carey

Karma: 9

carey 9 Nov 2012 2:09 UTC
0 points
on: Meetup : Melbourne social meetup
I am looking for rationalist pdfs, ebooks and audiobooks for an upcoming flight. If anyone can bring any of these this Friday, that will be appreciated. (I’ve finished reading the Sequences)

carey 21 Oct 2012 2:58 UTC
0 points
in reply to: gwern’s comment on: Open Thread, October 16-31, 2012
I mean I am interested in undergoing adaptation through sleep deprivation, then something like uberman then everyman.

It would not be viable for me to stay in a polyphasic schedule next year. Ultimately, I will have to return to something largely along the lines of segmented or monophasic. Still, I have heard that undergoing polyphasic-style adaptation can help you to become acclimatised to getting REM sleep in a 20-30 minute period, something I currently can’t do, but might be useful if I have a sleep debt or if I know I’m going to do an all-nighter etc.

So the idea is adapting to polyphasic then switching back to segmented or monophasic. Would I expect to nap better afterwards? Is this likely to be useful or worthwhile?

carey 21 Oct 2012 2:52 UTC
1 point
in reply to: RobertLumley’s comment on: October 2012 Media Thread
Great thread.

Separate movies from TV I think. I am trying to find movies for LW/THINK meetups and all I see is anime. Lots of appealing premises end up being of too short a length to be able to share in a meetup environment.

carey 20 Oct 2012 16:12 UTC
2 points
on: Open Thread, October 16-31, 2012
- Is it useful to learn to REM-nap even though I don’t plan to sleep polyphasically? Is it worth going through adaptation?
- where is a summary of the evidence for polyphasic sleeping, and likewise for paleo diets?
- do you think rationality is a more contagious idea than effective altruism?

carey 20 Oct 2012 10:00 UTC
3 points
on: Notes from Online Optimal Philanthropy Meetup: 12-10-09
When will there be another online optimal philanthropy meetup?

carey 16 Oct 2012 7:32 UTC
0 points
on: Fallacies as weak Bayesian evidence
Summary of this post: heuristics differ from biases in amount (of predictive power), not in kind.

Or perhaps they differ by some combination of predictive power, utility and directness of relation to their prediction (susceptibility to be screened off)

carey 14 Oct 2012 10:47 UTC
1 point
on: The Optimizer’s Curse and How to Beat It
Note Carl Shulman’s counterargument to the assumption of a normal prior here and the comments traded between Holden and Carl.

“If your prior was that charity cost-effectiveness levels were normally distributed, then no conceivable evidence could convince you that a charity could be 100x as good as the 90th percentile charity. The probability of systematic error or hoax would always be ludicrously larger than the chance of such an effective charity. One could not believe, even in hindsight, that paying for Norman Borlaug’s team to work on the Green Revolution, or administering smallpox vaccines (with all the knowledge of hindsight) actually did much more good than typical. The gains from resources like GiveWell would be small compared to acting like an index fund and distributing charitable dollars widely.”

carey 27 Sep 2012 6:47 UTC
2 points
in reply to: MixedNuts’s comment on: [study] Ego depletion might disappear with age
I think a more distinctly virtue ethicist way of putting it is that they don’t do slightly bad things because that would condition them to have bad dispositions, or to be bad people, something that is intrinsically disvaluable.

People who avoid doing slightly bad things to prevent instilling unhelpful habits, and to prevent themselves from bringing about future harm are (roughly) global utilitarians.

carey 25 Sep 2012 12:21 UTC
0 points
on: Meetup : Melbourne, practical rationality
This month’s meetups have been excellent. Look forward to seeing you all next Friday, and Matt, thanks for the venue.