More generally speaking: every way you can change a source program without changing the compiler output is a way it contains information that the machine code doesn’t. And compilers do a lot of non-injective transformations, that is, transformations which have same outputs for different inputs. Loop unrolling, replacing for with while (or vice versa), etc.
alexey
Karma: 126
The higher-level language contains things like “for loops,” which are much easier for a human to understand than an incomprehensible string of binary which you feed directly into a wire as changes in voltage, but I don’t think it contains any information that the machine code does not.
As trivial examples: comments, variable naming, etc. are information contained in HLL programs, but not in the corresponding machine code programs.
The other way around seems closer to right, but even there the compiler can provide additional information.
Do we know the tradition predates Christianity separating from Judaism? The particular story is later.
In fact, it seems at least possible (but I don’t know how plausible) that the causation is the other way around: the story is supposed to tell the readers that Rabbi Yeshua’s miracles don’t prove he’s right either.
I mostly agree, but it’s a double-digit percent increase in bankruptcies which ends up being (from the post)
about 4bps (0.04%)/year of additional bankruptcies
But, crucially, if one product is not available, then these people will very likely form an addiction to something else. That is what ‘addictive personality disorder’ means.
Except whatever they got addicted to before the legalization of online sports betting, it apparently led to much lower bankruptcy rates etc.
I feel that the discourse has quietly assumed a fabricated option: if these people can’t gamble then they will be happy unharmed non-addicts.
This post isn’t quietly assuming something: it’s loudly giving evidence that they will be much less harmed.
Do you expect anyone to answer “agree” to the starting question?
Bywayeans are pretty censorious and scrupulous about violations of the NAP
Except against people who enjoy sunsets, apparently?
He’d walk on over to nearby industry labs with candy and a sales pitch for why they should use his services. He primarily targeted top, Nobel-prize-winning research groups
and
Plasmidsaurus has historically done very little ‘traditional’ marketing — no brochures, few cold reach-outs
seem to be a bit contradictory?
If people followed Brennan’s advice, those ignorant of their lack of knowledge would keep voting, while well-educated people might think they’re not competent enough and abstain.
I’d add that people ignorant enough not to know or not to understand Brennan’s argument would also keep voting.
Was this post significantly edited? Because this seems to be exactly the take in the post from the start:
because he thought it wasn’t bad enough to be considered torture. Then he had it tried on himself, and changed his mind, coming to believe it is torture and should not be performed.
to the end
This is supported by Malcom’s claim that Hitchens was “a proponent of torture”, which is clearly false going by Christopher’s public articles on the subject. The question is only over whether Hitchens considered waterboarding to be a form of torture, and therefore permissible or not, which Malcolm seems to have not understood.
It’s absurd to end up with a framework that believes a life for a woman in Saudi Arabia is just as good as life for a woman in some other country with similarly high per capita income.
You could similarly argue a life for a woman in Saudi Arabia is worse than for a man, but it seems absurd to conclude from that that saving lives of SA men is better than saving lives of SA women.
Whether you save a life in Congo, Sri Lanka or Australia, I can’t think of strong reasons for why #2 would vary all that much.
It seems to me there are obvious differences: 1. family size (in the limit, the saved person may have no family at all); 2. how expected the person’s death is otherwise.
But you aren’t asked about (your current estimate of your prior). If you want to put it in this way, it would be , your current estimate of your previous estimate. And you do have exact knowledge what that estimate was.
Here is a counter-argument against Rovelli I found reasonable: Aristotle and Falling Objects | Diagonal Argument
so the maximum “downside” would be the sum of the differences between that reference populations lives and those without the variant for all variants you edit (plus any effects from off-targets)
I don’t think that’s true? It has to assume the variants don’t interact with each other. Your reference population would only have 0.01% people with (the rarest) 2 variants at once, 0.0001% with 3 variants, and so on.
Yes, but this exact case is when you say “This would be useful for trying out different variations on a phrase to see what those small variations change about the implied meaning” and when it can be particularly misleading because the LLM is contrasting with the previous version which the humans reading/hearing the final version don’t know about.
So it would be more useful for that purpose to use a new chat.
But the screenshot says “if i instead say the words...”. This seems like it has to be in the same chat with the “matters” version.
but speak only the truth to other Parselmouths and (by implication) speak only truth to Quakers.
I would merely like to note that the implication seems contrary to the source of the name: I expect Quirrell and most historical Parselmouths in HPMOR would very much lie to Quakers (Quirrell would maybe derive some entertainment from not saying factually false things while misleading them).
Or to put it another way: in the full post you say
There is some evidence he has higher-than-normal narcissistic traits, and there’s a positive correlation between narcissistic traits and DAE. I think there is more evidence of him having DAE than there is of him having narcissistic traits
but to me it looks like you could have equally replaced DAE with “narcissistic traits” in Theories B and C, and provided the same list of evidence.
(1) Convicted criminals are more likely to have narcissistic traits.
(2) “extreme disregard for protecting his customers” is also evidence for narcissistic traits.
Etc. And then you could repeat the exercise with “sociopathy” and so on.
So there are two possibilities, as far as I can see:
One or more things on the list are in fact not evidence for narcissistic traits.
They are stronger evidence for DAE than for narcissistic traits.
But it isn’t clear which you believe and about what parts of the list in particular. (Of course, with the exception of (4) and (11), but they go in the opposite directions.)
Yes, it’s evidence. My question is how strong or weak this evidence is (and my expectation is that it’s weak). Your comparison relies on “wet grass is typically substantial evidence for rain”.
But the base model already has to predict non-well-written fiction, because there is plenty of non-well-written fiction in the training data, no?
Do we have any data showing if base models do better or worse at predicting fiction compared to non-fictional texts? I’d naively expect bad fiction to be easier to predict than good fiction, as well.