but speak only the truth to other Parselmouths and (by implication) speak only truth to Quakers.
I would merely like to note that the implication seems contrary to the source of the name: I expect Quirrell and most historical Parselmouths in HPMOR would very much lie to Quakers (Quirrell would maybe derive some entertainment from not saying factually false things while misleading them).
That is a worthwhile note, and I would think about these roles differently based on which definition is in use.
If I was transported to a world where everyone is a Quaker I like to think I’d rapidly (though not immediately) switch to being basically pure Quaker. There might well be other kinds of Parselmouths that would lie as long as they were sure enough in not getting caught. Certainly norms like “you can lie to outsiders but never to your in-group” have existed, from organized crime to ethnic or religious bonds to children’s conspiracies to hide who broke a vase. That might be closer to the examples in the linked post and in HPMOR.
Maybe it’s worth coining terms to distinguish those. I make a genuine effort not to lie or mislead other rationalists. I don’t feel bound to speak truth to panhandlers.
As for the distinction between factually false and misleading, man, I have such profound cynicism and despair around accurate communication that someone could hide a small moon in the latitude I often have around misleading. Give me an intent-reading machine and that would change. I have written technical documentation professionally before and the experience of having your instructions called confusing because someone wasn’t sure if when you said “the right mouse button” you meant their right or the computer’s right is the kind of thing that sticks with you.
I would merely like to note that the implication seems contrary to the source of the name: I expect Quirrell and most historical Parselmouths in HPMOR would very much lie to Quakers (Quirrell would maybe derive some entertainment from not saying factually false things while misleading them).
That is a worthwhile note, and I would think about these roles differently based on which definition is in use.
If I was transported to a world where everyone is a Quaker I like to think I’d rapidly (though not immediately) switch to being basically pure Quaker. There might well be other kinds of Parselmouths that would lie as long as they were sure enough in not getting caught. Certainly norms like “you can lie to outsiders but never to your in-group” have existed, from organized crime to ethnic or religious bonds to children’s conspiracies to hide who broke a vase. That might be closer to the examples in the linked post and in HPMOR.
Maybe it’s worth coining terms to distinguish those. I make a genuine effort not to lie or mislead other rationalists. I don’t feel bound to speak truth to panhandlers.
As for the distinction between factually false and misleading, man, I have such profound cynicism and despair around accurate communication that someone could hide a small moon in the latitude I often have around misleading. Give me an intent-reading machine and that would change. I have written technical documentation professionally before and the experience of having your instructions called confusing because someone wasn’t sure if when you said “the right mouse button” you meant their right or the computer’s right is the kind of thing that sticks with you.