think it would be useful to decompose the problem into distinct branches. Information, attention, and moral/values manipulation are related, but not ultimately the same attack vector. They likely require different defensive strategies, and their relative threat levels may change differently over time as new capabilities emerge.
Here I argue that information manipulation may diminish as the dominant long-term attack vector as AI, data storage, sensors, and simulations improve, provided these capabilities remain broadly accessible and decentralized. Attention manipulation and moral/values manipulation seem more pernicious to me. We have limited time, attention, and compute for evaluating possible futures, while the relevant state space grows explosively with longer time horizons. And because morality remains an unsolved problem, there may be no simple analogue of “fact-checking” for these forms of influence.
Separate from governance and oversight, I think there may also be technical or infrastructural defenses worth considering. Information manipulation can, I think, be addressed largely by improving access to information and the tools for parsing it, while keeping these capabilities decentralized and broadly accessible. Attention manipulation and moral/values manipulation seem to require a different class of defenses (i.e., using AI against AI). This could include AI Debate or related methods that expose misleading reasoning and adversarial persuasion. Another direction would be to develop tools that can detect measurable persuasion or sycophancy cues and distinguish them from dialectical cues associated with non-manipulative truth-seeking.