calebo

• calebo 16 Sep 2019 16:05 UTC

  6 points

  in reply to: Rob Bensinger’s comment on: Real­ism and Rationality

  One thing I’m confused about this post is whether constructivism, subjectivism count as realisms. The cited realists (Enoch and Parfit) are substantive realists.

  I agree that substantive realists are a minority in the rationality community, but not that constructivists + subjectivists + substantive realists are a minority.

• calebo 29 Aug 2019 20:15 UTC

  3 points

  on: A Per­sonal Ra­tion­al­ity Wishlist

  Re Neuroticism.

  Let’s just consider emotions. A really simple model of emotions is that they’re useful bec they provide info and bec they have motivational power. Neurotic emotions are useful when they provide valuable info or motivate valuable actions.

  If you’re wondering whether a negative emotion is useful, check whether it’s providing valuable info or motivating useful action. I think internal family systems might be especially useful for this.

  Of course, sometimes you can get the valuable info or motivation w/​o experiencing a negative emotion (see replacing guilt).

  Many negative emotions are hypersensitive, which is why we see the trend towards limiting them. Ie. most often anxiety is not providing useful information or motivating useful action. The hypersensitivity would be justified if the costs of being wrong were super high, but for many of the things we experience anxiety about, this is no longer the case. That being so, I imagine for some people, negative emotions can play a useful role in some contexts, but one needs to be concrete here.

• calebo 11 Jun 2019 22:31 UTC

  3 points

  in reply to: Wei Dai’s comment on: Long Term Fu­ture Fund ap­pli­ca­tions open un­til June 28th

  Can you say more about what you mean by I. metaphilosophy in relation to AI safety? Thanks.

• calebo 11 Jun 2019 18:53 UTC

  3 points

  on: Long Term Fu­ture Fund ap­pli­ca­tions open un­til June 28th

  Have there been explicit requests for web apps that have may solve an operations bottleneck at x-risk organisations? Pointers towards potential projects would be appreciated.

  Lists of operations problems at x-risk orgs would also be useful.

• calebo 23 Jul 2019 20:53 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: Jay Molstad’s comment on: Learn­ing to Learn and Nav­i­gat­ing Moods

  I agree that the return to “learning to navigate moods” varies by person.

  It sounds to me, from your report, that you tend to be in moods conducive to learning. My sense is that there are many who are often in unproductive moods and many who aware that they spend too much time in unproductive moods. These people would find learning to navigate moods valuable.

• calebo 9 Aug 2020 22:48 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: TAG’s comment on: You See The Ter­ri­tory or Noth­ing at All

  There’s a sense in which debates over the concept “perception” are purely conceptual, but they’re not just a matter of using a different word. This is what I was getting at by cognitive qualia: conceptual debates can shape how you experience the world.

• calebo 29 Jul 2019 15:43 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Alexei’s comment on: What woo to read?

  Thanks!

• calebo 8 Jul 2019 16:36 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Rohin Shah’s comment on: Mus­ings on Cu­mu­la­tive Cul­tural Evolu­tion and AI

  Awesome, thanks for the super clean summary.

  I agree that the model doesn’t show that AI will need both asocial and social learning. Moreover, there is a core difference between the growth of the cost of brain size between humans and AI (sublinear [EDIT: super] vs linear). But in the world where AI dev faces hardware constraints, social learning will be much more useful. So AI dev could involve significant social learning as described in the post.

• calebo 8 Jul 2019 16:13 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: gwern’s comment on: Mus­ings on Cu­mu­la­tive Cul­tural Evolu­tion and AI

  Thanks, fixed.