It’s bs to die.
albeola
Karma: 172
The “FAR” keeps pushing me into far mode and then the red color keeps pulling me back into near mode. It’s like a Stroop task!
Apologies — I should have taken reinforcement into account and noted that the new algorithm is probably still a lot better than the previous one.
Ironically, it appears the new algorithm is frequentist.
I see it as being like the Chuck Berry scene in Back to the Future.
Beck is a Mormon, and Mormons generally seem a lot friendlier to transhumanist-type ideas than standard Christians.
Sure, I don’t see anything here to disagree with.
The problem of locating “the subjective you” seems to me to have two parts: first, to locate a world, and second, to locate an observer in that world. For the first part, see the grandparent; the second part seems to me to be the same across interpretations.
The original justification for the Kelly criterion isn’t that it maximizes a utility function that’s logarithmic in wealth, but that it provides a strategy that, in the infinite limit, does better than any other strategy with probability 1. This doesn’t mean that it maximizes expected utility (as your examples for linear utility show), but it’s not obvious to me that the attractiveness of this property comes mainly from assigning infinite negative value to zero wealth, or that using the Kelly criterion is a similar error to the one Weitzman made.
if you are seeking lowest complexity description of your input, your theory needs to also locate yourself within what ever stuff it generates somehow (hence appropriate discount for something really huge like MWI)
It seems to me that such a discount exists in all interpretations (at least those that don’t successfully predict measurement outcomes beyond predicting their QM probability distributions). In Copenhagen, locating yourself corresponds to specifying random outcomes for all collapse events. In hidden variables theories, locating yourself corresponds to picking arbitrary boundary conditions for the hidden variables. Since MWI doesn’t need to specify the mechanism for the collapse or hidden variables, it’s still strictly simpler.
There’s a difference between thinking as if dimensions are linked together, and thinking as if there’s “some cosmic niceness built into the universe that makes everything improve monotonically along every dimension at once” (emphasis mine). Switching between attacking moderate and extreme versions of the same claim is classic logical rudeness.
But there isn’t some cosmic niceness built into the universe that makes everything improve monotonically along every dimension at once.
Who believes this?
Is any of it transmissible? If not, is the reason why it isn’t transmissible transmissible? Do your reasons carry over to other people’s situations?
The commonly accepted view is that women and men are equally good at math on average
Some googling informs me that there’s a gender gap on the math SAT and other standardized tests. It may be that you have in mind some way in which these tests don’t reflect a real gap in average math ability, but I think it’s more likely that you confused the data on math ability and the data on IQ. A .3 standard deviation gap would mean 62% of women are below the male average. I agree that this makes “most women are bad at math” an exaggeration, though more male spread means the numbers look worse the higher you set the bar.
I guess I’m hereby tapping out of the discussion.
OK, so compare “BLUE-CAR person” with “CLOWN-car person”. They still seem different to me. (I didn’t downvote, though I wouldn’t blame people if they downvoted this entire sub-conversation for pedantry.)
There are some corpses in the street. Some people are proposing to bury them, because they’ll rot and cause diseases. Others are proposing to leave them there, because haha, corpses. In this situation, you may prefer cryopreservation to burial and at the same time prefer burial to non-burial, because cryo probably won’t happen. (Maybe this is an insane alien hypothetical world where cryo is just really unpopular.) If you’re facing a “bury yes or no” button, it may well be rational to push yes. This is true even though the probability of cryopreservation depends on your preferences. Now substitute bad commenters for corpses, banning for burial, and sidebar change for cryo. I’m not saying the parameter values are the same, but do you agree with the qualitative point?
Preferring sidebar change to banning does not imply preferring no banning to banning given actual probability of sidebar change. Do you agree?
There’s already the option of doing this through alternate accounts.